I owe Milo and Truthseeker some involved responses, which I shall try to get to shortly.
However, I wanted to link to this GQ thread “Are Arabs Religious” http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?postid=3248162#post3248162 as Astorian brought up a very good point, and I am ashamed that I did not bring in the evolution over time in my own answer as it is very, very important to recall.
I will second the first paragraph and on the second, I’m pondering this myself.
Frankly, it is hard to avoid a feeling of Catch 22. More shortly, incha’allah.
Truth Seeker
I do take a long view, I’ve witnessed the changes in regional culture over the past decade from the ground. This is not a novel observation for me.
At the same time, I have a lively view of the nature of changes, and their real meaning. I have seen the manner in which ‘corruption’ occurs, and westernization is never a process of young Arabs turning into Westerners (any more than the Westernization of Japan transformed deep underlying social structures there as far as I can tell), but situational adoptions, reinterpretations and the like.
Yes, that explains the immense liberalization of Saudi society, yes? In short, your idea, while attractive, is far too simple.
Let me take for example North African society, which I know well. It is a particularly attractive example insofar as the North Africans have had significant population flows to Europe, with no small amount of both seasonal and permanent backflow since 1950 to now. Further, much of the region can capture European TV and Radio broadcasts – and of course now with the widespread pirating of satellite descramblers (not that I would know that personally) you know, but I hear about it) and cheap dishes the widespread availability of the full range of Euro satellite channels.
For all that, the changes in North African society, long more liberal and flexible than the Middle East proper in my semi-subjective opinion, have been complicated and not in reality as transformative in the manner you seem to posit. The backwash of Euro culture, very differently structured now than their own, does not of necessity provoke either admiration nor a desire to copy – which are responses that are clearly at the heart of your presumption of positive change. As much it provokes tensions between values key to self-identity, and perceived tensions between requirements of religion (close to self identity, key to many people’s response to perceived rejection by the West) set off negative responses as often, perhaps more often than positive. Self-defence of one’s core sense of self. Often enough I have encountered young men and women with something of a mixture of both admiration for certain liberties in the West with a disdain for many others. The very process of exposure you posit I can say empirically in North Africa has not had the results you posit. Perhaps the exposure may be a necessary condition, perhaps, but it is clearly not sufficient.
In short, as I have argued throughout this thread, “liberal” values in a Western sense are not “default” values, and whatever admiration people may have for a select set of values, they may equally despise others. E.g. sexual liberalism may be seen as attractive on one level but not truly ‘free’ on others and in the end a gross offence against established notions of common decency. Combined with a sense that one’s culture may be threatened by a domineering outside power or powers, you get negative backlash.
Well, I do not disagree on one level, but on another as I have outlined above, merely exposure is not a sufficient condition for change. The degree of attitude transfer is easy to exaggerate outside of a narrow elite, especially in the case of Iran.
Well, I take such expat mags and views with a degree of a grain of salt given the ideological issues involved in re Iran, but yes I think you are right on this level.
The issue, however, is that the tensions between deeply held values (not solely imposed but really internalized) and new found and often superficial desires is great. I do not see easy ways to bridge. Internal evolution with the idioms and institutions becomes nativized and gathering native legitimacy – something the Revolution did in Iran – is the way to go.
Amusing on two levels: (a) you think that the Balkans already did not have fairly substantial exposure to Western media, relatives in the West etc.? (b) a possible route if economic conditions permit and ‘entrepreneurs’ of radicalism do not derail. I hope this is the case, but fading memories outside of the funny little amnesiac world that North America has created for itself is something of a problematic thing, as memories can as easily be rekindled and repackaged for new violence.
No, wrong.
Not everyone will want to achieve the Baywatch lifestyle and attainment is not the only issue, it is also the sense of control and the ability of the society to internalize and digest the changes. Without the later, you get rejection, as has been seen in North Africa.
Well given our history I take that as a high compliment.
I agree. Fully.
My overall argument has been that this time some lessons must be learned from being too “quarter driven” for short term results that have serious long term blow back.
Thsi is not easy to follow through on, let me be clear on that. I do not wish to argue the Bush Administration, even given my clear contempt for the manner in which the war has occured, is not facing non-trivial problems that even the best footwork will have trouble making work.
I don’t know. I really wish I had a pat answer.
The problem is the tension between the possible and rhetoric, expectations and reality.
There will be pressure, often cynical, to move Iraq directly to a parliamentary democracy, in institutional form at least. I believe this will be an error if done – Lewis and I agree on this much at least I think.
The social infrastructure, the underlying habits and understandings just are not going to be there, and the tensions leading to break up will be high.
My present instinct is that a federal government is the way to go, but not a highly decentralized one. Too decentralized and you will provoke an Arab backlash – the Sunni / Shia’ problem might easily turn into nothing versus an Arab – Kurd issue of a bloody nature 5-10 years down the pike.
