Help Me Not Be a Vegetarian!

Great Debates
181

Blonde, you’re making the same mistake Shodan is making, among others: rather than looking at beings as individuals, you’re grouping them together.

I’m not personally ashamed of the acts of terrorists, pedophiles, rapists, and brutal killers. I’ve not done any of those things. If other humans have, well, THEY are the ones that are morally culpable for them.

You say that animals are innocent of the evil deeds, but that is demonstrably false. If it’s the deeds themselves that are evil – if the deeds themselves have moral weight – then we find that many individual animals are wicked indeed. Roosters rape hens as a matter of course. Some chimpanzees practice kidnapping, infanticide, and cannibalism, not necessarily in that order. Ants wage wars to gain slaves.

The reason animals don’t have to live up to a morality standard is because they’re incapable of doing so. Asking a dog to behave morally is like asking a bolt of lightning to behave morally, or asking a Subaru to behave morally: it’s an absurd request.

Some humans, by virtue of being capable of making moral decisions, assume the burden of moral responsibility. It is our ability to make moral decisions that lends moral weight to our actions, not vice versa.

Daniel

182

I am using moral criteria. I thought you were doing the same, when you posited that animals could not be moral agents. Presumably they can’t be moral agents because of their mental condition, which is controlled by their biological characteristics. Humans can be, because their biology is different. In other words, the moral and biological overlap.

Blonde, you are contradicting yourself. If morality cannot be applied to animals, then you cannot praise them as “innocent” for actions that can only be condemned by applying a moral standard.

Besides, Left Hand of Dorkness has already mentioned that many animals engage in activities that would be condemned as immoral if performed by humans. Ducks commit rape, goats overgraze and destroy eco-systems, chimps commit cannibalism, murder, and war (cf. Jane Goodall). And particularly, animals commit violence against other species, as when predators eat other animals - the same behavior you condemn as immoral when performed by humans, and done with considerably less concern for suffering than in the average slaughterhouse.

Regards,
Shodan

183

Shodan, the thing is, ducks have biological reasons why they cannot be considered moral agents – but so do infant humans, and so do severely brain-damaged humans. Why are the biological distinctions between ducks and humans important, ethically speaking, but the biological distinctions between mentally competent humans and mentally incompetent humans unimportant?

You have a small error that I’m going to pick on, because this error glosses over the crux of my argument. You say that “Humans can be [moral agents].” That’s not, strictly speaking, correct: some humans can be. My question isn’t about those humans that can be; it’s about those humans that cannot be. What of them, and why do we treat them as moral subjects?

Daniel

184

An excellent point.

Trying hard to avoid special pleading in amending my argument, I would say a couple of things -
[ul][li]In many instances, we do not treat infants, the brain-damaged, etc., as moral agents. We do not hold children to the same level of responsibility as adults, and we allow euthanasia and abortion and otherwise treat some humans as we do other non-moral agents. So we do not implement the species-wide distinction as I described it. [/li][li]Since this is a thread about vegetarianism, we don’t use non-moral agent humans as food for the reasons I described above, because it confers an evolutionary advantage on the species to rule other members of your group as off-limits as food, even under fairly severe circumstances. I suppose you could describe this as a biological characteristic, as it is common to many species, but it is not exactly morally based in the same way that blaming an adult human for his moral actions is. [/li][li]If I understand you correctly, some humans can be moral agents, but no animals, in your view. By and large, I agree with you, although we could quibble about some animals like chimps and porpoises and so forth, or even theoretical extra-terrestrial animals. [/li]
Nonetheless, we eat animals because they cannot be moral agents. We do not eat humans, even non-moral agent humans, for reasons other than moral ones. Same for our non-eating of cats and dogs - they qualify for food status because they cannot be moral agents, but are not eaten because to spare them confers other advantages (even if some of those advantages are tenuous. I mentioned the emotional connection that people feel towards pets, which causes them to regard eating their cat with much the same horror as they feel towards cannibalism). [/ul]

In other words, we eat virtually any species except humans, because humans are unique. They are the only species capable of being moral agents. The reasons we don’t eat humans who are not capable of being moral agents, are unrelated to moral considerations under that principle. Our other treatment of non-moral agent humans - euthanasia, abortion, etc. - is consistent with the principle.

