Of minor interest, I found and posted an old review I wrote on Black Hawk Downin the Cafe:
http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?threadid=175341
Afraid I wrote this a while back and so did not work in any current commentary, haven’t time for that at present.
I have read a lot about the fears of the “Balkanizing of Iraq” after the war.
Would it be so bad to keep the Kurdish territory semi-autonomous?
Are you worried a Shia/Sunni change in power will be as bad as Hutu/Tutsi in Rwanda?
Jesus Horatio Christ! Nothing could be as bad as the Hutu/Tutsi debacle/blood bath. But there are definitely some “problems”.
Immediate and foremost: Kurdish reoccupation of territory and property confiscated by Saddam in this program of “Arabization”. Many of the homes in the northern territorys are occupied by Arab Iraqis. The Kurds want them back. The Iraqi’s want to keep them. Title searches are likely to be, shall we say, “complicated”.
Right now, the Kurds seem content with the polite fiction of “semi-autonomous”, as that equates to being left alone. Will they stay that way? When the oil revenues that are thier birthright begin to flow, might they not begin to heed the cries of their kin under Turkish rule?
(1) Depends on what the substance of semi-autonomous means. Despite the simple minded nonesense written about ‘democratic Kurds’ and the like, the reality has been warlordism for the past decade. This situation will not be acceptable in the long run, it is destabilizing. Further, I don’t believe the Arab majority will like the idea.
(2) No. Although something approaching Muslim-Croat tensions.
Cheesemeister, I have made reference elsewhere to a recent article in Atlantic Monthly by a former CIA ME analyst. “Fall of the House of Saud” (aptly yclept!) is soundly considered and well written, not least because it corresponds exactly with my own view that Saudi Arabia is a debacle of when, not if. Whaddayathink?
Hmmm, Atlantic Monthly is not something I come across here. Is it online?
Certainly is. Wonderful, insightful magazine, since the 1850s.
http://www.boston.com/dailynews/094/region/Atlantic_Monthly_editor_at_lar:.shtml
The first american newsman killed in the GWII was working for them.
Hm. Brief search says it’s the May issue. Not yet up on their website. But still, many good articles in it.
Hey Collunsbury you’ve used the phrase Egypt on the Euphrates in this and other threads. You clearly feel that government is incompetent/corrupt. But how would you compare the life of the average Egyptian to other countries in MENA? Would this still be an improvement for the average Iraqi?
As to the Atlantic article on the House of Saud, I doubt it contains much you aren’t already aware of, it centers mostly around the corruption and venality of the Princes, as amplified by thier rabbit-like reproduction, breifly sketches the alliance between Saud and the Wahabbite sect. It theme centers around the certain doom of the House Saud, either in the near future or the very near future. Very lightly it touches on the possiblility that this prospect might be an unstated motivation as regards our current policy to the ME, esp. Iraq, in light of our need to secure oil, and makes special emphasis on the fragility of the Saudi system and its vulnerability to sabotage.
At any rate, I doubt there is anything therein that would surprise you, so I am quite willing to hear your opinion in that regard without reference to the article itself.
**Collounsbury ** (or anyone else that might have an answer):
I heard news reports last night and this morning that said that Hussein’s cousin, “Chemical Ali,” may have been killed in a strike yesterday. I know that Ali was one of the people the coalition wanted to get, but I’m wonder how much of a difference getting him will really make, if any.
Thanks for your time, and thanks for this thread.
Another question (gee, they’re sure piling up!):
How much media coverage has there been in the Middle East of U.S. and British anti-war protesters? Of whatever coverage there has been, how are protesters portrayed? As naive hippies? Apologists? Serious political opposition that could potentially change the U.S. administration’s approach to the war? Well-meaning, but unfortunately ineffectual people? Some, all, or none of the above?
Don’t know how many caught Bernard Lewis on a marathon interview on C-Span this Sunday. This is the first time I listened to him, and for someone his age, he was exceedingly crisp and cogent (though he occasionally missed some questions and went off-topic).
He spoke of how Islamic civilization was at the forefront of all things human during its Golden Age. Though there was Islamic law in vogue, and absence of democracy as we know it now, he spoke of the checks and balances of power built-in Islamic society. Particularly, how the Sultan had to consult with respected members in society, religious leaders, merchants, the retired counsels etc, and how the Koran was a strongly “democratic” book which placed a duty on Muslims to disobey injustice. In some sense, he painted a pretty picture of a benevolent ruler with limited powers presiding over a progressive tolerant society (tolerant for its times). Now, in answering the question “What went wrong?” he spoke of a natural loss of these checks and balances, greater power concentrating at the ruler’s hands because of modernization of weaponry, communication etc and I found that quite fascinating.