I disagree for two main reasons.
(a) Think of the US civil war – unresolved issues can come back to bite.
(b) I see a trap in Kurdish separatism leading to secessionism.
© The Iraqi national identity is still fragile and contested – and Iraqi nationalists of all stripes will want to build it. Seeming to divide the nation is going to be a sore point and I think whatever theoretical value is challenged by the practical dangers.
The problem is the weakness and lack of civil society, and the degree to which this, if not carefully done, would clearly help reinforce local particularisms of a very unhealthy sort.
It is attractive on one level, but I do not believe a US style de-evolution is workable. Perhaps something modeled on recent European efforts in a centralized state context, but I think it would be too early.
If it were not for the issue of Kurdish separatism, I would almost go for it, at least as a medium term goal. However given the presence of a body of the population that fundamentally does not accept the state qua Iraq, well you have a serious, serious problem.
I should say that I like this last formulation.
The problem is of course not all stimulation will be in a positive, taking a more or less liberal society as the goal, direction.
For all that, I still see the best path for this in the context of the local socio-political idiom. Justify things in liberal Islamic terms.
**
Feh. You still owe me a post on heritability. 
Thanks for that long response. Let me digest it. However, I wanted to drop in and make an observation and ask two questions.
First, while there are disturbing parallels between Iraq and Egypt, two things are quite different. Iraq has about a third the population of Egypt and it actually has the bits and pieces of a functional and even prosperous economy whereas Egypt always seems to be running flat out just to keep from getting farther behind.
One of the reasons that Egyptian democracy has been hollowed out is that Egypt is Egypt. The government can’t deliver, people get restless and the government responds by tightening the lid. Repeat. If Egypt had been able to develop an increasingly prosperous society, it mightn’t have been necessary to tighten the screws down to the sticking point as they are now. BTW, when I say “necessary” I don’t mean that this is a “good” thing to do. I merely mean necessary for the government to prevent a threat to its established order.
Iraq has a fair shot at a relatively prosperous society. The problem is that there may be other reasons that the government has to institute command-and-control “democracy.” Keeping Iraq in one piece isn’t going to be easy and I can foresee a situtation where ethnic and sectarian tensions, rather than economic discontentment make repression “necessary.”
Question one. All right. Which is it? EYEraq, EARraq or EEraq?
Question two. What does the Arab street make of the increasingly surreal antics of that Shaykh of Spin, Mohammed Saeed Sahaf aka the Iraqi Information Minister?
Question 2.5 What does the Arab street make of Al Jazeera getting kicked out of Iraq?
I swear, this whole thing has passed from tragedy into farce.
The International Crisis Group has a report entitled War In Iraq: Political Challenges After The Conflict.
They advocate a UN transitional civil authority with full executive and legislative (but not security) powers as the least-bad near-term option. Worse options include rule by the US (too imperialistic in appearance) rule by Iraqis (choosing appropriate ones is too difficult) and rule by Iraqi exiles (they are out of touch). Furthermore, it is best to give certain brutalized elements (Kurds, Shiites, etc.) time to find their voice after years of brutality.
Furthermore, they advocate near-term “municipal, regional and functional elections”, acknowledging that while, “…elections are sometimes too glib a solution in post-conflict environments - as ICG has itself argued in other contexts - the key here is in fact to work hard and fast on organizing local and functional elections that will begin the process of providing the Iraqi people with genuinely representative leaders.”
Without reading the full report, I speculate that their reasoning runs as follows. A leading priority is to establish some of the fundamentals of civil society, a task made difficult by the extreme centralizing tendencies of the Baath party. National elections are a component of civil society, but they are not necessarily the most important aspect and can furthermore inflame separatist and factional tendencies (geographic and/or ethnic).
Near-term local elections can focus the public mind on the practical aspects of reconstruction and governance. They will also give an inevitably out-of-touch foreign national authority someone to consult with.
Eh?
Super, I myself have to piss off again, bit of a problem and have to make a site visit. At least it means the CEO is going to feed me another atrocious meal on his account. Reward or punishment?
Very fair summary.
However nota bene, Egypt did not look so bad 30 years ago, although the signs were there by all accounts.
It’s true Iraq starts out in less of a hole than Egypt does, but on the other hand, the socio-political stability is worse. One advantage Egypt has it is an ancient unitairy state. Egyptians really don’t question their Egyptianess. (Actually they can be quite ‘Big Country’ folks in their lack of consciousness of other views, which infuriates other Arabs to no end. Really very amusing sometimes.)
Bingo.
Come on now man, asked and answered in GQ. The Arabic is al-'Iraq. Has the nifty 'ayn sound I rather like so much. Eeraq is the closest, Eye-raq sounds downright Bushlike, Earraq sounds … well I don’t know.