Have I salvaged my bright line?

Regards,
Shodan

185

Shodan, if I’m reading you correctly, you don’t believe in moral subjects, right? That is, beings who are incapable of moral agency, but who are still the subjects of moral concerns?

That may be an important distinction between us, and I’m not sure how to bridge it. I see three broad categories of beings:

Moral Agents are those who can make decisions based on a rational ethos, whether or not they choose to do so. The desires and interests of such beings should be taken into consideration by other moral agents. The healthy, conscious adult human is the archetypal moral agent.

Moral Subjects are those who cannot make moral decisions, but who have desires and interests. The desires and interests of such beings should be taken into consideration by moral agents. A human toddler is an example of a moral subject.

Moral Non-Subjects are those entities who cannot make moral decisions and who do not have desires or interests. A pebble is an example of a moral non-subject.

I believe the category of moral subject is very important to a rational ethos: otherwise, in order to protect the brain-dead from murder, we must resort to shaky arguments like “evolutionary advantage.” Surely it would be to our evolutionary advantage to kill and eat those members of our society who are terminally ill? By doing so, we would not be wasting resource keeping the terminally ill alive, and indeed we would be gaining resources (calories) for the next generation.

Even if there were an evolutionary advantage to keeping the terminally ill alive, do we really want to base our philosophy around what confers an “evolutionary advantage”? Such thinking is behind eugenics, hardly the most lauded philosophy out there. Indeed, at the risk of Godwinizing, a philosophy that subordinates the good of the individual to the good of the group to such a degree comes perilously close to fascism or totalitarianism.

Instead of providing indirect protections to infants and the mentally incompetent, I advocate protecting them directly by assigning rights (negative-duty rights, mind you) based on desires and interests. When I refrain from beating a child, I don’t refrain because it provide an evolutionary advantage (I don’t believe it does, and even if it did, what do I care about evolution?) – I refrain because that child has a desire not to be beaten, and it is in that child’s best interests not to be beaten, and the child therefore has a right not to be beaten.

But then I look at my cat. My cat, spaz though she may be, desires not to be beaten. It is in her best interests not to be beaten. My cat therefore has a right not to be beaten.

In both cases, this right is prima facie: this right not be beaten exists only in the absence of other, conflicting moral issues. Perhaps I genuinely believe that, although my child has a desire not to be smacked, it is in the child’s best interests to be swatted for being so rude to a stranger. In this case, a desire and an interest are in conflict, and if I judge the interest to be stronger than the desire, I might conclude that swatting the kid is ethical.

Same thing with my cat: sometimes her desire not to be swatted conflicts with my desire not to have her sitting her little cat-butt down on my countertop. I’ll swat her off the counter.

This issue of conflicting desires and interests is what keeps me from being a reliable supporter of animal rights – as does my belief that, while cows and humans both have desires and interests, humans tend to have stronger and more of both.

Daniel

186

I agree with your category of “moral subject”, and I would include what I referred to as “non-moral agents” like fetuses, animals, and the brain-damaged in that category.

But I don’t think it would be to our advantage to eat the terminally ill, for reasons I mentioned in a previous post. The taboo on murder is very strong in our species, and since there tends to no be food shortages in societies rich enough to wonder what will happen to the terminally ill (hunter-gatherers and subsistence farmers tend not to have a choice), there is no advantage to be gained from eating the terminal.

The evolutionary advantages to be gained from an (almost) absolute prohibition on killing other members of the species outweigh the advantages of selectively butchering those who will die anyway. And this is not limited to humans - cannibalism is relatively rare in nature, AFAIK, since it tends to work against the success of a given breeding population. Jane Goodall described instances of cannibalism in chimps, but this seems to have been in response to population pressures on a subgroup of chimps limited in their range. There are very few large-bodied species who make other members of their species a regular part of their diet.

