Is this the most intellectual joke in the world?

I was just gonna post this one!

Alright, well here’s a different one:
Sartre walks into a café. After sitting down, the waitress asks him what he would like. “I’ll have a coffee with no cream.” “Monsieur Sartre,” the waitress responds, “We don’t have any cream.” Sartre replies, “Fine then, I’ll have a coffee with no milk.”

I know, it’s kinda like the monks with the lightbulb, but that’s what happens when someone steals your joke.

Rene Descartes walks into a bar, orders a beer, and drinks it at a gulp.

“Would you like another?” asks the bartender.

Descartes consideres the question. “I think not,” he says, and disappears.

Please, explain this joke for the uneducated and dumb.

“I think, therefore I am.” - Rene Descartes

Thus, if he says “I think not”, he is not, and disappears.

FisherQueen wrote:

Because of my formal logic training, this joke makes me cringe, as a story by one of my professors illustrates. He was at a party full of philosophers, and a lady said, “I’ve got a philosophy joke.” She told this one, and immediately six philosophers whirled on her accusingly and said, “That’s denying the antecedent!”

The same professor also pointed out an important difference between the language of first order logic and ordinary english by saying, "You don’t call up the fire department and say, `Help! Not everything is not on fire!’


Hello Again wrote:

The version I’m familiar with goes:

There once was a fellow named Fisk
Whose dueling was exceedingly brisk
So fast was his action
The Fitzgerald contraction
Reduced his rapier to a disk.


What’s a goy?

A goy is a girl before time t, and a boy thereafter.


PROOFS THAT P

Davidson’s proof that p:
Let us make the following bold conjecture: p.

Wallace’s proof that p:
Davidson has made the following bold conjecture: p.

Grunbaum:
As I have asserted again and again in previous publications, p.

Putnam:
Some philosophers have argued that not-p, on the grounds that q. It would be an interesting exercise to count all the fallacies in this “argument.” (It’s really awful, isn’t it?) Therefore p.

Rawls:
It would be nice to have a deductive argument that p from self-evident premises. Unfortunately I am unable to provide one. So I will have to rest content with the following intuitive considerations in its support: p.

Unger:
Suppose it were the case that not-p. It would follow from this that someone knows that q. But on my view, no one knows anything whatsoever. Therefore p. (Unger believes that the louder you say this argument, the more persuasive it becomes.)

Katz:
I have seventeen arguments for the claim that p, and I know of only four for the claim that not-p. Therefore p.

Lewis:
Most people find the claim that not-p completely obvious and when I assert p they give me an incredulous stare. But the fact that they find not-p obvious is no argument that it is true; and I do not know how to refute an incredulous stare. Therefore, p.

Fodor:
My argument for p is based on three premises:
(1) q
(2) r, and
(3) p From these, the claim that p deductively follows.

Some people may find the third premise controversial, but it is clear that if we replaced that premise by any other reasonable premise, the argument would go through just as well.

Sellars:
Unfortunately limitations of space prevent it from being included here, but important parts of the proof can be found in each of the articles in the attached bibliography.

Earman:
There are solutions to the field equations of general relativity in which space-time has the structure of a four-dimensional Klein bottle and in which there is no matter. In each such space-time, the claim that not-p is false. Therefore p.

Goodman:
Zabludowski has insinuated that my thesis that p is false, on the basis of alleged counterexamples. But these so-called “counterexamples” depend on construing my thesis that p in a way that it was obviously not intended-- for I intended my thesis to have no counterexamples. Therefore p.

Kripke:
Outline of a Proof That P(1)
Some philosophers have argued that not-p. But none of them seems to me to have made a convincing argument against the intuitive view that this is not the case. Therefore, p.


  1. This outline was prepared hastily–at the editor’s insistence–from a taped manuscript of a lecture. Since I was not even given the opportunity to revise the first draft before publication, I cannot be held responsible for any lacunae in the (published version of the) argument, or for any fallacious or garbled inferences resulting from faulty preparation of the typescript. Also, the argument now seems to me to have problems which I did not know when I wrote it, but which I can’t discuss here, and which are completely unrelated to any criticisms that have appeared in the literature (or that I have seen in manuscript); all such criticisms misconstrue my argument. It will be noted that the present version of the argument seems to presuppose the (intuitionistically unacceptable) law of double negation. But the argument can easily be reformulated in a way that avoids employing such an inference rule. I hope to expand on these matters further in a separate monograph.

Routley and Meyer:
If (q & not-q) is true, then there is a model for p. Therefore p.

Plantinga:
It is a model theorem that p p. Surely it’s possible that p must be true. Thus p. But it is a model theorem that p p. Therefore p.

