Those are entirely different issues though. Wasting timeouts = bad. Going for it on 4th down however increased the Pat’s odds of winning. In the NFL week 10thread there is more detailed analysis, but unless you are making some really goofy assumptions, the numbers favored going for it.
Repeating this try at home link here
If the Patriots make this play, every sports hack on the East Coast (except in NYC) would have been writing about the ‘gutsy’ call, showing ‘confidence in his offense’, and/or praising Belichick for winning the game with ‘brilliant’ play-calling. When the play fails, they all turn around and drag his name through the mud, similar to the OP.
My take is that you do not put the ball into P. Manning’s or T. Brady’s hands with 2 minutes left and a chance to win the game, regardless of how your defense has performed. Right call, though risky, and the risk bit the Patriots in the ass.
I think it is a wash, personally.
Bruschi has an article on SI saying that he’d see this decision as a huge slap in the face to the defense. I found this a bit surprising. I think I usually underestimate this kind of psychological thing.
Of course, you can look at what ended up happening too. The NE defense had their shot to stop Indy and win the game, and they just got completely rolled over on the last few plays. Watching that last drive doesn’t give much confidence that they would have stopped Indy on a longer field.
Yes, a fake punt might have been a wise choice. But it was not the choice that was, in fact, made. You can’t brag that he was brilliant for making a not-so-bright move that did, in fact, turn out badly.
It was a stupid call to throw on 3rd down. If he really wanted to go for it on 4th he should have run on 3rd to either A. get the first down or B. set yourself up for a 4th and 1.
Belichick botched the whole drive, but the 4th and 2 call was just icing on the cake.
Now that it’s in the game room, this thread is redundant. There’s already a huge argument in the Week 10 thread (meaningful analysis of the decision starts about here).
The closest thing to a consensus opinion so far in that thread would be: going for it is *probably *a little better than punting, but it’s close either way.
Given that the Patriots showed on two plays in a row that they couldn’t make 2 yards, maybe the “true” underlying odds were not so good. Of coruse it is just two data points, but it tells us a little.
:rolleyes:
Just aching to score some points, aren’t you? IMO, Fake punt: best possible; balls out going for it: still a good call; punting: not the best idea, but completely understandable given the circumstances.
This is football, not majority opinions from the supreme court. There’s no need to rules-lawyer every single possible interpretation of what I said.
The article you linked threw me off. It indicated that the Pats had the ball on the Colts 28. I’m wondering, why didn’t they kick a field goal? Was he trying to cover a spread?
I’m cool with it. You win some, you lose some.
It also shows that Belichick putting his confidence in his offense, not his defense, to control the ball was contrary to the evidence at that point.
whole bean, the ball went over on the Pats’ 28, not the Colts’.
Lucas Oil is not a loud stadium.
If that’s what the article said, it was incorrect. NE had the ball at its own 28, not Indy’s.
Contrary to the evidence? He should trust his defense that just gave up two 80 yard touchdown drives over his offense that had put up 475 yards in the game?
Did they not also have an interception of Manning tossed in there? 
Manning from the 30 or so has a good chance of scoring a TD, but not a great chance. Manning from the 22 has an almost 100% chance of scoring in that situation; certainly the chance is at least 80%.
Belichik’s decision in essence is a statement that he did not think his defense had a meaningful chance of stopping the Colts from long distance. He may well have been right, but given that they had intercepted Manning once in the 4th quarter, I’d say it was a better chance than he gave them credit for. And the chance of getting burned deep in a prevent is much less than being burned deep earlier in the quarter when they are forced to stop the run.
They had also just ended a drive by picking it off, so yeah, you could definitely find reason to trust the defense if you only went by the most recent drives.
As for trusting the offense based on recent performance, that’s a bit dicier. The Pats got the ball with 2 timeouts and had to burn both of them during the first three plays. That’s not a great indicator that your offense should be trusted. They’d also just failed to get those same two yards with basically the same out pattern the play before, which is a very strong indicator that you shouldn’t try it again.
So yeah, based on game situation, that call was moronic.
I think one thing that is kind of confusing the situation is that the going for it on 4th and 2 is a SINGLE play, versus punting and making them drive the field, which would be a series of plays. For me the idea of probabilities makes more sense when talking about the single play then the odds of driving the field through a series of plays. I know what the evidence is, but I liken it to a diversified portfolio versus having a single stock. Dunno if that makes any sense, but there it is.
Some people such as Bruschi and Rodney Harrison have been saying this, but I just don’t see how it’s true. Let’s say Belichick gives his defense a 50/50 shot of stopping the Colts after a punt. That’s certainly a meaningful chance. If he also thinks he has a 50/50 shot at converting the 4th, then he should go for it.
It doesn’t really work as an analogy, because there is only two possible outcomes win or loss. You diversify to ensure you avoid extreme outcomes, and get something in the middle. That isn’t possible here. So even though one option is one play and the other many it still comes down to a yes or no question. If one option means you win 75% of the time and the other 70% of the time then it is riskier to take the 2nd option even if it involves many more steps.