This refers mostly to murder for cannibalism. Of course there are many instances of infanticide, leaving old Eskimos to die, and things like war and capital punishment, but the specific idea of regarding members of your own group as food seems to be strongly selected against. It seems rather similar to the incest taboo, which also is nearly universal and arouses rather similar feelings of horror and disgust.

It also forms the basis for utilitarianism, a much less maligned philosophical position.

But frankly, it doesn’t matter (from an evolutionary point of view) whether or not eugenics is unpleasant or condemned in human thought. What matters is whether or not it is successful in increasing the chances that a given population will raise more offspring that survive to reproduce.

What I would object to about eugenics is not that it has led to abuses in the past, but that it was based on wrong notions about what was evolutionarily advantageous. The Nazis were mistaken in their notion that Jews and gypsies and so forth were '“less evolved” than Aryans, or that blue eyes were a more desirable trait than brown or black ones. Therefore applying deliberate selective pressure to get more “Aryans” to reproduce, and to try to eliminate Jews, Slavs, and so forth, were not simply wrong - they were stupid. To be successful in their “Final Solution” would not have addressed any of their problems, which were not biological in nature.

The mistake of eugenics is to class those who should be moral agents into the class of moral subjects, or of moral non-subjects.

I am perfectly happy to class most food animals into the class of moral subjects, who have no rights themselves but are the subject of moral obligations by moral agents. Thus animals, including food animals, should be treated humanely. But they are not the subject of any obligation not to be killed and eaten.

In the same way, I would not say that a terminally comatose patient has any right that moral agents are bound to respect not to be killed, but are the subject of moral obligations by the rest of us not to be made to suffer. But I have no problems with humane euthanasia for the incurable. I would even say that a irretrievably damaged person who cannot suffer pain (an infant born with no brain, for instance) is a moral non-subject - more like a stone or a carrot than a person. I wouldn’t eat her, for reasons described above, but it would be OK with me to kill her or use her for transplanted organs or something.

If you want to call that ‘eugenics’, I have no objection, in the same way I would have no objection to sterilizing some mentally retarded person with an inheritable illness and the likelihood of reproducing.

Happy New Year, by the way.

Regards,
Shodan

187

I was raised a vegetarian. To begin with, like most childeren do, I accepted the logic of vegetarianism. However, the hypocrisy of vegetarianism is obvious. Buying animal products made from meat gives money to the very same people who are raising animals for slaughter. This ends the logic behind the “Buying-meat-commissions-the-slaughter-of-the-next-animal-theory.” Of course, you can choose to avoid any animal products, but by doing so, unless you manage your nutrient intake like a Nazi, you will very likely end up unhealthy. Even if you do decide to become a vegan, this is not the most logical way of ending animal suffering. For example, vegetable and grain production involves poisoning, shredding, and squashing more animals (and causing more suffering) than even the meat industry does. I also have recognised the wisdom of Hindus. If suffering wasn’t an unavoidable part of the world, it wouldn’t be maiya. I understand the idea that we should reduce suffering, but vegetarianism seems to me to be an entirely different issue. Making a big stand on not eating animals seems to be missing the point. Eating small quantities of free range meat as part of an organic diet and a generally caring lifestyle would reduce suffering, make the world a better place, and allow someone to eat a fully varied and balanced diet.

188

First, let me distinguish two different issues: what can we eat, and what can we kill. For the first, I don’t think there are major issues; I see no reason why, if we accept that an animal, or a person, or anything else, is dead, we can’t eat it. Now, I’d prefer not to eat my grandfather, but if I were trapped and starving and he were dead, I’d do it. On the subject of ‘utilizing’ grandma’s teeth, I’m all for it. When I die, at least, I really hope someone does something more productive with my corpse than bury it. Donate it to science, give the organs, whatever; but don’t waste it.

