Of course, Elvis, at least Tony LaRussa won a World Series, which is more than you can say for Beane.
And to be fair, while the Final Four managers are all people persons, you have to compare Beane to the GENERAL managers. The Red Sox are an absurd team to claim as a contrast to Beane, because they’re probably the most sabermetric-obsessed team in major league baseball; they hired Bill James, for God’s sake, and the GM is a 29-year-old gearhead. The Yankees are certainly bears for high-OBP baseball. The Marlins and Cubs have been pretty smartly run but I’m not as familiar with their GM’s particular peccadilloes.
Well, the Cubs appear to be run from the Manager’s office at this point. I can’t imagine a sane GM wanting to pick up Womack, Glanville AND Goodwin is one spree. That’s just plain wrong.
The Sabrmetric guys are beginning to make an impact. Boston, Oakland, and Toronto are all run that way. There’ll be more.
And Jimmy Breslin was always a fool. There’s one helluva lot more to what happens in the game than the eye can see.
You obviously don’t understand, Jonathan. Those guys are PROVEN VETERANS!
Seriously, when does Baker stop getting a pass on his lousy management? He abuses his pitchers, gets outmanaged in every big game and has an affinity for light-hitting old men. He’s a good guy and people play hard for him but he’s also been blessed with the best player in baseball (Bonds) for a chunk of career and a team with one of the best rotations in baseball (Cubs) after that.
The “sabermetric-obsessed” Sox front office provided one of the scariest bullpens we’ve seen in a while. Of the big run-producers this year, Ramirez and Nixon were already here and Ortiz was signed only at the behest of Pedro Martinez. They signed Millar and Mueller as backups, not starters. The starting pitchers were inherited, too. Sabermetrics didn’t contribute a damn thing. The team won despite it. 'Nuf sed?
the reduction of the game to statistics and probabilities. There is an organization called SABR - Society for American Baseball Research - and the more exotic stats are called sabremetrics.
The question is what odds are you using. SABRmetrics provided a deeper analysis (supposedly) as to what was going on in the game and the relative value of various stats. Go to some of those sites we’ve recommended and you’ll get a grasp of what’s going on. And read some of the books recommended.
Anyway, back on topic, twenty years ago the manager might look at batting average to determine which player to put in the lineup, where SABRmetrics said, no, you look at on-base percentage to get a better feel.
For example, say you’ve got two guys and you’re trying to decide who to put in the leadoff slot. One guy has a batting average of .300 but an on-base percentage of .320. The other guy has a batting average of .280 but an on-base percentage of .340. Who do you use?
Well, 20 years ago the manager most likely would have just compared the two batting averages and went with player A. Nowadays, the manager would probably look at on-base percentages and go with player B. That’s impact of SABRmetrics.
The difference is in obsessiveness, to the point of discounting the importance of anything that can’t be readily quantified on a spreadsheet. The SABR geeks have lost perspective on the full game while claiming superior depth of understanding - unfortunately for them, that claim is not typically borne out by results.
The problem is peculiar to baseball because of the sheer mass of numbers available that can superficially seem meaningful as well. The disease simply isn’t possible in a more flowing sport like soccer or rugby or basketball - the saner mass of available numbers allows one to appreciate the actual game, the players’ athleticism, the drama, the full spectrum of the sports entertainment experience.
Did anyone mention the Fenway men’s rooms? Troughs.. Old, soldered sheet metal things that drain into a pipe at the end. “Squeeze together, boys, there are more behind you wanting to get rid of their overpriced beer! And remember to look straight ahead at all times - no peeking.”
It’s not, but you have to know just what odds to play. When deciding whether to pinch-hit for a certain batter, do you look at:
His batting average in general?
His batting average against that type of pitcher (righty/lefty)?
His batting average against this particular pitcher?
His batting average in this ballpark?
His batting average on humid Tuesdays?
Sabermetrics is all about isolating significant factors in baseball statistics to provide more meaningful comparisons…and thus, smarter ways to “play the odds.”
it depends on how intricate the stats get. You say “I’ll walk Bibliovore and pitch to Jonathan Chance, since Bib is hitting .325 against lefties, and Jon hits .225”, that’s playing odds. if you say Jon is a better player overall, because he has a higher Runs Created, where runs created is:
{(hits + walks + hit by pitch - caught stealing - grounded into double plays) * [(total bases + .26(walks - intentional walks + hit by pitch) + .52 (sacrifcies + sacrifice flies + stolen bases)]} / (at bats + walks + hit by pitch + sacrifice flies +sacrifices)
you are a sabrmetrician. (Runs Created, technical version, 1988 Bill James abstract). It is NOT the most intricate stat there, either. It is one used more often than some more arcane ones.
