Wishful thinking and the Science of Religion

[SentientMeat]

Hi you lot, it’s nice to be back, if only briefly.

I’ve recently reread a couple of excellent books by two of my favourite writers, Profs. Dawkins & Dennett: The God Delusion and Breaking the Spell. I’ve also had a look at a few recent religion-based threads here, such as this one. So I’d like to debate two points from the books in a manner that is in keeping with what’s found here.

I recommend both books for anyone, especially theists. I’ve also read critiques of both, but in almost every case the main thrust of the criticism is that they take aim at the too-easy targets of mainstream American Christianity and Middle Eastern Islam rather than the more enlightened strains of theism/deism/Love-ism or whatnot which reasonable and erudite Dopers here might favour. The fact that these criticisms were pre-emptively addressed in the first few pages of each book make me strongly question whether such critics even read them properly. In fact, there’s very little in Dawkins and literally nothing in Dennett which I think a reasonable theist would find objectionable. The reasonable theist’s opponent is not the atheist but the unreasonable theist.

So, the two points therein which I thought I’d raise here.
[ul][li]Religion, both in its claims and in its phenomenology, is a legitimate subject for scientific study. [/li]The fact of the matter of whether there is a presence or absence of a divine personality or an afterlife is of utmost scientific importance in our quest to understand our predicament. If some people actually experience a god or gods directly (rather than merely a natural neurophysical episode which they attribute to such), or if some people actually wake up after their physical death, then these are revolutionary data points which must be accommodated into our investigations. That they seem to be difficult subjects for experimental study (especially if said entities remain as coy as currently) is irrelevant: an extant god or afterlife would make the universe a scientifically different place, and radically so. Even if both were somehow “outside” the physical universe, the interface between the two would be accessible to science. I always had reservations about SJ Gould’s “non-overlapping magisteria” spiel, and now reject it completely.

[li]Believing something because it makes you happy makes it no more likely whatsoever that what you believe is actually true: That is the very definition of wishful thinking.[/li]
This may sound unnecessarily harsh, but I would hope that any friend of mine who considered that I was falling prey to such a mindset with regards to, say, the String Theory Landscape or the Computational Theory of Mind, would point this out to me just as succinctly. We may ask ourselves “What needs to be explained?” and posit supernatural explanations when natural ones fail – put gods in gaps, so to speak – but simply positing gods and afterlives because their absence would depress us in some way surely makes them, if anything, less likely to exist in actuality, when one looks at the situation with as much cold scientific objectivity as one can muster. And, most importantly here, divine experiences (or “everyday” experiences of the divine, perhaps) are themselves things to be explained. We may choose a natural, neuroscientific explanation or a supernatural explanation for these experiences based on the evidence, but to choose the latter for happiness’ sake is to favour the reward centres of the brain over its logical processing: To literally think wishfully.
[/ul]

There might be gods and afterlives. If so, I am to some extent suffering a delusion in thinking that the universe is solely natural, and that natural explanations can and will account for everything which needs explaining. If not, those who believe in them are likewise deluded. But the question is a scientific one, and we can and should approach it as such. And what we would like to the case has precisely zero bearing on what is the case, any more than the fervour of a sports fan watching his beloved team on TV actually affects the final result.

[begbert2]

Religion’s claims and phenomenonology are a valid course of study; and in the course of that study, the evidence so far available has been examined and found wanting. Especially once one realizes that the various goddish-feelings found in people the world over do not limit themselves to the support of any particular god, and thus they’re not valid evidence for any god at all. So, when new evidence emerges, the study can resume, at least long enough to examine that evidence too. In the meantime the game is called on account of a shortage of playing equipment.

And I wouldn’t call believing in an absence of gods when there is in fact one, if no good evidence exists for that god, delusion - I’d call that being innocently incorrect due to lack of information. Disbelieving in something for which you have been shown ample evidence, such as the fact of evolution or the fact that our brains house our minds, now; that sort of willful disbelief, that’s delusion.

[Thudlow_Boink]

If you’ve been on hiatus for a while, you probably missed the big-ass thread discussing The God Delusion from a few months ago.

[mswas]

1. Just because something causes a neurologically measurable response does not make it invalid as a religious experience. This is the main barrier to studying transcendent experience scientifically. The implicit bias that a measurable response invalidates the experience. Until that dogma is shed, it can’t be studied. Which is unfortunate because there is validity in scientific study. The problem is that from a western perspective we separate material and spiritual as though they don’t interact with each other. Eastern methods of describing such experiences do not call for such a strict compartmentalization.

2. The devoutly religious would agree with this wholeheartedly. Oftentimes religious belief can be a source of suffering. Christianity is not meant to bring one happiness but purpose.

