“Very definitely”? What does that mean? Does it mean that you could closely examine the “duplicate” down to the molecular level and “definitely” determine that it was the duplicate? No - we can’t. They’re identical and the same. Without handwaving about a “soul” or “consciousness”, there is absolutely no discernable difference between the two.
As for interrogating the creator, we already have:
Danton: “Which one is my hat?”
Tesla: “They all are.”
Same with twins shortly after the egg splits. Good luck telling any identical twins you know that because they’re genetically indistinguishable that they’re not individuals.
Of course the machine creates copies of whatever’s put inside of it. I’m surprised that you’d all make the reach that it splits an object into two (not literally into halves of a man).
But that’s not what I’m saying.
Immediately when the egg splits (where we hand wave away conservation of mass, etc.), they ARE the same. But moments after, they are separate as their experiences diverge. But as Frylock mentioned, Danton/Clone1 and Danton/Clone2 are just as different from each other as they are from Danton/LeverPuller, just as Munch11:10PM is different from Munch11:09PM. I’m certainly the same person.
Maybe the only difference is the lack of continuance Danton/Clone2 has into his new environment, since he’s transported there rather than travelling - but that’s really a meaningless distinction, since we can then just talk about a machine that transports both Clone1 and Clone2 into new locations instead (Clone1 getting dropped into a sealed tank).
Edit:
So? I think you’re sticking on the Multiplicity “a copy of a copy is inferior”. Why make that assumption? Why can’t we assume an absolutely perfect copy? And if there is an absolutely perfect copy, why is that any different, apart from the divergent experiences that begin instananeously after creation.
How is that “handwaving”? Is there another word you would prefer? I don’t see this as a supernatural cop-out. You had one body with a brain that gave it an awareness of its experience. The switch is thrown and instantly there are two bodies, each presumably with a brain. One body/brain will experience death by drowning, the other will get applause.
How can one person both drown and not drown simultaneously?
This is why I used “except that they are definitely duplicated” (perhaps I should have used a word besides “definitely”) in my above analogy, because that is where the egg analogy differs from what I believe is happening with the machine. With twins the egg splits, whereas with the Dantons a duplicate is created.
DO = Danton Original
DD = Danton Duplicate
DO steps into the machine, takes a deep breath and pulls the switch.
The machine transports DO up to the balcony and DD is created within the machine in his place. DD plummets to his death.
DO did not both die and survive. He survived. It was his twin that was killed.
Because the at the instant the switch is thrown, there is no definable difference between the two. A micromacronanosecond later, there is, and they become separate individuals as they experience different things.
But at that very instant that they are the same, they are also identically the same to the original Danton that threw the switch. One is not a “copy” of the other, because a “copy” infers “slightly inferior” in some way - and that’s not an inference that can be made with the information we have.
Because they believe that the twins are one person.
This is where you and I disagree, of course. To me it’s obvious.
It’s nice to put a deep and philosophical bent on things but really, just because two objects are exactly the same doesn’t mean that they are literally the same object.
No. At the instant the switch is thrown one Danton is standing on the balcony and one is still in the machine. They do not occupy the same space at the point of the clone’s creation and so at the very moment of creation already they are separate individuals due to the different experiences you mentioned.
Even if an identical replicant is made with absolutely no ambiguity as to which is which, what is the difference between DO and DD at the very moment of DD’s creation? None. So why does it matter which dies after that?
Okay - now we’re getting down to the speed of information. I’m using the word “instant” to mean just that - a frozen singularity point in time where no information exchange is possible.
It might not “matter” at all, but that’s a philosophical question.
But that would indicate that when you climb into the machine you are not both killing yourself and bowing. You are killing your clone and bowing. Or killing yourself and your clone is bowing, whatever the case may be.
No, it would indicate that the word “clone” is a misnomer, because it carries the same baggage as “copy”.
Fine, then we can monkey around with what I said.
I flip the switch in one literal instance and the information is sent but not assembled and the assembly takes place in the next literal instance. They still don’t occupy the same space.
And even if you take issue with that, remember that the rest of the machine’s existence is not only impossible but unexplained. We don’t know which laws of physics the machine is capable of breaking and which it is incapable of breaking. It might just send information despite that impossibility of exchange.
Pretend I said copy, then. I haven’t agreed that “copy” implies inferiority in regards to my explanations.
Well, sure. There is certainly a lot we don’t know about the fictional machine. And it is a philosophical discussion - it’s the Ship of Theseus, but with molecularly identical planks. It ultimately comes down to how we want to define the admittedly undefined machine.
