Fair enough; it’s true that the NE defense had a couple INTs in the second half, and there’s certainly a chance they’d get another. I have to say though that both the INTs were really unusual plays for the Colts, and I’d say it’s pretty unlikely that you’d get another like that. That’s obviously at least somewhat subjective.
The timeouts were weird for NE. Belichick said after the game that they had to call the last timeout because some of the offense started to come off the field and some of the punt team started to go on, so there’s at least some kind of irony or something to that.
Regardless, I don’t see how it’s fair to call either decision (punting or going) moronic. They each give a pretty close probability of winning the game.
Not so. Scoring a touchdown is harder than just moving the ball down the field. When the field gets small it is easier to defend. With a long field you sometimes give up first downs in order to prevent big plays.
I believe the Colts only score a TD a little over half the time from inside the 20, let alone the 30.
When you add that the Patriots probably had above a 50% chance to convert, it was clearly the right call.
The redzone percentage isn’t really applicable, though, because the vast majority of times they get to 4th down they kick a field goal. This was clearly 4 down territory which bumps up the likelihood a fair amount.
This isn’t quite right. Given that a first down would have practically guaranteed a win (they would have been able to kill the clock), what his decision meant is that he thought they had a better chance of making two yards than they did of stopping the Colts if they punted. So, for example, he may have thought they had a 70% chance of stopping a drive, and an 80% chance of making the first down.
There was no guarantee they could have killed the clock. There was the 2 min. warning, followed by two Indy timeouts still left, I believe. Indy probably would have had the ball returned to them anyway with about 30 sec. left. So you have to factor in the possibility that going for it would not have salted the game.
While they only score less than half the time normally, that’s not what they were facing. Throw the general stats out; when you can quote me the stats on the Colts under Manning when facing a must TD situation from inside the 25 with 2 min or less remaining, then we’ll talk.
Again, this is meaningless. All you stats crunchers are forgetting something supremely important: the game is played by humans, with all that entails. Including things like momentum.
Let me give an old example from a wounded memory.
It’s the 1989 Super Bowl. My Bengals are facing 3rd down late in the game, tied with the 40Whiners. They are in the ‘Niners’ end of the field, with about 4 yards to go for a first down. The clock is running down, but there are still about 3 min. left in the game. Wicky Wacky Wyche calls for Esiason to hand off to a back (the precise back in question escapes me, because I didn’t care, really) for the express purpose of centering the ball between the hashmarks for a field goal attempt. In the process, they eschew any realistic attempt at making a first down. In comes the FG unit.
I turn to my then-wife (a confirmed 49ers fan, sadly) and say, “Well, that’s it, game over.”
She looks at me upset and says, “He could miss!”
I look at her sorrowfully and say, “You don’t understand. The game is over because the 'Niners are about to win.”
We then watched as the one person in the history of the NFL you NEVER EVER wanted to see with the ball in his hand and two minutes left to play in the game marched his team down the field to win the game on a pass to Taylor. Just as I knew would happen the minute that the Bengals accepted the concept that increasing the chance of making the field goal was more important than trying to make a first down and run time off the clock. I’ve never forgiven Wyche since (well, I’ve never forgiven him for a lot, actually, but that is high up there!!! :p).
Now, I have no idea what the stats were on the 'Niners scoring percentage on drives starting from a kickoff that year. Less do I care. I knew they would win the game; it wasn’t even a close question. Stats be damned, individual humans are not statistically predictable.
So let’s return to last night. Yes, maybe the percentages would work out that, without any other information involved, Belichik could assert that his decision was at worst a break even chance, and possibly a better shot at winning. So what? HE WAS RUNNING THE SERIOUS RISK OF GIVING THE BALL TO THE BEST DAMN QUARTERBACK IN THE LEAGUE WITH OODLES OF TIME TO SCORE ON A SHORT FIELD TO WIN A VERY IMPORTANT GAME!!!
I knew he blew the call when he made it; momentum had decidedly shifted to the Colts and it was a gamble, not a sure thing. When it failed, I knew it was going to be game over. Yeah, maybe not statistically so, but again, statistics do a piss poor job of predicting the results of individual human beings.