Ahhhh. Not sure what current views are, until recently he had some real street cred.
I personally think he is pulling off an impossible job with a real pinache. I actually have come to like the fellow, he amuses me in a way that, say Ari Fleischer -the Emir of Smirk- does not.
Pity of course, early on the Iraqis actually were doing a better job of accuracy than the US. Faded away under pressure obviously.
I would say that people are going to cling on to him until a breaking point, probably within the next few days, and then go anti. Right now the dream of Arab resistance appears to be breaking down, it has most folks I deal with in a pissy mood, and since I am busy, I prefer not to endure any rants at present.
Proof that al-Jazeera is no joke. They piss everyone off, ergo.
For all that I am displeased with their recent coverage, they fell for the idea of a genuine Sadaam holdout and seem to be having a hard time repositioning. This is more their correspondents in the field than the home anchors, who to my view are better trained and tend to be more BBC objectivists.
Well, let us see.
This thread is ten pages, I’m guessing my question may have been addressed already. Please forgive me if it has, and if you would be so good as to direct me to the page/posts where I could find my answer, I’d be much obliged.
However, if not, then this is an important addition to the discussion, I think.
Coll, have you read the current issue of The Atlantic Monthly, the cover story about The House of Saud? If not, it is an examination of the ruling family of Saudi Arabia, our good “friend”.
So here’s my question:
Holy shit! What the hell are we doing? Saudi Arabia, at least as this article portrays it, is ready to topple oh…tomorrow. It is bursting at the seams with American haters (hence the 9/11 hijackers, or has everyone forgotten in our rush to go after Iraq that all but four were Saudis?), the royal family, all 30,000 :eek: of them, are a bunch of self-indulgent punks… I really wish I could link to the article.
Anyway, what is your take on this situation, and do you think the bottom line is that our understanding that SA is ready to implode is a driving factor in this war, since we have to have a secure source of oil, and SA might not be that soon?
(Again, all apologies if you all have been there, done that.)
Stoid: See elucidator’s 2nd post on the top of page 9 (this page): Collounsbury has not read the article. Of course he could still comment on SA…
[celestina tiptoes into this thread]
I’ll preface this by saying: forgive the inelegance of this response. I’m sure our panel of experts like Tamerlane & Sugarlump can come in here and clean up anything I’ve missed or unintentionally represented.
stoid & elucidator, I’m certainly no expert on Saudia Arabia, and I haven’t read this article, but I do know folks what used to live in Saudia Arabia in the past decade or so. Here’s my 2 cent version of what they have to say on this culture.
Yes, Saudia Arabia is messed up due in part to the precarious balance of power the House of Saud has. Basically they’ve made a bargain with the Wahhabis. In exchange for the Wahhabis supporting them and letting them do what they want, they won’t try to stop the Wahhabis from spreading Wahhabism and making it the predominant sect of Islam in Saudia Arabia. I don’t think any other religion is allowed to be practiced in Saudia Arabia, and other forms of Islam like Shia are most likely frowned on. The Wahhabis and the power structure–outside of the House of Saud–they represent, instead of investing in education in science, industry, and so on, have invested funds in establishing mosques that promote Wahhabism throughout the world.
But it’s not just the House of Saud that’s at fault, it’s the Saudis themselves who have been lulled by former years of wealth from oil into a sense of entitlement. But the wealth doesn’t stretch as far now. What will probably cause the collapse or just do considerable damage to this country is the fact that the general populace is dependant on foreigners upon whom they look down to do the dirty work (e.g. driving taxis, cleaning houses, doing the entry-level jobs) for them. Many folks’ attitudes towards education are that they don’t have to work hard to learn. There are exceptions, of course. In fact, I believe the women who do get a chance to study, generally perform better than the male students because their attitude is a little better about working. Many students will do just enough to get by so they can get their degrees and then go immediately into those glamourous management positions that are becoming more and more scarce. If they can’t have those positions, then they stay at home and have babies and go to the mosques and the malls. Many of them believe that they should not have to work in unglamourous jobs so they don’t. Because the upperlevel jobs are limited; there’s a lack of investment in an educational and social infrastructure where women and men are equally valued; funds from the oil wealth don’t stretch as far due to an increased population–all many of them do is just have babies–and critical thinking about religion, culture, and the world at large is not encouraged, Saudi Arabian culture has put itself in a precarious position. If the ex-pats who live and work there doing the fundamental, but unglamorous jobs leave, them Saudis is in big trouble. Based on my friends’ perceptions, I don’t think that most Saudis are as afraid of Western concepts or Westerners as we Westerners would like to believe. Rather, they think their way of doing this is better. Or, perhaps they’re just in a state of denial.
