Popper described the concept, he didn’t invent it, so his views of dualism aren’t really relevant. In any case I was referring to the OP’s definition. Certain types of dualism are clearly falsifiable. His isn’t, which he admits.
States in that form, it’s not a fundamental law, but applies merely to large enough systems to have a thermodynamic description to a good approximation. I was thinking about the statistical physics definition, which applies to every system, but only makes statistical predictions. From wikipedia:
So no, we don’t have to rewrite the laws of physics to observe violations of the second law.
That’s kinda like saying that you’re just deluding yourself if you believe in the existence of arms, because they can be reduced to cells, or atoms, or quantum fields, or what have you.
I think both are wrong. The dominant current physical picture is an indeterministic one, and the question of determinism is wholly irrelevant regarding moral law. Even if all of our choices are predetermined doesn’t mean that they aren’t morally consequential, just as the fact that you can’t change that you ordered pizza yesterday doesn’t mean you didn’t make a meaningful choice ordering it.
Besides, I don’t think your dualism gets you where you want to go. While only souls might be able to suffer, the fact of their suffering is wholly irrelevant towards the actions taken against them. Or, in other words: my actions are wholly determined by the physical (on epiphenomenalist dualism), consequently they have no moral import, because it’s not me, not my soul, my self, that’s responsible for these actions. It’s all due to the universal wave function and the boundary conditions of the universe. Whether as a result of these actions, a soul suffers or not doesn’t factor into it. Morality arises through being responsible for one’s actions, which I can’t be, on your model.
On an entirely unrelated hijack, I’m of the opinion that people who get hung up on free will and determinism/nondeterminism don’t even understand the question they’re trying to answer. Free will isn’t about being unpredictable; it’s about whether you make decisions yourself, without your decision being influenced or dictated by outside forces. Your mind, your memories, your physical brain state - those are all part of you, and thus are supposed to participate in the decision-making process. If they determine the result, even if they determine it in a wholly deterministic and predictable way, that’s how it’s supposed to work!
I mean, I don’t like spicy food. I’m 100% predictable regarding whether I’ll choose to eat something spicy or not. Does this mean I don’t have free will? Of course not. It means I have thoughts and opinions, which is what makes me able to make a meaningful choice. Randomity may add unpredictability, but it reduces free will - if I let a coin flip choose my meal that’s not an exercise of will, free or otherwise.
Honestly, even if there is randomity inherent in the underlying substrata of the physical universe, I’m quite certain that the mechanics of the brain work to mostly or entirely avoid random effects influencing the system, just like computer systems are designed to avoid perturbations in the electrical currents messing things up. If people were really constantly having random perturbations scrambling their thoughts they wouldn’t even be able to walk straight.
I will for now refrain from further arguments about determinism because I don’t fully understand the current state of physics. I don’t understand how non-deterministic physicalism works but I am really in no position to argue about it, and even if I were that would be better suited for a different thread.
~Max
I will admit that the mechanism, if it exists, does exactly as you say it does. So it is simpler to cut Susan out of the picture entirely. Somewhere deep down the representation might be different, if you are thinking “is that good for his soul” instead of “is that good for him” perhaps the neurons are arranged slightly differently. But the function would be the same.
That is not to say Susanism or Dualism is useless or could not exist as a basis for morals. But it is needlessly complicated compared to the purely physical basis. Neither am I yet convinced the purely physical basis of morality exists, but if it does not exist neither can Susanism or Dualism. Answering that question is for another day and another thread. Susanism and Dualism are still less pragmatic than Physicalism.
~Max
So, chimps have no souls, humans do. Got it.
What about Neanderthals, did they have souls? Did Denisovans? And what about* Homo erectus*?
What about the child of a human and a Neanderthal? Is there a one-drop rule for souls like there is for Soul, or is there a degree of admixture that’s allowable?
Did I take it knowing that? In what sense?
Let us not. If a doctor constantly sees people who ask him to leave them alone, drug-addled or not, and yet continues, that doctor immediately needs to find a different drug.
So is your argument that the person doing the asking is no longer mentally competent? Is their reaction to the doctor purely a drug response, or also a reaction to the accompanying pain or even just anticipation of the pain they’ve been told to expect? How can you tell?
Are children and the severely mentally challenged, even while not considered mentally competent for decision-making, not sentient beings? We regularly inflict pain on them on someone else’s say-so, but we don’t wipe their memories of it. Would it make a difference if we did? (General question for all thread participants)
Right. But you mean the other kind, the kind that’s incoherent.