Well, to get back on topic, he did not offer any opinion about the war except to discuss two scenarios:
(1) Worst case where a pro-US quasi-dictatorship comes into power (may be even a prominent member of the Ba’ath party) which he guaranteed will give rise to a Saddam-type regime.
(2) Creating the opportunity for democratic institutions to flourish and leaving as early as possible. Though he did not expound on that, he did say that democracy needed to be injected slowly (else the patient dies). He did make an analogy to Japan/Germany which was unexpected.
Any thoughts on (2) and how exactly can the forces leave early and yet slowly create the environment for growth of democratic institutions?
Egypt is a disaster waiting to happen. I don’t have the time to elaborate presently, but I think I touched on essentials already. I personally feel it is worse than any major Arab state (Yemen, e.g. is a basket case, but it’s Yemen, a few mill. people.).
The essential issue is the government is closely identified with the States, it is abusive and corrupt, and the very symbol of hypocrisy in our stated policies on democratisation. It is widely understood in the region that Egypt is the symbol of what the US really wants: lip service to democracy, ‘kow-towing’ to Israel and bending over to get fucked for US interests when needed. That is, a lackey.
This is not 100% fair – maybe 50-75% fair depending on the subject matter, as the Egyptian Gov plays a two faced game on many issues.
The essential in this observation is as follows:
(a) US will reap only limited credit for rebound post-War, as Iraqis I know almost universally heap as much blame on the US and UK for the sanctions as Sadaam. Externalizing blame is a common feature in this society.
(b) It will take years to get back up to the Sadaam Golden Age – 1970s, this will be harped upon.
© ‘Happy Feelings’ fade fast, complaining starts early, I see little room for much credit being given for improvements versus complaints on how little has changed.
(d) Given regional tensions and almost zero good will in surrounding countries ex-Kuwait, I see little room for a genuine democracy to emerge – nor are the local conditions sufficient either.
The cards appear stacked in favor of something looking rather like the Egyptian government emerging in a few years. Corrupt, authoritarian with a democratic mask, slavishly pro-American on key foreign policy issues, and deeply disconnected with the popular opinion on the same.
Egypt on the Euphrates.
Now, that is avoidable, but it will require sophisticated legwork, good diplomacy, a careful balancing of Iraqi interests and tolerance for Iraqi independence on a number of issues (e.g. Israel).
Don’t know how many caught Bernard Lewis on a marathon interview on C-Span this Sunday. This is the first time I listened to him, and for someone his age, he was exceedingly crisp and cogent (though he occasionally missed some questions and went off-topic).
He spoke of how Islamic civilization was at the forefront of all things human during its Golden Age. Though there was Islamic law in vogue, and absence of democracy as we know it now, he spoke of the checks and balances of power built-in Islamic society. Particularly, how the Sultan had to consult with respected members in society, religious leaders, merchants, the retired counsels etc, and how the Koran was a strongly “democratic” book which placed a duty on Muslims to disobey injustice. In some sense, he painted a pretty picture of a benevolent ruler with limited powers presiding over a progressive tolerant society (tolerant for its times). Now, in answering the question “What went wrong?” he spoke of a natural loss of these checks and balances, greater power concentrating at the ruler’s hands because of modernization of weaponry, communication etc and I found that quite fascinating.
Well, to get back on topic, he did not offer any opinion about the war except to discuss two scenarios:
(1) Worst case where a pro-US quasi-dictatorship comes into power (may be even a prominent member of the Ba’ath party) which he guaranteed will give rise to a Saddam-type regime.
(2) Creating the opportunity for democratic institutions to flourish and leaving as early as possible. Though he did not expound on that, he did say that democracy needed to be injected slowly (else the patient dies). He did make an analogy to Japan/Germany which was unexpected.
Any thoughts on (2) and how exactly can the forces leave early and yet slowly create the environment for growth of democratic institutions?
Media coverage of the protests, above all European has been extensive.
In general the protests have been covered as signs that Blair and Bush are isolated from world opinion, and that this means they are illegal bullies. I don’t believe anyone got any sense that Bush was going to change his policies, which of course contributed to a boiling dislike verging on hatred for him.
Of note, of course, were the clear lessons that in the West one can go out and yell at one’s leader without the state apparatus coming down on you. This is obviously not generally the case here. Obviously not news per se, but has fed into frustration with goverments here – where the sensation is that unlike in Europe, and even elsewhere per the spin, they are too craven to stand up to Bush.
He’s a major scholar of the Medieval and Ottoman periods, knows his stuff there.
Well, one of the problems in this picture, for all that I agree with it in the caveat of tolerant for its times, is that it is a highly textual picture. The reality, away from texts, could be different, but yes the wealthy Golden Age was a good time for the region.
