That the factions in the Lebanese gov’t other than Hezbollah are secretly happy about what’s going on, because it is likely to lead to an end to Hezbollah, and therefore an increase in their own power?
And that the reason the Lebanese army isn’t going in is because the non-Hezbollah factions of the Lebanese government, on the one hand, and Israel on the other, have an… understanding… if you know what I mean…
I speak, I know, out of utter historical ignorance. I wonder how ignorantly I speak, though, along other dimensions as well.
I don’t think it’s fair to say that any other part of the Lebanese government is happy about the Israeli attacks. There might be factions that were glad to see Hezbollah suffer, but the price is too high.
The attacks have destroyed billions in infrastructure, a lot of which was built in the past decade as the country recovered from the civil war.
There is are some good reasons why Lebanon’s army hasn’t taken on Hezbollah. Hezbollah is Shiite, while the army is largely dominated by the Sunnis. In the Shia parts of Lebannon, Hezbollah has a great deal of legitimacy. If the army was to attack Hezbollah, it would likely reignite the civil war which remains an incredibly painful period for the country.
No one in the goverment (and probably in the country) seems to have the stomach for another civil war, the country was on its way back to being the Paris of the Middle East. Now, in the period of a couple of weeks all of that is teetering on the brink again and sending the army to fight Hezbollah would likely push it over the edge.
Just the opposite, I think. Hezbollah is a creature of Syria, in large part, and isn’t going anywhere no matter how many bombs Israel drops. Lebanon has long been under Syria’s thumb, but after the assassination of Hariri, they were just beginning to find the resolve to cut the Syrian cancer out of their country. It seems to me that the Present Unpleasantness is more about Syria loosing the leash on their Hezbollah dogs in order to bait Israel into attacking Lebanese assets with the goal of strangling nascent Lebanese nationalism and re-establishing their hold on the country than it is about anyone actually making any sort of dent in Israeli power. The idea is, I think, that when the dust settles in a couple of weeks (or so Syria hopes), Israel will be exactly where it was, Hezbollah will belly back up to the arms-smuggling trough, and Lebanon will be the same basket case it was ten years ago, unable to resist the Syrian tentacles threading their way into the corridors of power, and resuming their status as a puppet state. If Syria’s able to get any movement on the old Golan Heights issue, so much the better, but the real goal, I believe, is reining in Lebanon’s tentative steps toward actual independence.