[Voyager]

@mswas

1. Just because something causes a neurologically measurable response does not make it invalid as a religious experience. This is the main barrier to studying transcendent experience scientifically. The implicit bias that a measurable response invalidates the experience. Until that dogma is shed, it can’t be studied. Which is unfortunate because there is validity in scientific study. The problem is that from a western perspective we separate material and spiritual as though they don’t interact with each other. Eastern methods of describing such experiences do not call for such a strict compartmentalization.

If you are responding to SMs first bullet, I think you missed the point. If you define religious experience as the internal reaction, then measuring it validates it, not invalidates it. If you define it as some kind of contact with god or other supernatural entities, measuring the response does not prove or disprove a supernatural involvement. The best you can do is to say that there is an explanation that does not require the supernatural, but this does not prove that the supernatural is not involved.

But I think the point was that most religions make specific claims about the interaction of the supernatural with the natural world, and this can be examined. If the religion claims that the deity answers prayers and makes people better, that we can measure.

2. The devoutly religious would agree with this wholeheartedly. Oftentimes religious belief can be a source of suffering. Christianity is not meant to bring one happiness but purpose.

I think his statement works just as well for things that make you unhappy, or thoughtful, or whatever. Measurable internal states that are commonly associated with the supernatural do not have to be unless you can prove they are obtainable in no other way. One might be full of the spirt of the lord - but it might be just gas.

[Revenant_Threshold]

@mswas

1. Just because something causes a neurologically measurable response does not make it invalid as a religious experience. This is the main barrier to studying transcendent experience scientifically. The implicit bias that a measurable response invalidates the experience. Until that dogma is shed, it can’t be studied. Which is unfortunate because there is validity in scientific study. The problem is that from a western perspective we separate material and spiritual as though they don’t interact with each other. Eastern methods of describing such experiences do not call for such a strict compartmentalization.

Why would an ability to measure it make it invalid in religious terms? I don’t think that’s being claimed, or that it’s an existing bias - “Ah, we can measure that, so it’s just a process of the brain and nothing more”. A more detailed understanding of the processing of religious feelings only helps us to understand the process; we’re not really any further in saying they’re from a god or that they’re entirely self-produced or the like.

2. The devoutly religious would agree with this wholeheartedly. Oftentimes religious belief can be a source of suffering. Christianity is not meant to bring one happiness but purpose.

I think SM’s point works just as well for any feelings that the person in question believes is right (not necessarily that they enjoy). Believing in something because it makes you happy, gives you purpose or meaning, allows you a sense of security, or of justice, or mercy, is wishful thinking. It’s not a real argument for something, it’s just saying it would be nice were it so.

[SentientMeat]

@begbert

Religion’s claims and phenomenonology are a valid course of study; and in the course of that study, the evidence so far available has been examined and found wanting.

This, I feel, is a common but unfair characterisation. Many theists set forth gods as explanations for things they observe and experience. To them, the fine-tuning of the universe (and the fact that it exists at all), the origin of life (if not the subsequent evolution), the mystery of consciousness, and especially divine experiences themselves are evidence. And I have no problem with them calling it so – in fact, it makes the whole debate easier. Like a court of law, both sides present their evidence without any assumption that one side’s evidence is inadmissable a priori.

And I wouldn’t call believing in an absence of gods when there is in fact one, if no good evidence exists for that god, delusion - I’d call that being innocently incorrect due to lack of information.

Well, innocently deluded then. Again, I’m trying to level the playing field in terms of finding out, somehow (even if you have to die or live for centuries more to do so) that you’re actually wrong.

@Thudlow Boink

If you’ve been on hiatus for a while, you probably missed the big-ass thread discussing The God Delusion from a few months ago.

Thanks TB – it’s an interesting thread, but it’s more of a review than the debate I intended. (In fact, I think a debate cannot generally handle more than 3 opening points without bifurcating uncontrollably, so I’d prefer to just stick to these two. Have you read Dennett, by the way?)

@mswas

1. Just because something causes a neurologically measurable response does not make it invalid as a religious experience. This is the main barrier to studying transcendent experience scientifically. The implicit bias that a measurable response invalidates the experience. Until that dogma is shed, it can’t be studied. Which is unfortunate because there is validity in scientific study. The problem is that from a western perspective we separate material and spiritual as though they don’t interact with each other. Eastern methods of describing such experiences do not call for such a strict compartmentalization.

Even if neuroscience were to explain divine experience solely naturally (and it’s not far off, IMO), that would still not make such experiences invalid. (Who says so, by the way? Sounds somewhat strawman-y to me) It would merely show that no supernatural cause or source is necessary, just as no such entity is necessary for evolution, lightning bolts, planetary motion or whatever else people used to attribute to the supernatural.

