The war in Ukraine has led to some speculation about just how much power Putin has to unilaterally order the use of nuclear weapons, and have that order be obeyed. Which makes me wonder about the situation in Stalin’s USSR. How was command authority over the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal implemented at the time? Would or could anyone dare naysay Stalin if he had ordered atomic bombs used? Conversely, who could Stalin trust enough with actual custody of the bombs?
It seems it is up to the Russian president to authorize the use of nuclear weapons (so, presently, Vladimir Putin).
A 2020 document called “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence” says the Russian president takes the decision to use nuclear weapons.
That said, the missiles do not fly because the Russian president pressed a button. He issues the order which is moved to central military command that carry out the order. One can only hope someone in that chain would refuse but that would be a helluva gamble.
ETA: I realized I did not answer the question. I’ll leave it anyway as semi-relevant. I’d be shocked if Stalin had less control though.
I’ve been trying to research this, and apparently between the 1949 “First Lightning” test and Stalin’s death in 1953, the Soviet Union only had a miniscule slightly-more-than-zero stockpile, like North Korea has today: enough to scare the USA but not enough to plausibly carry out a nuclear attack. And since the program was overseen by Beria, who was already in charge of the secret police, presumably Stalin thought whatever hold he had on Beria would suffice. Still, I wonder if Stalin ever thought of the possibility of a smuggled bomb vaporizing the Kremlin one day.
North Korea has a respectable nuclear arsenal. It would be best described as “dozens” of bombs, but probably fewer than 100. It has been remarkable how quickly they have gone from nothing to something.
Further, I have enough respect for them to think they have worked out delivery of these things by unconventional means. Their missiles are now probably good enough too at this point.
I don’t think their missiles can quite reach the US yet (maybe Hawaii). Also not sure how accurate they are but I get they are nukes…the threat of them landing anywhere in the US is still scary.
I believe the issue here is that neither the USSR nor the US had missile systems in the early 1950’s capable of delivering nuclear weapons. They had some long-range bomber capability (so did the US), but they really didn’t have much capability for delivering what nuclear weapons they had at that time.
As we know, the US delivered two nuclear weapons in combat in 1945 over a range of 1,500 miles, demonstrating that the US, at least, had delivery capabilities. The Soviet Union had the Tupolev-4 long range bomber, a direct copy of the American B-29. I don’t think the nuclear attack scares of the 1950s would have been what they were if people at the time had doubted the Soviet Union’s delivery capabilities.
I don’t think the USSR’s missile systems were all that good, even after Sputnik. The “missile gap” was pure fiction–the US had more warheads and better delivery systems.
This RAF training video discusses tactics to use against the “B-29:”
The SAC had the B-36 in service by 1948. The USSR had the Tu-95 in service by 1956.
In hindsight, American fears over the prospect that the Soviet Union might be able to drop 100 fission bombs on US soil seems almost quaint compared to the nuclear arsenals of the early 1980s.
And yeah, however many bombs the USSR had, Stalin had to rely on the aerial forces to deliver them; although I can easily picture a special corps of commissars with drawn pistols and submachine guns at the ready overseeing the process.
An interesting book is Le Carre’s The Russia House - if someone during the old war dropped a Russian analysis in theAmericans’ lap that said “Russia can’t aim their missiles worth doodoo” what would America do? Can you trust it? Can you be sure it’s not deliberate misinformation?
Similarly, Kim has missiles that apparently can reach mainland USA, he has nuclear weapons. Does he have enough weapons that can fit together as a delivery system? The first bombs dropped on Japan were huge (about 10,000lb?), and needed a full sized bomber. Supposedly NK announced a few years ago the capability to mount nuclear weapons on their rockets.
I guess another important question is command structure - as I understand, Russia has army, navy, air force - and rocket command. I assume the navy handles the submarine launches, air force the dropping kind, and rocket forces the ICBM’s. This would suggest to me that central command would be the one place where all possible launches could be overruled on one group’s initiative. At least in Stalin’s day, we presume the chain of command and only available weapons went only through the air force, allowing a longer list of officers to commit suicide by declining to obey orders.
Another note is that the Russian military is supposedly notorious for a lack of initiative, so any dissent would be very unusual.
I can think of two times a Soviet officer refused to launch nukes. Once during the Cuban Missile Crisis I believe a submarine captain refused to shoot a nuclear torpedo and another time the Soviet early warning system indicated a launch from the US. Soviet policy was to launch a retaliation when such a thing happened but an officer overseeing this refused to launch. Turned out the sun caused a Soviet satellite to glitch and think that was a launch.
Not sure what happened to the sub captain. IIRC the guy in the silo was neither punished nor praised. He stopped a nuclear war but he disobeyed orders. I guess in Soviet Russia those cancelled each other out.
For what it’s worth, the guy in the silo was Stanislav Petrov.
The R-7 was a dinosaur of an ICBM, the USSR didn’t have a “real” missile capacity until 1961. But it served its purpose: the USA almost invariably interpreted Soviet secrecy as hiding the USSR’s strength while in reality it was usually hiding its weaknesses.
The submariner was
He remained in the Soviet Navy and retired as vice admiral.
I seem to recall reading they had trouble with heat shields for their warheads as well.
After the recent tests, the Japanese defense minister estimated the range of North Korea’s ICBMs to be about 15,000 km. This would be enough to get anywhere within the continental US (and indeed to any significant land mass in the world outside of South America.)
That’s an overly sensationalist account of what happened, at least as far as the second of the two incidents you mentioned is concerned (can’t say anything about the first). It occurred in 1983, when the Soviet early warning system reported an American missile launch. The Soviet officer in charge at the time was Stanislav Petrov who, correctly, assumed that this was an error and refrained from raising an alert to his superiors. The important thing to note here that Petrov’s job was not to launch counterstrikes; he had neither the authority nor the technical means to do so. His job was to report the alert to superiors, who would then have brought it to the attention of top decision-makers in Moscow. The world was very fortunate that Petrov acted the way he did, because we don’t know what would have happened if he had made that report; but it’s still too much to say that he should have launched a strike.
As I recall about that incident, the other point was there was nothing interesting going on geopolitically (not like the Cuban Missile Crisis) so the likelihood the USA has suddenly launched a sneak missile attack was pretty low probability. The guy made a good judgement call.
Well, now, it would not be much of a sneak attack/overwhelming decapitation strike if the enemy were expecting something, would it?