In another context, when Admiral Cunningham was told it made no sense in a cost-benefit way to risk his vital fleet to air attack to rescue a few thousand stranded soldiers after the battle of Crete, he famously said:
“It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition.”
A similar sort of reasoning is at play here. Obviously, Israel hasn’t had three centuries, but its army’s morale is at least in part predicated on its unique traditions - like never leaving a man behind, officers must lead (even if they are more likely to be casualties), etc. Point here is that doing the “sensible” thing in terms of cost/benefit may have intangible but real costs in terms of loss of unique morale.
Whether the “tradition” and its morale-creating effect is worth the obvious cost/benefit loss is always going to be a matter of argument.
Would any of the people here who are constantly maintaining that Israel is the bad guy in every situation like to take a crack at spinning this 1000-for-1 trade as more Israeli brutality?
Morale sometimes matters more. If Israeli soldiers know their capture would be (eventually) rescued or bargained for, they would fight that much harder rather than fighting to simply avoid capture. Yes, I know they already have a lot to fight for, such as the survival of their country, but this is just one thing more.
Also, it sends a psychological message to the terrorists: 1 of our people is worth more than a bunch of yours.
Perhaps. But I think what’s going on here is that the Israeli government has decided to prioritize the morale of its military and populace over that of its enemies. Living up to their commitments to the soldiers (as detailed by **Alessan **above) is winning out over trying to control the morale of Hamas. I can see the arguments both ways, but I do think this action makes sense.
How about this: If the released terrorists go on to kill more Israelis, those killings are still being committed by the terrorists. The government may be in somewhat culpable for not keeping them in jail, but the actual killings are committed by the enemy. Conversely, refusing to ransom Shalit would be itself an action the government would be taking.
Sorry I was unclear. I meant prioritize the positive effects of getting Gilad Shalit back on Israeli morale over the negative consequence of raising Hamas morale. They apparently care more about the effect on the Israeli public/military than the effect alluded to by Grumman. Every country balances these different concerns in situations like this, and I think this deal makes it clear how the balance comes down for the current Israeli government.
Thanks for explaining.
I agree that essentially telling Hamas that if they take an Israeli soldier prisoner they can trade him for a bunch of terrorists is a very, very bad idea. Alessean (sp) has done military service iin Israel, so I’ve got to go with his opinion.
Huh? Alessan is already in this thread arguing the exact opposite position.
I’m not too worried about more kidnapping, since I assume Hamas is already doing everything in its power to kidnap Israeli soldiers. But returning experienced fighters, bombers, and killers to your enemies seems like a bad idea.
I guess Israel is so locked down right now that they only fear rockets.
He means that Israelis are such utter savages that the very presence of several hundred Palestinian terrorists in their prisons makes the country, on average, more civilized.