Chisholm:
P-ness is self-presenting. Therefore, p.

Morganbesser:
If not p, what? Q maybe?

Haack:
Unfortunately, by the very nature of logical codationalism I cannot offer a proof that P along the elegant lines of BonJour’s coherentist proof. Indeed, I cannot offer a PROOF that P at all, and for two reasons; first, because PROOF (as opposed to proof) embodies a linear foundationalist conception of justification that cannot survive the “up, up and away” argument, and second because BonJour’s own account of justification falls prey to the “drunken students” argument. Nor can I offer a proof that P, as I seem (like Fodor) to have mislaid my theory of the a priori.

Yet a case can be made – in modest, fallibly naturalistic terms – for P. And if the criteria embodied in codationalism are in fact truth-conducive (and if they are not, then every other theory of justification is likewise a failure since codational criteria are used by coherentists and foundationalists without proper appreciation of their interconnections), then this will amount not to a PROOF nor yet a proof that P, but simply a proof that P, based on the explanatory integration of P with the rest of my beliefs that are explanatorily integrated with each other.

The explanatory integration at work in this proof is rather like that found in a crossword puzzle. . . . [Remainder of the proof is left as an exercise for the reader. For the solution, consult next Sunday’s London Times.]

Margolis’s disproof that p:
The assumption that P – indeed, the belief that P is so natural and obvious as to be beyond dispute – is so deeply woven into Western thought that any attempt to question it, much less to overthrow it, is likely to be met with disbelief, scorn, and ridicule. The denial of P is a deep thesis, a theme of courage, a profound insight into the fundamental nature of things. (Or at any rate it would be if there were a fundamental nature of things, which there isn’t.) Anyone unfamiliar with the hidden brutalities of professional philosophy cannot imagine all the nasty things that will be said about someone who dares to mount an assault on P. (Just look at how neglected Protagoras is now – they even cut his writings up into tiny little bits!)

It has repeatedly been alleged that the denial of P is self-refuting. Extraordinary! As if one bold enough to deny P would feel bound by the conventions of dialethism on which alone any charge of self-refutation rests! Once we have seen through this delusion, we are free to dismiss as nonsense our current vision not only of philosophy and science but also that quaint notion of `the good life.’ We are also free to discard antiquated Hellenic prejudices as to what counts as proof and disproof, whilst retaining (of course) a proper sense of logical rigor. Hence, the foregoing constitutes a disproof of P.

OK, this isn’t really a joke, but where else can I tell it? The following was in the church bulletin one Sunday:

“Clear your mind of can’t.”
–Samuel Johnson

Oh, the irony… :stuck_out_tongue:

I love the proofs that P.

Here’s one from Peter Lipton:
To be able to say that P, we must be able to say why P rather than Q. We can see that previous failed attempts to prove P have focused on the fact, P, rather than the foil Q. On examining Q, we find it to be clearly stupid. Since Q is stupid, then P.

The Proofs that P crack me up, even though I’m not familiar with everybody it lampoons. I do have a couple for my own philosophy professors:

Cling’s Proof that p
Hmmm… He seems to be saying not-p. But that’s bullshit, right?

Martine’s Proof that p
It’s not as though its just somehow silly to say that not-p, although its not clear to what extent that gets you anywhere.

Hanks’ Proof that p
p? shrug smile

A neutron walks into a bar and asks what the price of a drink is. The bartender responds:

“For you? No charge!”

Ahhh hahahahahahah!

Nieztch: “God is dead”
God: “Nieztch is dead”

Knock Knock

Who’s there?

Pavlov… just checking.

It’s almost Q. I gotta go P. :stuck_out_tongue:

Sorry to bump this old thread, but the following two puns are killing me. I know there’s a pun in there somewhere but I can’t find them.

Can someone please explain:

Beware, this llama spits

and

Transit Gloria Monday

?

And so I’m not totally useless, I’ll add a joke:
What’s the integral of 1/cabin dcabin?

A boathouse (log cabin + c)

Beware = Be where

“Sick transit Gloria Monday” - Sic transit gloria mundi, a Latin phrase meaning “Thus passes the glory of the world.”

Someone more scholarly than I could probably tell you the source of the Latin phrase, if you’re really interested.

That kind of humor is so… derivative. :stuck_out_tongue:

got it… thanks… (bit of a let down, but I knew I was asking for it…)

How many managing editors does it take to screw in a light bulb?

Three. Two to hold the author down and one to screw the bulb in.

Naturally I can’t remember the whole joke but it was one in a LONG string of bad science jokes I’ve heard for the last 6 years.