In fact, I suspect large-scale violations occur with relative frequency. If you have a 5000K star orbiting an 8000K star, the colder one will emit radiant heat that will be absorbed by the hotter one. The net heat flow will be toward the colder one, but the hotter still receives some heat from it.
Simultaneous heat flow from the warm star to the cold star or even radiation to outer space would qualify as “some other change, connected therewith, occurring at the same time”.
Even if you are using Carathéodory’s principle with Planck’s principle, there is still no violation. A (closed) system consisting of two cold stars in space is not adiabatically accessible from a system consisting of a warm star and a cold star in space. A warm star cannot turn into a cold star without suffering some transfer of heat or energy, either to the cold star or to space.
~Max
This doesn’t have direct relevance to dualism anymore - if a physicalist philosophy can’t answer, neither can the form of dualism I was defending. With your permission I would like to move this discussion back to the Versed thread.
~Max
I can’t draw the line with Dualism any better than a physicalist could. See the rest of the post you quoted, and also [POST=21611376]post #196[/POST].
~Max
Adabiasis is a system mechanism. It pertains to fluid movement. Stars do not primarily emit heat through fluid transfer, outside the internal convection zone within the star. Most heat escaping a star is radiative, in the form of IR and other photons. The radiated heat goes out in all directions (though possibly less at the poles), so a star will gradually cool at it sheds heat into space.
Stars come in many different flavors, some hotter than others, so it is not unusual to have a hotter/colder binary pair. A small fraction of one star’s radiative heat output will impinge on its partner, and vice versa. Hence, the colder star will move some of its heat to the hotter star, albeit less than the hotter star is moving to the colder star. A bunch of photons moving on a path are not deterred by a bigger bunch of photons coming the other way.
Let me say first of all that I’m not at all sure I understand all the arguments in this thread.
But I do see a physical basis for morals.
Humans are members of a social species; and have been since before we were humans. Members of any social species need to be able to interact with each other in some fashion that will prevent group members from seriously damaging each other; and that will allow at least occasional interaction with other groups to occur in such a fashion that not only will a sufficient number of individuals survive such interaction to continue the species, but at least one of the groups will usually remain functional as a group.
Species whose members fail to evolve ways in which to behave in such fashions either won’t survive, or won’t become species that function in even small social groups.
I think that’s the basis for our morals. Since we’ve also developed the sort of mind that wants to put things into words and into categories, human groups have developed lists and categories of Ways to Behave, based on what we feel is Right. Different groups have come to drastically different conclusions about the details of what’s considered Right; but I think they’re all based on our physically evolved need to be able to live together and to get along well enough while doing so that we don’t need to routinely devote huge amounts of energy to keeping group members from abusing each other so badly that the group becomes non-functional.
None of this came out of nowhere, suddenly appearing only in Homo self-called Sapiens. There’s significant evidence that humans aren’t the only ones with a sense of justice.
With your permission I would prefer to continue this sub-discussion in [POST=21612858]the General Questions board[/POST].
~Max
Perhaps the evolutionary advantage of relative morality is as you describe, but I am not convinced the basis of morality is an advantage or disadvantage to myself or the species.
I’ll think about it and maybe make a new thread on that topic later.
~Max
Again, throughout history, every mystery ever solved has turned out to be Not Magic.
The simplest explanation, until contrary evidence is presented, is that evolution is true and there is a continuum of self-awareness and intelligence among species that shows that primates and some other species have basic abilities that are close to the ones humans have. Thing is, no matter where in that continuum a critter is, there is no need for the peculiar soul idea that you are reaching for.
And repeating again that your position can not be falsifiable, then welcome to the same column where meaningless things reside, like medieval theologians weird arguments.
I wanted to address this earlier, but forgot. Dennett’s book provides a somewhat narrow perspective at the issue of consciousness, pushing his own, idiosyncratic and not necessarily widely accepted views on the matter. If you want to get an overview of the field, I’d suggest starting with Jaegwon Kim’s ‘Philosophy of Mind’, which is I think still pretty much the standard text on the matter, or perhaps William Seager’s ‘Theories of Consciousness’. The latter, however, can be somewhat tough going in places.
I still say dualism, as I defined it, is non-falsifiable and thus not a solvable mystery. The scientists in your earlier cite’s cites said they could not find any physical evidence of a non-physical mind. My form of dualism says there will never be any evidence.
I have already admitted that my form of dualism is useless compared to physicalism. It’s not absolutely useless, but physicalism can provide everything dualism can and is falsifiable, therefore better.
I lost the debate - what are you going on about?
~Max
Thank you, I will definitely check these out. Although I should wait until I have finished Dennett’s book. The college was hesitant enough lending one book to a non-student.
~Max