Agreed the denazification program in Ukraine is not proceeding according to Putin’s original plan, is there any realistic chance that it will end even more badly for him than we’re thinking?
If the Russians start pouring even more resources into the fight, and get whupped at every turn for another few months or so, might NATO decide “Hmmm, this might be the right time for us to mount an invasion, stage a coup, attack Russia in some way we didn’t think possible before?”
What would that look like, a more directly aggressive stance towards Russia by the west?
Unless we’re absolutely positive that it’s the only way to prevent nuclear war, the chance of direct regime change - meaning invasion - is absolute zero. It’s not going to happen.
Indirect regime change - meaning providing clandestine support for elements inside Russia who may overthrow Putin - is likely, and probably already underway. But that won’t involve any NATO “boots on the ground”.
Quite clearly yes, but to quote the Beatles, maybe “with a little help from my friends”.
A lot of this is wishful thinking, though. Putin is well aware of potential threats against him personally and has structured political and military power accordingly.
Under what circumstances would it even be possible to stage an invasion without triggering a nuclear war? Do you have a particular scenario in mind?
Staging an invasion after a nuclear war has started might happen, provided the two sides didn’t completely annihilate each other with nuclear weapons first.
Okay but one of the scenarios I have in mind is if Putin stupidly decides that he’s backed so far into a corner that he tries some sort of limited nuclear weapon against Ukraine, or something equally desperate. Or say the Ukrainians get him so much on the defensive that they mount an offensive to take back Crimea so the war escalates further, and NATO starts thinking, “In for a penny, in for a pound”?
I’m talking about some far-fetched scenario in which we know that Putin has already comitted to launching a full-scale nuclear assault, and the only way that it might be stopped would be to take him out quickly. Not likely, I agree, but you can’t write it off.
Even with this scenario it will have to happen from within. The Russian military wants to remain in power as well, putting them in a nuclear exchange would pretty much wipe out their existing power structure. They would rather maintain power like they have now than have to rule in a post nuclear apocalypse world. In other words, no one want to rule in hell when they have a choice to serve in heaven in extreme comfort.
I don’t think that the Russian military is against using nuclear weapons in the proper context. I just don’t believe that they would see this situation that Putin has placed them in justifies going nuclear. And Putin knows this.
Listened to Do Not Go Gentle on This American Life yesterday. Terrifying. If you want some insight into just how much Russians and specifically the police have bought into the “You’re either in favor of the war or you’re a traitor,” listen to act 2. The level of violence and profanity is pretty shocking. Chapter one is about Victor Orban’ victory in Hungary, so also interesting and depressing. I would say that currently regime change is not on the event horizon.
Exactly how much time do you think there is between “committed to launching a full-scale nuclear assault”, and said assault being launched? We’re already talking a matter of minutes, there. And the amount of time between us finding out that he’s thus committed and the launch of said assault is a negative number.
I agree with others that the “regime change” will have to happen from within. Given that it appears that the Russian citizens and even their church are solidly on Poutine’s side, regime change isn’t happening anytime soon.
Things that might haven some effect are the sanctions and if the pope would publicly condemn Poutine and Kirill. (I think he’s the head of the Russian church)
When it will happen is the big question. As long as the world keeps feeding money to Putin it will continue. Cut off the gas and oil sales and they’ll go under in 2 weeks.
If Russia’s border starts moving in - Turkey annexes some land, Lithuania annexes some land, China annexes some land, etc. - then Putin will get thrown out pretty promptly, I expect.
If it gets locked into a war of attrition then it will just hang out in Ukraine, fighting like two tired, bloodied boxers who can barely lift their arms for as long as it takes to quietly give up, go home, and pretend that the whole thing never happened. Putin stays.
But, most likely, Putin withdraws just before May 9th, announces that he was victorious, and lives on with prime ratings for having killed all the nazis, using that popularity to start building the self-sufficient nation of Russian.
First, stop giving even a hint of legitimacy to this offensive propaganda by repeating it, even if intended in jest. Russia is not “denazifying” Ukraine, and while Ukraine (like many Central and EasternEuropean nations has issues with white nationalist elements, it is a democratic regime run by a Jewish president. Without irony Russian propaganda will talk of ‘denazification’ one minute and then about the ‘Zionist leadership’ of President Zelenskyy the next, illustrating their Fox News-like ability to spew venomous invective even when it is self-contradictory.
The Russian Orthodox Church is part of the Eastern Orthodox tradition, which are autocephalous quasi-national churches recognized under the authority of Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, Bartholomew I. There are informal relations between the Patriarchate and the Apostolic See (in effect, the Roman Catholic Church) but the Eastern Orthodox Churches are a separate tradition with no obligation to or recognition of the Pope of Rome as their religious leader.
As for any notions of a popular uprising, even if the Russian people were so discontent with Putin it wouldn’t matter. The Russian Confederation is ostensibly a democracy in its trappings but Putin has assured that all effective opposition has been eliminated and criticism silenced. The protestors you see being arrested represent only a small fraction of primarily younger people (Russia has one of the oldest population demographics in the world) and most of them are likely going to be sent to prison for extended terms. In general, Russians are not very enthusiastic about ‘democracy’ as a form of effective governance, and their brief experience of it under Yeltsin (who himself was not especially positive about democracy and mostly mouthed the words to improve the international standing of Russia in the hopes of being more integrated into the global economy) validated all of their skepticism of it. The Russians are fine with a strong autocratic leader as long as they perceive that things are going better in Russia than elsewhere, and such perceptions are sculpted by propaganda. Isolating Russia through sanctions and travel restrictions ironically makes it easier for Putin to control the population even though they will bear the brunt of the economic effects in the near term.
A military coup might be possible if enough military leaders could get together to conspire (as they did under Yeltsin in 1993, but it seems clear that Putin has clearly weakened and divided the leadership (which in part probably explains the exceptionally poor performance in the Invasion of Ukraine). If there is any element within the Russian government likely to instigate regime change it probably comes from the intelligence apparatus which seems very unhappy with how it has been used during the Putin regime, but again Putin seems to have taken steps to assure that such action is not likely in the near future by dividing power.
I know there is a common belief that nuclear war cannot happen because ‘someone’ will step in and stop it, but just as with the US National Command Authority (in the Office of the President), the Russian President has plenary authority to authorize the use of tactical nuclear weapons and order the launch of strategic systems without any other approvals. There is nothing that NATO can do to stop this other than emphasizing their deterrence strategy of proportionate response (in the case of tactical) and devastating counterstrike (in the case of strategic exchange), which only works if the launch authority cares about the consequences of such a response. Certainly invading Russia or even directly threatening its allies (such as they are) will only precipitate extreme responses.