2. The devoutly religious would agree with this wholeheartedly. Oftentimes religious belief can be a source of suffering. Christianity is not meant to bring one happiness but purpose.

Well, OK, believing something because it causes positive feelings makes it no more likely that what you believe is actually true, then. The point is that the feelings it brings about are irrelevant to assessing the actual truth of one’s belief, such that answering the question “Why do you consider that gods and afterlives are more likely than not?” with “Because it brings me purpose” is a subtle but widespread non sequitur.

[mswas]

@Voyager

If you are responding to SMs first bullet, I think you missed the point. If you define religious experience as the internal reaction, then measuring it validates it, not invalidates it. If you define it as some kind of contact with god or other supernatural entities, measuring the response does not prove or disprove a supernatural involvement. The best you can do is to say that there is an explanation that does not require the supernatural, but this does not prove that the supernatural is not involved.

I was responding to the bit about:

(rather than merely a natural neurophysical episode which they attribute to such)

Why is say an acid trip, or a sudden release of a higher dosage of Di-Methyl Tryptamine or a surge in electrical traffic across the Corpus Collosum not a valid religious experience? Why make the caveat ‘merely an natural neurophysical episode’? How does one tell if one neurological event is ‘merely natural’ vs another one that is supernatural in origin, when to the person reading the EEG it looks pretty much the same?

But I think the point was that most religions make specific claims about the interaction of the supernatural with the natural world, and this can be examined. If the religion claims that the deity answers prayers and makes people better, that we can measure.

Certainly. Though, Acupuncture in terms of case studies can show individuals getting better, yet in various threads you’d ascribe that to a placebo effect. The anecdotal evidence of billions of people who will swear that Acupuncture has made them better is not enough. Even if you can show the case study that shows people getting better. Corrolation is not causation, but there seems to be a bias toward the idea that corrolation is irrelevant.

I think his statement works just as well for things that make you unhappy, or thoughtful, or whatever. Measurable internal states that are commonly associated with the supernatural do not have to be unless you can prove they are obtainable in no other way. One might be full of the spirt of the lord - but it might be just gas.

That is not necessarily true, because the way you are measuring it is from external objective events. Just because Dopamine is released because I ate something that causes it to be released or because an angel came down and caused it to be released doesn’t cause the relationship to be invalidated. This is one of the fundamental misunderstandings of religious experience. The idea that God does not work through the mundane. Only if we can prove some violation of the laws of physics can we show evidence of God’s hand, if we are to expect it to be accepted. But, the basic premise is that God created the universe and all of it’s rules, so why can he not act through the physical rules as an intermediary? Why does it have to be some sort of singular and unique event?

I’ve experienced bouts of synchronicity where I’ve asked for something and literally within a minute or two that thing shows up for me. This is enhanced by being in an environment where the concentration of people who believe in synchronicity is higher. “I really wish I had a…” Now, I know this has happened, and it has happened multiple times, and I have had the experience with other people who commented on it, and have heard many other anecdotal stories from others with similar experience.

Once a few years ago, we had a debate about the term ‘supernatural’. In my opinion, the word supernatural itself is the problem. It implies that the super does not act through the natural. It’s as though the movement invalidates the notion of the mover.

[ITR_champion]

As I was the most prominent religious debater in our previous thread on The God Delusion, my opinions on it are well-known. I will just reiterate briefly that I view it as the most dense collections of pseudoscience and nonsense I’ve ever read. We had a free-wheeling discussion of many points. I’ll just focus on one.

In chapter 5 Dawkins begins by saying that Darwinian processes ruthlessly eliminates any behavior except that which is good for survival. He also simply assumes that all human behavior is determined by our genes. He offers no evidence or argument to back this up. He then proceeds to explain that religion exists because children have a gene which makes them believe and obey adults. Again no proof. (He does acknowledge that this is speculation, not proved.)

Well this, we can surely agree, is a scientific hypothesis that we can put to the test. Do children actually believe everything adults tell them and obey whatever adults command them? I think that if you ask anyone who deals with children, they’d agree that the answers are no. Thus the hypothesis fails to deal with reality, and the fact that Dawkins might believe something like this do not do much to elevate my respect for him.

I do not agree that the existence of God is a scientific hypothesis. Dawkins seems to feel that anything is a scientific hypothesis. To me it sounds merely off-the-wall, like saying that “cheeseburgers taste good” is a historical hypothesis.

To summarize, the book confirmed my belief that scientific materialism is not adequate by itself for dealing with the world. (I haven’t read Dennett’s book, so I won’t comment on that one.)

[mswas]

@SentientMeat

Even if neuroscience were to explain divine experience solely naturally (and it’s not far off, IMO), that would still not make such experiences invalid. (Who says so, by the way? Sounds somewhat strawman-y to me) It would merely show that no supernatural cause or source is necessary, just as no such entity is necessary for evolution, lightning bolts, planetary motion or whatever else people used to attribute to the supernatural.