I’m taking the tack of “it creates absolutely identical versions” because “it spits out the absolute original as well as a copy of the original” resolves itself immediately with no dilemma of self or identity. The entire movie is a discussion of self and identity, so it seems a bit like cheating to take the easy way out.
Either way - this has been fun. But I gots to sleep now!
Only one thing is certain: If I had the machine I would be making lots and lots of money. Literally.
What defines a person, other than their memories? What makes Danton a person? What differentiates him from a pile of offal? I say that it is his mind. Not his brain, but his mind: a collection of thoughts, memories, opinions, and ideas. And that doesn’t have a physical form, it’s just an electrical pattern. In The Prestige, there is one pattern in the machine when the switch is flipped. In the next second, there are two patterns: one pattern thinking, “Hey, I’m on a balcony!” and the other pattern thinking, “Fuck! Drowning!” Neither of these patterns are exactly the same as the pattern that threw the switch, because both have been altered by their experiences post-switch throwing. But both are direct, lineal descendants of that pattern. They are, for every conceivable intent and purpose, the same pattern that was in the machine at the beginning of the act, to the exact same extent that I am the same person, right now, that I was before I started writing this post.
You’re still comparing the two post-trick Dantons to each other. That’s not the argument. The argument is, the two post-trick Dantons are the same as the pre-trick Danton.
Go back to my example of the twins. Which twin is that egg a picture of? Both, obviously, because at the point the picture of that egg was taken, they hadn’t separated yet. At that time, they are the same “person.” A few minutes later, the egg splits, and there are two of them. If the egg splits a few hours later, same same. If it splits a few days later, still no change in the premise. What we’re saying here is, what if it splits forty years later? That’s what happened to Danton. Danton steps into a machine. When he comes out, there are two of him. They’re both the same person who stepped into the machine. They aren’t the same person as each other.
I realize the OP specifically asks about the film, but the book is (as they tend to be) a bit different from the film in some key details. Whether it resolves or provides clues into any of the philosophical questions, you’ll have to decide yourselves. Spoilered, because it’s not specifically the topic of the thread (and these are end-of-book spoilers. The book is quite different from the movie in a lot of ways, so I’d advise you to skip this if you want to read the book).
[spoiler]In the book, the act of transporting is significantly different: The body left in the machine is killed by whatever mechanism it is that transports the man. There is no separate act of killing. The bodies are:
[/spoiler]
Transportation isn’t instantaneous. At one point, Borden interrupts Danton’s act by turning off a circuit breaker just as the transportation is happening. This results in two “incomplete” copies that make up a whole. One Danton looks whole, but weighs less and becomes physically ill. The other Danton is, basically, a ghost: Able to pass through doors, unable to easily grasp physical objects, a sickly voice, ghostly appearance, but mentally competent. Additionally, some gold coins that were in Danton’s pockets during this transportation (he had been duplicating gold coins) looked identical to untransported money, but weighed less and sounded different when clinked.
Doesn’t give a lot of insight into the movie, but the frame story of the book is a modern day guy has always felt like he has a twin, but there’s no evidence to back it up. He’s related to Borden, comes into possession of Borden’s journal, runs into a descendant of Danton’s, reads Danton’s journal, and Danton’s descendant tells him about an episode during their childhood where their families met, got into an argument, the guy was thrown into the running machine, and poof, voices in his head for the next 20 years.
Also, previous thread from when it was released theatrically. Many of these questions were discussed then too.
Just because the duplicate has continuity of consciousness doesn’t make him the exact same person.
One Danton throws the switch. That Danton is either transported or stays where he is. At that time, a duplicate of Danton is created in the opposite location.
And our armchair philosophy department will argue that these two men are exactly the same at that moment, because to say otherwise means you’re arguing for the existence of a soul, harrumph harrumph, et cetera.
No, there’s at least one other important physical difference - and that’s location, location, location. One of the two Dantons did not physically exist the moment before the switch was thrown. They possess molecules in identical configurations, but they do not share the same molecules. One of them has just come into being, created out of the ether.
And our armchair philosophy department will make reference to distinctions without difference.
But let us say I had a disk of information. I put it in my CD-ROM drive, D:. I start a program to copy that information to a second, blank CD-ROM (of the same manufacture) in E:. The process completes. Now, which disk is the original? They’re physically identical. The contain the same information. Surely, then, the question is one of the great imponderables of the universe!
Not really. The original disk is in D:. The copy’s in E:. They may be identical and interchangeable in most senses, but one of them only became that way recently, and thus, the word ‘original’ is useful to use because it helps us describe the process.
Further, we’re only assuming the copies are identical in The Prestige. We don’t really examine the question at length. If we allow that it’s **possible **that the copy is somehow lesser, then it becomes essential that we distinguish the original.