So what you’re saying is that a single anecdote is in fact superior to data, because there are humans involved. Humans are not statistically predictable, but you can beat the stats on gut feeling?
How many billions have you made with this ability?
The numbers are clear: Going for it was much more likely to succeed than punting. Belichick (a man I despise) went for the best percentage play. It didn’t work out, but if he punted, that might not have worked out, either.
And if he punted, he wouldn’t be giving the ball to the Colts? With two minutes and the best quarterback in the game (and a time out)? Payton would still have had oodles of time to score and the extra yards would not have been a problem.
This was the smart, percentage play in the situation. Getting the first down wins the game. Period. Missing it has no major disadvantage against Peyton compared to punting. Belichick may be an ass, but he was absolutely right with the call.
You must be new to this discussion, because the numbers are anything BUT clear.
I don’t want to hear data about generic 4th-and-2 situations. In the other thread, furt made the good point that a better comparison would be goal line stands, because the secondary was all playing up (as well they should have been – very little difference between a 3-yard play and a 70-yard play, in that situation). And Ellis Dee made another good point that even that’s not the best comparison, because there’s the option for a field goal in most goal line situations.
So yeah, quoting how 4th-and-2 is converted 60% of the time means shit. There are mitigating factors that make that number shit. Some think the number should be higher, because it’s Tom Brady in the backfield, others (like me) think it should be lower, because (a) it was in the noise at Indy, (b) the Colts were willing to give up the big play to stop the short gain, and (c) well, hell, if it’s so goddamned easy, why didn’t the Pats convert on 3rd-and-2?
After reading the other thread, I leave with an impression that it wasn’t the worst decision in the history of football, but neither was it some savvy, statistically sound move that only true football experts “get.” It was probably a coin flip, and, honestly, I think the Colts probably would have won even if the Pats had punted. (The Pats all but assured a loss either way with really, really poor clock management, leaving the Colts with a time out AND on the north side of the two minute warning).
I think most good or great coaches in that situation would have punted and then done SOMETHING to get a weary defense fired up. Cheater Bill obviously isn’t the kind of Rah-Rah, get the team fired up sort of coach, so that option wasn’t really on the table. Instead, he played the numbers (which he deemed to favor going for the conversion), because that’s the sort of coach he is.
I think it will be most interesting to see what sort of hangover the Pats will have. Had Manning driven 70 yards for the score, that’d leave a mark on a defense’s psyche, no question. But I have to imagine that having your coach make that decision will leave an even bigger bruise on a defense’s confidence.
Your anecdote would seem to argue against punting in the game last night, not for it. On the one hand, you’re upset about a team conceding possession of the ball to a supremely dangerous opponent who has enough time to march down the field and score. On the other, you’re upset about a team that did everything they could to *avoid *conceding possession to a supremely dangerous opponent who has enough time to march down the field and score. Which is it?
To me, the clear moral of the story is: “Closing out the game with your offense on the field is far superior to letting a Hall of Fame QB try to beat you, and is a goal that should be pursued if at all feasible.” I’m honestly hard pressed to come up with an example you could have used that would argue more *against *your point of view.
Vikings fan here who was slightly pulling for Indy, but likes watching great teams, so I was generally indifferent to who won. I didn’t think either defense was going to win the game for their team. I thought both would/could score, given a decent amount of time, and they would only fail to score through their own ineptitude (overthrowing receivers, stupid penalties, etc). So, last team with the ball and just enough time would win.
A few discussion points:
What would you think if it’d been Manning and Calhoun going for it to ice the game? The whole “Evil Bill Belicheat” aspect is irrelevant in my opinion. It’s a great offense going for 2 yards against a tired defense. What happened on 3rd down (a bad call, I agree) is independent of what would happen on 4th. I’d bet 9 times out of 10 on either Brady or Manning getting their O to get the 1st.
