Not criticizing or US bashing… just curious to know why the US never allows for US troops to be under a foreign overall command when deployed abroad. Even when the number sent isnt that big.
Even during WWII they were reluctant to have British Generals in command of US GI’s.
I can understand of course when the US troop number surpasses other nations troops… but why this limitation in other scenarios ? What set this precendent ? When did it start ?
It’s not that we don’t allow US troops under foreign command, it’s just that we think our commanders are better.
WWI there was a feeling of inferiority that made the US government and commanders want to put up a good showing the first time. The US military had not yet been tested in a European war, so there was some question as to how the yanks would perform in a “real” war. (Prejudices of the time did not allow for chasing the Spanish off Pacific Islands, appropriating half a continent or chasing Pancho Villa around the desert as real tests of a military.)
America raised the troops, shipped them over, but General Pershing was unwilling to let them be parceled out to French and British units. He felt they would be misused or underappreciated. He wanted to prove that American troops could fight under American leadership.
I believe some units were lent out, and I think the Marines got engaged before Pershing felt the Army was ready, but for the most part, he held back the American troops until they were a useful force.
IMHO, that established the precedent, and in WWII, we had plenty of Generals and no desire to lend the tropps to the French or the British.
Now, I think the reluctance is based on the fact that we fight wars better than the other guys, so we should lead the wars.
Besides, if you’re from the same country as the guy picking cannon fodder, it’s not so likely that you will be cannon fodder.
Its known as cohesion. Cohesion results when units and commanders mesh as one fighting force. In today’s battlefield where death can come from 1,000 of miles away it is important to know where all your “pieces” are so that you don’t have cases of fratricide. It still happens but to mix and mingle troops of different nationalities would be begging for it to happen on a much larger scale.
Over time when a unit is in battle and its morale is tested it either becomes a better fighting force or a list of casualties. If it was broken up and mixed into other units the new transfers and the units they transfer to would lose something only battle training provides.
leenmi has a point here too.
“Besides, if you’re from the same country as the guy picking cannon fodder, it’s not so likely that you will be cannon fodder.”
Wars are not fought with great homogenized armies but with individual units executing many small tasks at the same time. So to just throw soldiers into units which they are not trained to work with is tanatmount to making them cannon fodder.
I think U.S. officers are usually in command because U.S. troops are usually the largest portion - if not the majority - of any mixed force. It was certainly that way in the European campaign.
Besides, weren’t U.S. troops under Montgomery’s command during Market Garden?
“Why won’t you lend me your Cadillac? I lent you my Kia Sephia last week!”
Montgomery was the overall commander in Market Garden but the units themselves performed in their respective areas as individual commands. Once the airborne troops hit the ground they were cut off until Monty’s XXX corp could break through with the armor. Since this was also Monty’s plan it was decided that the british 1st Airborne would take the farthest bridge since it was going to be the most difficult to take and hold until XXX corp arrived.
So eventhough American troops participated in this operation it still relied on the success of British armor comming to the aid of British Paras. Unfortunately, British intelligence failed to notice the 2 German SS Panzer Corps holding the bridge at Arnhem. This failure cost the Brits about 7,000 casualties and POWs out of 10,000 Paras that went in (a 70% casualty rate!).
Were not American troops under the command of Marshall Foch during the final compaigns of WW!?
Montgomery was land forces commander at Normandy until Eisenhower took control on September 1, 1944 at which point Monty became commander of 21st Army Group. Until then, the chain of command of US forces in Normandy went through Montgomery. During the Ardennes campaign in ‘44/45 the US 9th Army was detached from the US 12th Army Group and placed under command of Montgomery’s 21st Army Group. During the Italian and Sicilian campaign, overall control of Allied forces went through Alexander, first as the commander in chief in Italy and later as the Supreme Commander of Allied forces in the Mediterranean.
I’d say since World War II, it’s been partially a fear of a harder public sell of explaining casualties due to someone else’s mistakes rather than a US commanders, as well as a desire to have greater control over the situation if its been decided that it is worth risking US lives on it. However, even since World War II the US has been somewhat willing to place its troops under foreign command. One need only look at NATO.
NATO has yet to be really tested IIRC.
True in NATO you do have nominal command of US troops by a overall NATO commander that sometimes is not american… but then NATO hasnt gone into action.
From what I understand the border with the Warsaw Pact was divided by areas… each sector was defended by a specific country and therefore in a Cold War going Hot War the US troops would have been under an american effectively.
Weren’t Bosnia and Afghanistan NATO operations?
Don’t forget that post WWII every serious fight the US has been involved in has been overwhelmingly composed of US troops (where a mix of other troops could be found). The biggest mix of US troops with non-US troops was probably Desert Storm I and the US still hugely outnumbered everyone else (about 75% of the 660,000 troops at the first go around). The other 25% was distributed (unevenly) among 34 other countries. Technically Desert Storm II had a multi-national contingent but it is token at best and the US is far and away the majority of the troops.