Economics, economics, economics.
The region did not keep up, it became economically isolated when the Europeans cut off its trade routes and captured much of the value that had previously flowed through the region. Long slow decline accelerated.
Lewis is not very good on economics.
Egypt on the Euphrates. Not Sadaam II, more like Mubarek al-Iraqi.
Well, the analogy to Japan and Germany is bullshit, pity he made that, otherwise, I think I have made some points rather similar to this. I used plant analogies, but the idea is similar, democracy will not flourish magically, nor overnight.
Japan and Germany are utterly inapplicable for reasons given earlier in the thread.
Catch 22 really. Staying generates resentments, leaving too early seems to be just as dangerous.
If one gets international participation and neutral participants, I can see some useful transition emerging, but again this is not what seems to be coming out of the Bush Admin where the rah rah simple minded ‘super-patriots’ in the Pentagon civil staff seem to have the vision of a Japan like McArther admin over Iraq.
This is idiocy of the highest order.
Impossible to know.
What I can say is that it appears that the Bush Admin and other commentators seriously underestimated the cohesion of the regime. It is hard to say how much individual there is versus structure.
In any case, as I have said before, my real concerns are about the post-‘battle/war’ period, not the destruction of Iraqi’s rather pitiful army.
I am concerned for a Beirut scenario.
He spoke of the unintended causes of modernization as just one of the many reasons. Apparently he has written an entire book on “What Went Wrong?” Though, IIRC, he did not dwell on the economic reasons during the interview.
He did say that during the Golden Age, the banking institutions were very advanced. People could cash cheques across continents and the concept of credit was well-established. He made a passing reference to how “interest” was prohibited by the Quran though it wasn’t strictly followed.
And, yes, many many times he stressed on how democracy has to grow, and how it will take time, and how the concept cannot be forced, and institutions be built and handed-over, but how conditions for the growth of such institutions need to be created. No real details… just outlined a very abtstract vision.
For starters, I’d like to say this thread has been one of the more interesting and thought-provoking I’ve seen on these boards in a good long while. And all should be commended for the tone in which it has been conducted, given that this is such a passion-invoking and divisive subject.
An observation: The unfortunate consequences of the U.S.'s short-sightedness in its fight against Communism, the ends-justify-means, any-enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend mentality, live on and on. It’s amazing, the wide-ranging parts of the world where this, decades later, still bites us in the ass. Winning the Cold War was necessary, but some of the excesses of that fight are without a doubt the most shameful chapters in our country’s relatively short history.
The net result is, however earnest we may be in our intentions in Iraq (or, for another example, in trying to offer assistance in the recent Chavez problems in Venezuela), our efforts are met with cynical skepticism. This will be our lot well into the foreseeable future. And a natural human inclination to grouse about the perceived top-dog only accentuates it.
Collounsbury and/or Tamerlane: Just asking for an opinion here. What makeup of a democratic government do you think has the best chance of success in taking root in Iraq?
I haven’t seen this idea floated anywhere, but I’ve been thinking about something I rather glibly title the Kinda United States of Iraq.
Given the longstanding factions within the country - religious, tribal, geographical, etc. - maybe a highly powerful, centralized federal government is not the way to go (though such a powerful and centralized interim authority will probably be necessary in the volatile days and months immediately following Saddam’s ouster).
Think about how it works in the U.S. The federal government’s role is the more big-picture stuff - national defense, social security. State and local governments by far have a greater role in people’s day-to-day lives.
What about a somewhat similar structure of government in Iraq? The government people actually see daily will be at the local and state level, involving people with whom they are familiar and comfortable. It potentially mitigates the “Sect A isn’t going to tell me, a Sect-B’er, how to live my life” mentality.
There would be some form of President/Congress at which the more big-picture, federal-type issues are addressed, I assume.
Given that democracy is the stated goal in a post-Saddam Iraq, does a states-rights-intensive type of structure make more sense than a strongly federal, top-down one?
I want to echo the sentiment about the quality of responses (not limited to the principles) in this thread. (And also want to compliment Milo on his thoughtful post re post war democracy.)
Coll and Tamerlane: this idea highlights, for me, the major problem in transitioning into a free Iraqi state. Obviously, the interim government, whether it’s US-UK or UN directed, must be strongly federalized in order to establish even a minimum level of control. But while transition into a more loosely centralized permanent self-governance would allow for more democratic representation for the regional and ethnic groups in Iraq, it would also promote, in the worst case Balkanization and civil war, and in the best case a weaker and more fragile autonomy for Iraq as a nation. Do either of you see any clearly preferable path for post war reconstruction of an independent Iraq?