Well I am not trying to put words in your mouth. Here is the problem with the notion of ‘supernatural’. Maybe what is ‘supernatural’ is only that which is beyond our CONCEPT of what is natural. As our phenomenological field expands, what we consider to be natural becomes a wider field. As we expand the scope of our study, maybe it will expand to include some of the things we consider now to be supernatural. Say, angels, faries, invisible pink unicorns, reincarnation or life after death. Maybe the soul is perfectly natural, but the cosmology as it is dealt with today is simply insufficient to explain it. As more is learned the cosmology will be more capable of reconciling the idea of the soul.

Well, OK, believing something because it causes positive feelings makes it no more likely that what you believe is actually true, then. The point is that the feelings it brings about are irrelevant to assessing the actual truth of one’s belief, such that answering the question “Why do you consider that gods and afterlives are more likely than not?” with “Because it brings me purpose” is a subtle but widespread non sequitur.

You don’t understand the notion of purpose. It’s not merely about a feeling. Idries Shah, a prolific writer on Sufism says that the seeking of a ‘feeling’ is not true spirituality. The idea of seeking experience is generally rejected by many religious schools of thought, including Christianity. The purpose found can be seen in how it impels one to act. This is one of the main foci of Christianity, what can be discerned not through being, but through doing. It is the impulse and drive to act, and the results of those actions that creates the purpose, the meaning, and not merely a, “Oh I’ve been baptized now, my life has meaning, I feel great.”, sort of thing. That’s a vulgar and simplistic interpretation.

[begbert2]

@SentientMeat

This, I feel, is a common but unfair characterisation. Many theists set forth gods as explanations for things they observe and experience. To them, the fine-tuning of the universe (and the fact that it exists at all), the origin of life (if not the subsequent evolution), the mystery of consciousness, and especially divine experiences themselves are evidence. And I have no problem with them calling it so – in fact, it makes the whole debate easier. Like a court of law, both sides present their evidence without any assumption that one side’s evidence is inadmissable a priori.

Theists call things evidence for god without in any way establishing reason for us to believe that their god, or any god, caused it to happen. This is like if I pointed at my car and declared that its existence was proof that vampires exist. The proper recourse is to ask why they think so, not be impressed by their answer, study the thing yourself, find no god-fingerprints, and conclude that they’re incorrect in their assumption - even if they’re right that God caused thing X, if there is no evidence that God did, then thing X is not evidence of God’s existence.

@SentientMeat

Well, innocently deluded then. Again, I’m trying to level the playing field in terms of finding out, somehow (even if you have to die or live for centuries more to do so) that you’re actually wrong.

The problem with this sort of thinking is, you’re leveling the playing field with a willingness to pretend that the more correct position is as bad as the less correct position. We see this a lot from certain theistic posters - “leveling the playing field” by asserting that science is a religion and that if you profess confidence in science then you’re a brainwashed zealot. In my view, this sort of thing, trying to level the playing field by taking well-earned points away from the leading team, is not a good thing.

And we can never know that there is no noninterfering deistic god, no matter what happens. On the other hand, we can easily know that there is no god that devies that which is observed; that is, we can easily know that there was no man-from-dirt creationist god. Where we are now is, we have no decent evidence that there is a god. This could change at any time; God merely needs to show up and do something that only he could do. This might happen after death, if he copies our neural patterns into new bodies in some ‘afterlife’ at some point - that’d be a moderately convincing display, if he could convince you to give him credit. Hard to say. Regardless, we haven’t seen it yet.

[SentientMeat]

@mswas

Here is the problem with the notion of ‘supernatural’. Maybe what is ‘supernatural’ is only that which is beyond our CONCEPT of what is natural. As our phenomenological field expands, what we consider to be natural becomes a wider field. As we expand the scope of our study, maybe it will expand to include some of the things we consider now to be supernatural. Say, angels, faries, invisible pink unicorns, reincarnation or life after death. Maybe the soul is perfectly natural, but the cosmology as it is dealt with today is simply insufficient to explain it. As more is learned the cosmology will be more capable of reconciling the idea of the soul.

Surely that would stretch the word “natural” far, far beyond useful currency? Aliens with Matrix-like mind control, I’m happy to call that “natural”. But gods, souls and magical beings?? That would be like expanding the word “innocent” to include the guilty or the word “true” to encompass false statements. One can forever propose that we just haven’t yet got the cerebral capacity to accommodate concepts like guilty innocence or false truth. That is no reason to forego plain language. Indeed, I suggest that semantic equivocation is rather a way of fleeing the arena. The prefix “super-” is common currency in all kinds of contexts, let us not devalue it for the sake of but one.