A bunch of chemists were sitting around arguing about why a relatively straightforward experiment failed. Finally they agreed to start over from scratch the next day.

The next day they do it again and it still won’t work. They check over their notes and can’t figure out what they did wrong so they try again the next day. And it still won’t work.

In their fustration the swear an oath to give up chemistry if it doesn’t work a 4th time. So the next morning they are exceedingly careful and try again.

This time it works! They are rejoicing and they head to the bar just off campus where all the students hang out. They’re sitting there enjoying a pint when one of them notices a sign.

<Name of famous theoretical chemist> Will be downtown giving a lecture.

The chemists look at each other in horror as they realized that their lab along the route he took and checked the notice for the date. After a few seconds of silence one of them remarked, “My god, that was 4 days ago! That asshole forgot his notes!”


Ok now to explain it… UGH

Experimental and Theoretical chemists are generally at odds (more so than with physists). Basically, one is a theoretical chemist if you can’t get an experiment to work. So the better you are at theory the worse you are at the experiments. Ok? Now, the people who are the kings of theory exude an aura of anti-experiments.

The joke is that the guy giving the lecture caused the experiment to fail when he drove/flew past the lab. The experiment failed two more times because he forgot his notes and had to go back to get them and return.

It’s actually pretty funny.

Not sure in what context these could be used, but it could be pretty funny in the right crowd.

Non calor sed umor est qui nobis incommodat.
It’s not the heat, it’s the humidity.

Di! Ecce hora! Uxor mea me necabit!
God, look at the time! My wife will kill me!

Estne volumen in toga, an solum tibi libet me videre?
Is that a scroll in your toga, or are you just happy to see me?

Cum catapultae proscriptae erunt tum soli proscript catapultas habebunt.
When catapults are outlawed, only outlaws will have catapults.

Lex clavatoris designati rescindenda est.
The designated hitter rule has got to go.

Sona si latine loqueris.
Honk if you speak Latin.

Te audire no possum. Musa sapientum fixa est in aure.
I can’t hear you. I have a banana in my ear.

Stupid Cow!
Vacca Foeda!

Re vera, cara mea, mea nil refert.
Frankly my dear, I don’t give a damn.

Sentio aliquos togatos contra me conspirare.
I think some people in togas are plotting against me.

Antiquis temporibus, nati tibi similes in rupibus ventosissimis
exponebantur ad necem.
In the good old days, children like you were left to perish on windswept
crags.

Caesar si viveret, ad remum dareris.
If Caesar were alive, you’d be chained to an oar.

Quantum materiae materietur marmota monax si marmota
monax materiam possit materiari?
How much wood would a woodchuck chuck if a woodchuck could chuck wood?

Nihil curo de ista tua stulta superstitione.
I’m not interested in your dopey religious cult.

Recedite, plebes! Gero rem imperialem.
Stand aside, little people! I’m here on official business.

(At a poetry reading)
Nullo metro compositum est.
It doesn’t rhyme.

Non curo. Si metrum non habet, non est poema.
I don’t care. If it doesn’t rhyme, it isn’t a poem.

Minutus cantorum, minutus balorum, minutus carborata descendum pantorum.
A little song, a little dance, a little seltzer down your pants.

Tuis pugis pignore!
You bet your bippy!

Quomodo cogis comas tuas sic videri?
How do you get your hair to do that?

Feles mala! Cur cista non uteris? Stramentum novum in ea posui.
Bad kitty! Why don’t you use the cat box? I put new litter in it.

Romani quidem artem amatoriam invenerunt.
You know, the Romans invented the art of love.

Aio, quantitas magna frumentorum est.
Yes, that is a very large amount of corn.

(At a barbeque)
Animadvertistine, ubicumque stes, fumum recta in faciem ferri?
Ever noticed how wherever you stand, the smoke goes right into your face?

Neutiquam erro.
I am not lost.

Ita erat quando hic adveni.
It was that way when I got here.

Sic hoc adfixum in obice legere potes, et liberaliter educatus
et nimis propinquus ades.
If you can read this bumper sticker, you are
very well educated and much too close.

Hocine bibo aut in eum digitos insero?
Do I drink this or stick my fingers in it?

Illiud Latine dici non potest.
You can’t say that in Latin.

Vah! Denuone Latine loquebar? Me ineptum. Interdum modo elabitur.
Oh! Was I speaking Latin again? Silly me. Sometimes it just sort of slips
out.

CRorex wrote:

Mmmmmm…science humor.

Having to explain things sort of takes away from the affect/effect (Whichever, not bright enough to know which one to use but bright enough to know there is a difference. So there, you fancy pants science types.)

I had to read the explanation twice, perhaps some footnotes would help.