Ooog, statistics. While they’re fine in moderation, I refuse to get bogged down in the morass of numbers that some fans seem to love wallowing in. Yes, I want to know how well garciaparra did last season versus this season, but I don’t care what his batting average is when hitting against lefty pitchers on humid Tuesdays in Yankee Stadium while wearing boxers and breathing through his left nostril. I just want to enjoy the game, breathe some fresh air, and cheer for my team for a while. The food’s important too, though.
Heard this on the radio yesterday: Pedro Martinez opponents batting average through his first 100 pitches of the game is something like .224 – but AFTER 100 pitches his ERA is over SIX and opponents hit some .370 against him.
Now, this is important to consider when you look back and see that in Game 7 vs. the Yanks, Pedro threw 100 pitches to end the 7th inning. The Boston bullpen had been almost unhittable all post-season. At this point, it seems obvious to go to the bullpen. Furthermore, to begin the 8th, AFTER the Yanks began to rally, Boston’s manager Grady Little (Baltimore’s future manager) STILL left Pedro in the game, and the decision quite possibly lost them a chance at the world series.
I think there is a fine-line as to what is important and what isn’t when getting into stats. I think what Beane is trying to do is just figure out which stats are more important than others from a draft/general manager sense, but there might be a need for “in the dugout” analysis (in my opinion).
You don’t need those stats to see Pedro was gassed by the 7th inning and shouldn’t have been used in the 8th, Stover. It’s just one more log on the bonfire of evidence against Grady’s move.
Yep. And all that was known a long time ago about Pedro. Little ignored it and look where it got him.
SABRmetrics (I admit, I’m a member of SABR) is advancing the game just as much now as in the past when Thorn and Palmer published The Hidden Game of Baseball or later when Bill James began using real numbers to produce results about won-loss records through the research done by the Baseball Prospectus and Retrosheet. Each generation discovers new intricacies in the game.
I firmly believe that, as the new era continues old guys like Baker and (God help us) Baylor will eventually fall by the wayside. Scouts and those believing them have been believing the (now demonstrably) false assumptions for decades. It’s time we showed them the door.
Examples:
When faced with a first round draft choice. Should one take a high school pitcher with talent 10 (numbers made up) or a college pitcher with a talent of 7? Most scout-oriented people would draft the high school player because he has the highest potential. Well enough. But a historical check of things would show that of those pitchers more of the college pitchers (with less talent) will make it and contribute to the major league team because they’re A) farther along in their development when they’re drafted and B) they’re less prone to injury (the bugaboo of young pitchers). Therefore the smart way to bet is on the college pitcher and he should be your draft choice.
Man on first, no outs. What does one do…bunt or swing away? Conventional wisdom (scouts again) would say that in a close game one should bunt the runner over to place him in scoring position. However, by looking at run production over the last X number of years (anywhere from 1 to 100 years depending on how far down you want to go) one can determine that the odds of scoring with a man on first and no outs are significantly higher than the odds of scoring with a man on second and 1 out. So swinging away and not bunting is the smart way to bet.
What SABRmetrics is about is the challenging of the revealed wisdom of the institutional memory of baseball. To take so belief ‘in such-and-such a situation one should do X’ and determine if that is actually a wise move. Frequently the answer is ‘yes, that’s the right thing to do’. But because it also sometimes answers ‘no, that’s foolish and here’s why’ it threatens a great many people.
Nonetheless, an organization that arms itself with this data, prepares itself to use it and consistently implements it will eventually begin improving their fortunes. After that it’s only a matter of time before the others do. No industry is as fiercely imitative of success as major league baseball.
From Ruth deciding that home runs were a worthy goal to Gossage and Quisenberry and Fingers defining the ‘closers’ role we keep moving forward. And those who can’t see and adapt end up losing in the long run.
I believe there is a fine-line in using stats because no matter how large the sampe, or no matter how far you go back, it’s almost impossible to duplicate a certain situation.
ie the runner on first nobody out in a close game situation. Yes, numbers may tell you, with great accuracy, what works on average. But that’s just it - on average. Unless you can duplicate the exact same situation (what average do the following three batters have, how many home runs to they have, how wild is the pitcher, how fast is the runner, is the wind blowing in or out, etc). Of course you could assume all else equal, but when it’s game 7 of a championship series, what if there’s a guy on first w/ nobody out and an american league pitcher with 10 career at bats is up? What if the count runs 2-0 and someone who can steal is on? Or a poor catcher is throwing. Or David Wells is on the mound. I just think it’s all situational, and that’s what’s great about baseball 'cause you can second guess alot, and success sometimes appears to be caused by intangibles rather than stats…?
Sort of. It depends on your situation. Suppose I’m the Yankees of a few years back or the Braves of the mid-90s. In that situation, I take the high ceiling player because I’ve got no pressing needs and can afford the time to develop him properly. And the rewards will be greater by the time he does come up.