You don’t understand the notion of purpose … That’s a vulgar and simplistic interpretation.

I am suggesting that inflating the ascribed probability of gods and afterlives “because it gives one purpose” (however such a property is characterised) is a non sequitur. I’m happy to admit my ignorance of the different meanings of “purpose” (though note that I used to be a committed Christian so I might have more insight than you suspect) but I don’t think that’s particularly important here.

Why is say an acid trip, or a sudden release of a higher dosage of Di-Methyl Tryptamine or a surge in electrical traffic across the Corpus Collosum not a valid religious experience? Why make the caveat ‘merely an natural neurophysical episode’?

Because these are physical molecules, made of the same carbon, hydrogen and oxygen atoms which don’t make you feel any different in other arrangements.

How does one tell if one neurological event is ‘merely natural’ vs another one that is supernatural in origin, when to the person reading the EEG it looks pretty much the same?

You can’t, so the question is, why posit extra “supernatural” entities without necessity? (And are you suggesting that your “synchronicity” experiences couldn’t possibly be natural selection bias? If it could be so, why introduce divine intervention here too?)

@ITR

I do not agree that the existence of God is a scientific hypothesis.

Why not, might I ask? Surely it has testable consequences in principle, such as gods appearing before our eyes if they so chose?

To summarize, the book confirmed my belief that scientific materialism is not adequate by itself for dealing with the world.

Would you characterise this position as a God of the Gaps argument?

[SentientMeat]

@begbert

Theists call things evidence for god without in any way establishing reason for us to believe that their god, or any god, caused it to happen. This is like if I pointed at my car and declared that its existence was proof that vampires exist.

Surely it is like pointing to your car and offering it as evidence (not proof, which is deductive, not inductive) that it was designed by a person, which is perfectly reasonable?

even if they’re right that God caused thing X, if there is no evidence that God did, then thing X is not evidence of God’s existence.

Again, they would offer (perfectly reasonably) that the very existence of the universe, life, consciousness and epiphanic experiences are evidence of gods’ work because natural explanations are insufficient (in their opinion), just as the very existence of your car is evidence of intelligent design since natural explanations cannot account for your car. (“Natural” in the traditional sense – I think human designers evolved naturally, of course.)

[Thudlow_Boink]

[QUOTE=SentientMeat]
[li]Believing something because it makes you happy makes it no more likely whatsoever that what you believe is actually true[/li][/QUOTE]
Agreed. What is true is in no way determined by what we would like to be true. Would anyone here argue the opposite side on this one?

answering the question “Why do you consider that gods and afterlives are more likely than not?” with “Because it brings me purpose” is a subtle but widespread non sequitur.

But, I think you may be misinterpreting what some of these people are saying.

In a case where we do not know whether something is true or not, where there is no compelling evidence forcing us to come down on one side or another, then, in choosing what to believe (or, if you prefer, in choosing what to adopt as a working hypothesis, or in deciding whether to act as if something were true or not), it is not unreasonable to consider the effects of believing (including how they contribute to happiness) as one major factor in deciding how to believe/act.

[mswas]

@SentientMeat

Surely that would stretch the word “natural” far, far beyond useful currency? Aliens with Matrix-like mind control, I’m happy to call that “natural”. But gods, souls and magical beings?? That would be like expanding the word “innocent” to include the guilty or the word “true” to encompass false statements. One can forever propose that we just haven’t yet got the cerebral capacity to accommodate concepts like guilty innocence or false truth. That is no reason to forego plain language. Indeed, I suggest that semantic equivocation is rather a way of fleeing the arena. The prefix “super-” is common currency in all kinds of contexts, let us not devalue it for the sake of but one.

Now it’s your turn with the straw man. That’s not what I was saying at all. It’s not about cerebral capacity, it’s about evidence and the ability to observe things. Possibly some new way of observing things will come about that we will be able to observe the phenomena that people call ‘angels’ etc… The problem with the materialistic approach is all it does is tell us about the elements, and how the elements are acting. It tells us absolutely nothing at all about what those elements mean, or from where meaning derives. How is it that we make choices? Is it merely chemical attraction at a very highly aggregated scale? If so, then why are we aware of the choices we make? Why does the carbon atom in my calf obey the impulse driven by the gastric juices in my stomach when I am hungry? Why does it matter on a chemical level that we be in the form we are in at all? Where does that form come from? Why does life have an impulse to survive? How did we develop to have an association with a certain arrangement of chemicals that we can control and manipulate? What is ‘We’ anyway? What am ‘I’? Why should I care about you? Why do I even recognize you as being similar despite that I’ve never seen you? Why would I accept that there is a being behind these configurations of electrons that are being beamed into visual cortex?