Indy already had the momentum (I think this was discussed more in the Week 10 thread). Once they stopped NE on 3rd, the crowd was going crazy, and the Indy O would have been pumped up with the ball at the ~25 after a punt, so getting a stop on 4th doesn’t get them that much more excited. They just wanted the ball; it didn’t matter where they got it.
Perhaps Belichick thought what I was thinking: Indy was going to score regardless. If they score from the 30, presumably there’s a bit more time left (30-40 seconds, perhaps?), which would probably be enough for NE to get into fg position.
What I think it comes down to is the trade off of ~40-45 yards. Worst case scenario for NE in either case, Indy scores. Indy always shows they’ll go across the middle, and in a 2-deep, that’s going to be available. Indy would cover that ground pretty quickly, maybe 3 plays. So, they’re back to the NE 30 with 1:10-1:20 to go. Now, NE would (likely) have less time to march down the field to get a game-winning fg, assuming Indy gets the TD.
The problems for NE last night late: 1) TO before 1st down, 2) poor 3rd down call, and 3) tackling Addai at the 4, though you can’t blame the defenders too much for that.
When they threw the pass and it was a first down, it was a great and glorious play. When they marked it short, it was a stupid mistake and he should have known better.
You’re not alone, certainly. But is it just that you don’t want to hear the numbers because of some statistical obstacle that you perceive, or is it that you don’t think a question like this could ever be better resolved via statistics than football sense?
I don’t think this is an adequate argument against using 4th and 2 numbers as a baseline, though, even if you prefer to use it as a cautionary factor. The thing that makes goal line stands tough is not really the fact that short yardage equals a really bad outcome, but that the field of play literally ends just a few yards away. 4th and goal from the five gives the offense only fifteen yards of depth to work with; anything beyond that depth is immediately disqualified. A 4th and 2 from the 30 might seem like a goal line stand in terms of outcome, but in terms of defending it there’s a huge difference; if the defense was to literally ignore the medium depth the way it does in a goal line situation, the offense would convert probably 96% of the time.
If it was a 4th and inches, you wouldn’t expect the chances of conversion to be the same as a 3rd or 4th and goal from the 1-inch line, would you?
You say that it means shit, but I still don’t see the logical reason to discard the number as a general indicator of the probability of success. We can assume that roughly half of all 4th and 2s happen on the road in the noise, for instance, so that’s already part of the data. “If it’s so goddamn easy…” isn’t really an argument. If somebody says the chance of a conversion is 60%, that means a 40% chance of failure, not that IT ALWAYS WORKS WE ARE PROPHETS OF MATHEMATICAL NUMBERS.
Can you show me where somebody says only true football experts “get” it? It always seems to be the case that a group of people want to rely on statistics, and a group doesn’t, and the group that doesn’t often uses scare quotes like this to ridicule the notion that the numbers are meaningful. Do you really think there’s a lot of that kind of sentiment being expressed in these two threads?
I’ll tell you what my impression is: I think that Belichick made an unconventional decision which was grounded in sound principles, and it appears to me that Belichick is getting attacked from the defenders of the conventional approach; viz. “Bill Belichick trips over his own ego,” “his ego is the only possible explanation,” “So, it was “brilliant” because, despite being a risk with no corresponding upside and hugely unlikely to win anything, it was a “risky” move,” etc. These criticisms run counter to what I consider rational and considered arguments in favor of what Belichick did, and seem to be based on something other than considered and rational arguments.
And it seems to me that if this kind of analysis is the engine driving Bill Belichick’s coaching style, there’s ample reason to be ready to accept it as better than the conventional. Yet all you hear and read from the larger sports media is that kind of criticism – Rodney Harrison says it was the worst decision Belichick ever made, the analysts are unanimous in condemning the move, and so on. And frankly I’m kind of tired of it. Nobody thinks about things. It’s all rehashed Vince Lombardi tropes about how the only thing you can rely on is gut feelings and hustle and desire, and you can never trust actual analysis. “Stat” is a pejorative, and it conjures up a whole slew of mom’s-basement jokes and nerd putdowns. “You stat crunchers.”