In instances like these I don’t see how anyone could expect it to not be US commanders in charge. If the US participated in a war between Brazil and Colombia and lent, say, 5,000 troops to Brazil’s 100,000 you can bet Brazil would see to it that Brazilian commanders were in charge.
Nope Fang. Sorry to say that neither were.
Not necessarily. Most of this is IIRC from back in the 80s and very early 90s when I paid attention to it. Norway was to be reinforced with a Marine division and the 10th Mountain division, which would have fallen under a Norwegian command at some point in the chain. A National Guard light infantry division was slated to deploy in Northern Army Group’s sector in northern Germany/Denmark and would have fallen under NORTHAG’s command, which rotates between British and German generals. The US provided (provides?) elements to the Allied Command Europe mobile force, a roughly brigade sized force deployable by air anywhere from Norway to Turkey. One of the deployment options for III Corps was as a NATO strategic reserve, allowing it to fall under NOTHAG’s command if need be. The US still provides ships to the Standing Naval Force Atlantic and Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, which operates under rotating command amongst all those providing ships. The US also provides forces for the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, who’s current commander is British.
On preview: Bosnia is currently a NATO mission, with US forces under NATO command: NATO Stabilization Force. The Kosovo related bombing was also a NATO operation. NATO has also taken responsibility for some forces sent to Afghanistan and Iraq.
Should a distinction be made between overall, grand strategic command and tactical command? Where in that ladder between those two would you expect to see non-US command and US command? I’m no expert but I’d wager on the tactical level groupings of troops are kept ‘pure’ with a given nationality. The chance of miscommunication and simply not knowing the troops wouls likely spell disaster if you mixed and matched troops between nationalities. Only on the grand strategic level might you see one overall commander from a single country. However, even in WWII could Eisenhower be said to have been the Grand Poobah of ALL allied forces? I think not…certainly not inclusing the Russians and I wonder that he had absolute sway over British and French forces (or Canadian and Australian). It was always my sense that at the very very highest levels politicians (Roosevelt and Churchill) worked for consensus and dictated to the various commanders the broad strokes. The various high commanders had to find a way to work with each other (one reason why Patton was passed over in favor of Bradley who was mroe conciliatory…or at least somewhat politically adept).
Am I wrong on that? Was Eisenhower the final word that ALL allies abided by?
I do believe that there were British officers in charge of several divisions of US troops. I’m not sure of this though, but I do remember reading about some US troops complaining they were under British control.
My simplest answer is that they are our troops, we pay them, we pay for their weapons, and we design the war plans, so I think it would only be right for US troops to be under US control. It’s just a choice IMO.
Let’s put it another way. As far back as the American Revolution, foreign officers working with the rebels/patriots (depending on your side) felt it necessary to remark on how self-willed, contrary, perverse, and ornery Yank troops were. Maybe the only ones who can be sure to ride herd on these heathens is another Yank.
I think you raise a very valid point that hasn’t been sufficiently addressed. Eisenhower was no more the final word on Allied strategy than Montgomery was the final word on the direction of the Normandy campaign when he was officially in charge by virtue of his title. Political pressure existing through the separate chain of command at national levels will always have some sway, as will military necessity. To use a couple of examples that have been raised, Eisenhower was personally in favor of a ‘broad front’ strategy against Germany in WWII, but gave into Operation Market-Garden which his subordinate Montgomery wanted to carry out. Even during this operation, the US airborne divisions involved ran through British General Browning’s First Allied Airborne Army, whose headquarters dropped at Nijmegen. When the US 9th Army went under British operational control as part of 21st Army Group during the Ardennes offensive (Battle of the Bulge), it was because the wedge the Germans were driving was separating the 9th Army from its parent unit, the 12th (US) Army Group. To give a good example of a US general who choose personal glory over all else, General Mark Clark (who, IM not so HO was one of the worst general the US has produced in recent history) during Operation Diadem in Italy in the summer of ’44 sent his forces against Rome in order to be the first there rather than sticking to the plan to encircle and destroy German forces, disobeying the direction of his British commander General Alexander.
In addition to Montgomery and to Alexander’s overall command of the Italian campaign, both British and U.S., already mentioned, we should note Wavell’s command of ABDA forces, including U.S., during early 1942.
In Korea and Vietnam, U.S. forces were the largest share of a multinational force, and were accordingly commanded by U.S. generals.
American forces served under British command in WW2 on numerous occasions. Its always a political topic but the traditional rule in alliances is the nation that provides the most troops in a campaign also provides the commander. In this light its not unusual for the US to want to retain control in Iraq but in the circumstances its counter-productive in my opinion and just reinforces the impression of imperialism.