I am suggesting that inflating the ascribed probability of gods and afterlives “because it gives one purpose” (however such a property is characterised) is a non sequitur. I’m happy to admit my ignorance of the different meanings of “purpose” (though note that I used to be a committed Christian so I might have more insight than you suspect) but I don’t think that’s particularly important here.

That’s the problem. It’s NOT irrelevant at all. Purpose is what drives us to do anything. You are eliminating the central question of religion, “What is my purpose?”, as being not particularly important to a discussion of religion. Why are you even addressing the issue of religion if the question that defines it’s core ‘purpose’ is irrelevant? What impels us to act? Dawkins reduces it to mere survival. So the question then is, ‘Why is survival important?’, regardless of whether I live or die, my constituent molecules will go on existing. So what does it matter if I try to preserve them in this configuration over another? Who am I to dictate the pattern these molecules inhabit? What difference does it make if the potassium in my neurons is over here, or over there? Why go through the trouble? Why consider it trouble? What is suffering to something that is merely an arrangement of chemicals?

Because these are physical molecules, made of the same carbon, hydrogen and oxygen atoms which don’t make you feel any different in other arrangements.

So what? Why does the usage of physical molecules invalidate the subjective nature of the experience? Every experience is experienced through the medium of neurotransmitters. So why should spiritual experience be any difference? If you give someone a high enough dose of Di Methyl Tryptamine they will have something akin to a religious experience, EVERY TIME. Why does that invalidate the spiritual nature of what occurred? Does the usage of ATP in more mundane neurochemical interactions invalidate somatic sensory awareness?

You can’t, so the question is, why posit extra “supernatural” entities without necessity? (And are you suggesting that your “synchronicity” experiences couldn’t possibly be natural selection bias? If it could be so, why introduce divine intervention here too?)

I am not arguing that they are unnatural. Perhaps it is selection bias, but how is it that my voiced desire comes to me from someone who is not discernably within hearing distance? Maybe he did hear it even though he was 500 yards away at the time? That’s possible. I don’t ‘need’ it to be supernatural. I have no particular affinity for the word, in fact I find it rather distasteful and cumbersome. I rarely use it of my own volition.

Why not, might I ask? Surely it has testable consequences in principle, such as gods appearing before our eyes if they so chose?

Well, the thing about that is, that it’s testable if it’s repeatable. If Gods exist, then they are sentient beings, who are more powerful than we are. To repeat the results for verification we would have to be able to compel their behavior no? So perhaps Gods simply do not feel the need to prove themselves to mortals.

Mostly this is a semantic issue, and Cognitive Neuroscience is beginning to touch on that. You scoff at the notion of Magic because you can explain it. You say that a computer isn’t magic, it’s scientific, but to someone who does not understand science, it is still magical. It doesn’t matter how you selectively define it. Scientists are still an elect priesthood wielding powers not accessible to the common man. Sure we like to think there is an egalitarian access to science, but it’s not true. Most kids glaze over in chemistry, they cannot grasp the abstraction necessary to do anything but pull a C in chemistry, whereas some kids can just spit it out in a rap. Whether it’s magic or science is really a matter of which side of the technical divide you’re on.

[begbert2]

@SentientMeat

Surely it is like pointing to your car and offering it as evidence (not proof, which is deductive, not inductive) that it was designed by a person, which is perfectly reasonable?

No, surely it is not; you’re warping the analogy in a way that quite explicitly doesn’t map across to reality. One can examine a car and trace down solid, compelling evidence that it was created by humans; one cannot do that with anything and God. So, it’s like I said: it’s like if I pointed at my car and declared that its existence was proof that vampires exist.

Or, if you prefer the analogy to reference design, it’s like it’s like me pointing at the sun and offering its existence as evidence that it was designed by a person. Keep in mind that the complete lack of evidence supporting the assertion is the point of this analogy.

@SentientMeat

Again, they would offer (perfectly reasonably) that the very existence of the universe, life, consciousness and epiphanic experiences are evidence of gods’ work because natural explanations are insufficient (in their opinion), just as the very existence of your car is evidence of intelligent design since natural explanations cannot account for your car. (“Natural” in the traditional sense – I think human designers evolved naturally, of course.)

God of the gaps is a load of stinking crap - it has failed in every case that we’ve actually managed to discover the cause of something. A gap is nothing more than that - a place where we don’t have an answer. Pretending it is an answer is just rolling yourself up in a rug of ignorance and lies and praying that actual truth never arrives to peel away your warm and comforting fantasy.