A stat is a fact. A true thing that has happened in the game of football that was recorded as a successful football maneuver on somebody’s part. Bill Belichick, as he generally does, decided to make a decision based on real things that have happened, rather than football augury. And he’s getting pilloried for it because, well, he’s an asshole. But in a larger sense, this is an argument over whether there’s a place in sports for thinking about things. And it’s getting pretty tiresome that it’s somehow less pure to think about sports than it is to just vomit the wisdom of old dead men.
It’s because I think a generic 4th-and-2 success rate has very little bearing on the situation at hand, for the reasons I discussed. I suppose you could call it a “statistical obstacle,” if you insist.
You’re right in theory, but again, you’re coming at this from a generic 4th-and-2 perspective that just doesn’t apply here. With the pressure the Colts would be sure to bring (now that Dungy isn’t there) and tight man coverage, there isn’t any way that a 40 yard pass downfield is going to be allowed the time to develop. So while that space is there, unlike in a true goal line situation, the defense essentially gave Brady time to play with 5-10 yards of it. Hence, goal line is a fair comparison.
Well, there’s road noise, and then there’s “Make some damned noise crowd or this game is OVER” road noise. But it’s in the statistic to some extent, I’ll grant you that.
I’m not sure it’s been stated so explicitly, but that’s the “vibe” I’ve gotten from the other thread, if you will. Your mileage may vary, and that’s fine.
This was a very fair characterization of the situation, until you threw in that irrelevant, misplaced, and erroneous bit about “scare quotes.” But I’ll agree with your characterization otherwise.
Now that’s a silly thing to say in an otherwise fine post. A stat is a single data point largely devoid of context. That’s why some people throw up their own numbers to make their point, and others throw up their numbers to make their point, and we have fun discussions. If this were a simple factual matter, like “A football has laces,” then we’d not have such discussions.
What does this mean? Has anyone ever accused any coach anywhere of rolling the bones to find out what play to call? Or, to put it more bluntly, huh?
Oh give me a break. This isn’t a disagreement between grunting macho men and nerdy Poindexters armed with supercomputers. Belichick didn’t crunch any goddamned numbers before he made the decision, he didn’t run any computer simulations. He simply felt (and I’m assuming, but so are you) that Brady would likely convert the down, and Manning would likely score if he punted. There’s no anti-intelligentsia movement here.
On preview: I’d expect the chances for a 4th-and-one inch conversion to be almost precisely identical no matter where on the field, especially if EVERYONE is up on the line (as in this case).
Fair enough. I take your point. I disagree, but I don’t have the data.
It certainly wasn’t irrelevant, whatever else you might think about it, since I was talking about my mileage varying. I’m referring here to your implication that there was a vibe that only certain people get it, as you said. The vibe is exactly what I’m talking about; you put quotes around “get it” to demonstrate what the other side was talking about, right? But it isn’t. More in a second.
The paragraph that came in between the above two quotes contained examples of the sort of thing I was talking about. In case I wasn’t clear, I’m not accusing you of taking that particular stance, just explaining why, from my perspective, these kinds of debates get wearying quickly as a result of their oddly personal nature.
All I’m saying is that there is a very consistent tradition in these threads that goes like this:
A: widely-accepted bit of sports wisdom
B: actually, statistical analysis tending to demonstrate that sports wisdom is misguided
A: rolleyes, you number crunchers, everybody knows that accepted sports wisdom
B: yeah, but check it out - here are the numbers
A: you and your numbers, ha ha ha, try watching a game some day
And it’s annoying. I don’t want to make this a thread about me providing citations of this phenomenon, but I promise you, it wouldn’t be hard. And that might explain the vibe you are getting.
And again, I promise you, that is exactly what there is in these threads. I apologize if you feel like you’ve been lumped in with it unfairly; that wasn’t my intent so much as I intended to describe my perspective. You are mistaken if you don’t think that Belichick crunched any numbers or relied on any computer simulations. That’s what I meant with the “augury” remark; Belichick (and now his disciples) is pretty well-known as being one of the very few if not the only NFL coach who relies to any great extent on that kind of advanced analysis rather than the conventional, more subjective style of decision-making.