What we’re allowed to kill is a different question. I see nothing wrong with eating dead people; I see a lot wrong with killing living people. However, I don’t think I really do agree with the classification of ‘moral subject.’ I don’t think you can just assume a moral obligation exists without being able to show why it exists. A moral agent has rights, not just because I say so, but because I can show why this is so (an argument I made in this thread: http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?threadid=230016&pagenumber=2. I’d repost it, but the two posts I made in that thread added up to nine pages in Word; I don’t want to hog that much space). A moral subject, on the other hand, is just a being that is asserted to have some sort of rights. Looking at specific cases:

The baby. Probably the most sensitive case here. I’d classify the baby as a moral agent of sorts, with rights, because even if the baby can’t make decisions now, the potential for decision-making is still there. Assuming the child isn’t miserably deformed, it will as it grows develop the capacity to make moral decisions, thus qualifying it as a moral agent.

Mentally retarded persons: divided into two groups. The first group is peopel retarded but still functional. These people still have some measure of decision-making ability; even if they can’t reason as well as you or I can, their mental ability is still somewhere above a cow’s (I’m taking my mother’s word on this; she worked on a cow farm one summer). Even if they have more limited rational capacities, those capacities still exist.

The second group is the totally braindead. These people have no thought-process whatsoever. I’m going to get attacked for saying this, but I’m used to it: I have no problem with killing those people whatsoever. As far as I’m concerned, a person who isn’t capable of thinking, at all, isn’t really alive. He’s just dead and waiting for his heart to stop beating. Thus, I would consider a full lobotomy teh moral equivalent of murder, even if the body were put on life-support.

Now, the subject of this thread, animals: I think it depends on the specific animal/species in question. I would have issues with eating a dolphin or a chimpanzee; I don’t know that they have rational capacities, but it’s certainly immanently possible, so I wouldn’t kill one of them. However, there does seem to be a difference between chimpanzees and chickens or cows, so I have no problem with killing the latter.

Next, I disagree with those of you who say that Blonde and the other pro-vegetarians are too harsh in their approaches to meat eaters; in fact, I almost think they’re too mild. If you accept the premise (which they seem to; forgive me if I misrepresent) that animals have as much right to live as we do, then it seems to follow that you should treat a person who kills an animal the same way you would treat someone who kills another human being. I would be utterly horrified to talk to someone responsible for the deaths of hundreds of innocents; but if you class cows and chickens in with those ‘innocents,’ I’m surely guilty of that many, if not more. I don’t find this reprehensible simply because, to be blunt, I don’t care what happens to the chicken, and see no reason to care. In contrast to those of you who say we can kill the animal but we have to be humane, I don’t care how they’re treated. I see no reason to torture animals (especially if it’s true that stress makes the meat taste worse), but I see no reason not to either.

Conversely, I, oddly enough, get nearly as offended at vegetarians as most strict vegetarians do at meat-eaters. This is because I place a great deal of value on a quality (rationality) that separates humans from animals; any degradation of the value placed on that quality tends to make me bristle. Thus, I tend to be somewhat upset by people who equivocate animals and humans because they are, as I see it, trying to avoid acknowledging the part of humanity that makes humans valuable and relevant.

Finally, to those of you who ask about my killing my pets: if my mother weren’t sure to get upset, and the dog were slightly more annoying, I’m sure I’d find some way to get rid of it.

189

I am hoping that your statement was made in a very USA centric fashion, because actually “the majority of the earth’s population” is looking for a way to eat enough to survive, not seeking to have their next happy meal. http://www.thehungersite.com/cgi-bin/WebObjects/CTDSites.woa/166/wo/0L5000VS600LO200J7/1.0.49.1.0.1.0.1.0.CustomContentLinkDisplayComponent.0.0

As to what alternative (vegetarian or not), I don’t believe that was the OP’s question, but as to whether the scare tactics employed by PETA are reality or not. I understand PETA’s desire to “demonize” its opposition, but I believe it descredits those who believe that a vegeterian or vegan lifestyle is something they choose, and not a moral imperative to be imposed on the rest of humanity. I believe it is the same as the case of GM crops, in that we may not agree with them, but to have people starve to death…