[SentientMeat]

@mswas

Now it’s your turn with the straw man. That’s not what I was saying at all. It’s not about cerebral capacity, it’s about evidence and the ability to observe things. Possibly some new way of observing things will come about that we will be able to observe the phenomena that people call ‘angels’ etc…

Well then, that was really the point I was making in my first bullet. Yes, angels might exist, and finding them would be only the start of our scientific investigation into them. But angels are supernatural beings by definition, which is why they’re so interesting in the first place. I think we’re saying the same thing, ultimately: finding gods or afterlives would expand science immeasurably, whatever we labelled our new discoveries.

The problem with the materialistic approach is all it does is tell us about the elements, and how the elements are acting. It tells us absolutely nothing at all about what those elements mean, or from where meaning derives.

Note that asking for the “meaning” of a system of elements might be a category error. Materialism neither proposes nor rejects such a possibiliy, it just asks us to bear it in mind.

How is it that we make choices? Is it merely chemical attraction at a very highly aggregated scale?

No, I have never understood this fixation with chemistry in characterising modern cognitive science. A far more helpful analogy (though with important disanalogies) is a computer: it can make decisions based on inputs, past memories and feedback. Perhaps human decision processes are similar (though far more complex).

If so, then why are we aware of the choices we make?

This question rather reduces to why we are aware of anything, which I actually consider to be rather circular: could nonaware entities even use the word “we”?

Why does the carbon atom in my calf obey the impulse driven by the gastric juices in my stomach when I am hungry?

You mean by going to get food? If so, this description misses the crucial computational components: the bus (nerves) and CPU (brain). (Again, forgive the vast oversimplification here!)

Why does it matter on a chemical level that we be in the form we are in at all? Where does that form come from?

Evolution, starting from replicating molecules (genotypes) which produces proteins in particular patterns (phenotypes) involving continuous copy-errors (mutations).

Why does life have an impulse to survive?

Some life doesn’t, so it doesn’t. Am I missing something here?

How did we develop to have an association with a certain arrangement of chemicals that we can control and manipulate? What is ‘We’ anyway? What am ‘I’?

Maybe there is no “association”, there is only the arrangement, which such arrangements label “I” in no more mysterious a manner than a computer storing a digital photo of itself. Again, science does not demand so, it merely asks that the possibility be considered.

Why should I care about you?

Do you? Some people don’t, some do. Again, those mutating molecules might mutate differently in different branches, rather like the simple neural networks we can “evolve” artificially, which also show differential behaviour.

Why do I even recognize you as being similar despite that I’ve never seen you? Why would I accept that there is a being behind these configurations of electrons that are being beamed into visual cortex?

You ascribe a high probability based on strong correlations to memories of previous encounters. You (ie. the computer in your skull) forment an explanans to account for the explanandum of shapes appearing on your monitor. (And that would be photons incident on your retina, not electrons incident on your cortex BTW.)

That’s the problem. It’s NOT irrelevant at all.

I’m not saying purpose isn’t important to us, I’m saying it isn’t important in assessing the probability that gods and afterlives exist. I’d be happy to try and express this point more clearly if you don’t think bullet #2 was adequate.

What impels us to act? Dawkins reduces it to mere survival.

Does he? Where??

So what does it matter if I try to preserve them in this configuration over another? Who am I to dictate the pattern these molecules inhabit? What difference does it make if the potassium in my neurons is over here, or over there? Why go through the trouble? Why consider it trouble? What is suffering to something that is merely an arrangement of chemicals?

Whom, or what, are you asking these questions of? Me? Ah, but I’m a suffering, empathising, survival-seeking biorobot (IMO) just like you. It sounds like you’re asking the universe for some “objective” answer to what matters and what doesn’t, which you’re unlikely to get. In any case, I’m still not sure how this pertains to the OP really.

So what? Why does the usage of physical molecules invalidate the subjective nature of the experience?

Again, who is saying it does??

Well, the thing about that is, that it’s testable if it’s repeatable.

No, tests can be one-time-only. Gods instantly appearing to everybody simultaneously would be a significant data point.

Mostly this is a semantic issue, and Cognitive Neuroscience is beginning to touch on that. You scoff at the notion of Magic because you can explain it. You say that a computer isn’t magic, it’s scientific, but to someone who does not understand science, it is still magical. It doesn’t matter how you selectively define it. Scientists are still an elect priesthood wielding powers not accessible to the common man. Sure we like to think there is an egalitarian access to science, but it’s not true. Most kids glaze over in chemistry, they cannot grasp the abstraction necessary to do anything but pull a C in chemistry, whereas some kids can just spit it out in a rap. Whether it’s magic or science is really a matter of which side of the technical divide you’re on.

I’m afraid I don’t quite understand how this pertains to anything I’ve said. Are you saying that cognitive scientific explanations for divine experience are less likely to be true because a lot of people don’t understand them?

@begbert

No, surely it is not; you’re warping the analogy in a way that quite explicitly doesn’t map across to reality. One can examine a car and trace down solid, compelling evidence that it was created by humans; one cannot do that with anything and God.

OK, let’s do this for two types of motor: Rudolph Diesel’s internal combustion engine and Mr. God’s bacterial flagellum. Please provide a trace of the former, then I’ll do the same for the latter.

God of the gaps is a load of stinking crap - it has failed in every case that we’ve actually managed to discover the cause of something.

But what of those we haven’t?

A gap is nothing more than that - a place where we don’t have an answer. Pretending it is an answer is just rolling yourself up in a rug of ignorance and lies and praying that actual truth never arrives to peel away your warm and comforting fantasy.

Could a theist not say that your comforting fantasy is that we’ll fill that gap naturally one day, and thus that you are blanketing your ignorance with faith in no less dogmatic a fashion?

[I’m not trolling you here, **begbert**, despite being as atheistic to the core as yourself. I just think some of your characterisations of religion, especially of reasonable theists of which there are many, are misplaced]

[SentientMeat]

@SentientMeat

OK, let’s do this for two types of motor: Rudolph Diesel’s internal combustion engine and Mr. God’s bacterial flagellum. Please provide a trace of the former, then I’ll do the same for the latter.

Actually begbert, this might be considered a bit troll-y because I happen to know the natural answer for the flagellum (as provided by Christian geneticist Ken Miller). So you do Diesel’s engine, then I’ll do God’s RNA molecule instead.

[SentientMeat]

@Thudlow

In a case where we do not know whether something is true or not, where there is no compelling evidence forcing us to come down on one side or another, then, in choosing what to believe (or, if you prefer, in choosing what to adopt as a working hypothesis, or in deciding whether to act as if something were true or not), it is not unreasonable to consider the effects of believing (including how they contribute to happiness) as one major factor in deciding how to believe/act.

But surely there is compelling evidence from cosmology, molecular biology and cognitive science that natural explanations can and will make gods and afterlives unnecessary, and thus highly unlikely?

[Revenant_Threshold]

In chapter 5 Dawkins begins by saying that Darwinian processes ruthlessly eliminates any behavior except that which is good for survival. He also simply assumes that all human behavior is determined by our genes. He offers no evidence or argument to back this up. He then proceeds to explain that religion exists because children have a gene which makes them believe and obey adults. Again no proof. (He does acknowledge that this is speculation, not proved.)

He assumes no such thing, to the first part. He certainly assumes that natural selection is true; he also assumes that natural selection will influence our behaviour. But he does not claim that all human behaviour is determined by our genes. He uses the example of the placebo effect to illustrate the idea of religion on us not just in terms of how we’ll survive but the very nature that it exists at all shows that we can be influenced by things other than our genes. He doesn’t give cites for our genetic makeup being our sole influence because it’s not something he claims is so.

Well this, we can surely agree, is a scientific hypothesis that we can put to the test. Do children actually believe everything adults tell them and obey whatever adults command them? I think that if you ask anyone who deals with children, they’d agree that the answers are no. Thus the hypothesis fails to deal with reality, and the fact that Dawkins might believe something like this do not do much to elevate my respect for him.

I think you’re mischaracterising that pretty badly, if subtly. Dawkins suggests - and points out repeatedly that it’s only an example of the kind of thing he means - that children are likely to be primed with a tendency to trust and obey authority. He isn’t claiming kids will obey any order from adults to the letter; it may be he doesn’t deserve your respect, but I don’t think this he’s said what you think he has.

I do not agree that the existence of God is a scientific hypothesis. Dawkins seems to feel that anything is a scientific hypothesis. To me it sounds merely off-the-wall, like saying that “cheeseburgers taste good” is a historical hypothesis.

Again, you’ve gone to the extreme. I don’t consider the existence of God perface to be a scientific hypothesis. But the existence of miracles? Whether or not things may happen naturally, or whether supernatural elements are required? There are I would argue certainly claims about the existence of gods and the supernatural which may be studied scientifically, and I think it doesn’t do you credit to leap to the Big Question while ignoring all the little ones along the way.

To summarize, the book confirmed my belief that scientific materialism is not adequate by itself for dealing with the world. (I haven’t read Dennett’s book, so I won’t comment on that one.)

Why? I mean, if I understand your problems with the book and Dawkins here and in the past thread, you think it’s reasonable safe to say that he has brought nothing new and no effective arguments for his side to the table. But his opinion is no more confirmatory of your ideas than mine might be because I disagree with you. I would never consider my beliefs “confirmed”; after all, that would be assuming I know everything there is to know about the subject. I tend to see your arguments here as jumping on the most extreme arguments, even when they’re not being made, but I don’t consider your overall position to be confirmed wrong, just that I think you are.