Now before y’all jump on me for my less than flattering portrayal and generalizations of Saudi culture and folks, I will say that within all of the repression and sense of entitlement, there does thrive critical thinking and concern about where the country is going. Folks do find ways to rebel against or to critique the repressive standards that are in place. Folks do have access to an education, and there are many who do value learning and make an effort to learn. In the Saudi press, there are attempts to voice different perspectives–there are stories by women and about the difficulties women who’ve been mistreated by their husbands have; there are stories about how women feel the pressure to marry, but can’t because dowry issues or because the men don’t make enough to support them; and there are articles and editorials validating the vaunted roles that men have in the culture. So folks ain’t all just sitting around doing nothing all day. 
IIRC, my friends say that there’s not much to do in Saudi Arabia but go to the malls, perhaps surf the internet, go to work or school, and go to the mosque. The mutawa, the religious police whom many dislike, are nasty folks who harrass women in malls and other public places if even a piece of hair or an ankle is showing, but the youth do find ways to get around the mutawa. If guys and girls want to hook up, they can and do by strategically dropping paper with their cell phone numbers on them, pretending to be their parents to check into hotels, and so on. While folks ain’t supposed to try to convert others to Islam, some Saudis do engage in this practice with non-muslims. But, Saudis do find ways to rebel as well by holding secret meetings where they talk about topics or engage in activities that the Wahhabis and their goons the mutawa would not like. But change is slow in coming. It requires real effort and considerable risk to speak out against and not conform to the norm.
As far as what this means to US interests, it makes sense to think that Bush & Company would be concerned about Saudi Arabia’s instability, but I think it’s more complex than that. The Saudis I think on some level, even if they hate the US, realize they need to do business with us, but their oil reserves will only last so long. I would hope that Bush & Company are aware of this and the fact that we can’t just walk into Saudia Arabia, even if it were to collapse tomorrow and take over like we’re doing in Iraq. We’d have a mess on our hands for sure since muslims everywhere probably wouldn’t like us bombing the country where Mecca is. And we have no diplomatic or even moral grounds for bombing Saudi Arabia. Well, and it’s questionable in the long run if we’ll really be able to colonize Iraq, help ourselves to their oil, and have them like it.
There’s my inelegant analysis. I’ve gotta run. Y’all have fun tearing this apart, or not.
[celestina tiptoes out of this thread]
**Collounsbury, ** and anyone else with M.E. living experience, how do you think the news reports of U.S. troops in Saddam’s palaces, especially ones of them taking home “souvenirs” (i.e. looting, albeit very small-scale from what I’ve read so far), and photos of troops sitting on the couches in the palaces having a smoke break will go over in the M.E.? Will people see such actions as understandable, or as an insult to Iraqis at large?
Re: the post-war Iraqi administration, it appears (based upon the fact that the Pentagon has already airlifted him to Iraq) that the administration will be giving considerable post-war authority to Ahmad Chalabi (an Iraqi exile who has been living in the United States). Does anyone have any information about Chalabi, and his standing with the Iraqi populace (other than the recent news reports that say the CIA doesn’t like him)?
Kenneth Pollack on Ahmed Chalabi, p. 97
It should be noted that Pollack is not a disinterested observer in these matters. The INC attacked Pollack and others in the Clinton administration who advocated that they be given a role in regime change, but not a leading role. (Ironically, the remainder within the executive branch wanted to give the INC little or no role at all.)
The smoking wasn’t anything to be concerned about – here there is almost no consciousness of smoking politesse.
I have a big sign in my office, in Arabic, " Please Refrain from Smoking in the Office" – people regularly march in and ignore it. It is amazing.
The looting, well the real problem is lack of control over the Iraqi looting.
Keep in mind the class structure in Iraq. What Iraqis, and other Arabs, see is not “Iraqis celebrating and looting” but the Shiites doing so. First, it is a threat to social order, something that really does not go down well here, and may be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to undermine social order. Second, the winners and losers in the looting are not evenly distributed over the social and ethnic groups – Sunnis are clear losers, Shiites winners. This is not a good thing to let go on for long.
Collounsbury, what’s the impact on the Arab street of the images and events of the last 24 hours?
My read (from English language sources) is a sort of grudging endorsement of what the coalition has done so far, coupled with continued deep suspicion regarding future plans. The attitude seems to be, “Ok, Sadaam did have it coming and you’ve removed him just about as delicately as possible. I guess we can’t really be too upset about what you’ve done so far. Now get out.” Is this correct?
**
Yes. Most definitely. In my opinion, this is actually one of the very best (though not publicly acknowledged) geopolitical reasons to “clean up” Iraq and rebuild its oil industry. Saudi Arabia is responsible for about 16% of world petroleum production. Having a relatively friendly Iraq able and willing to take up the slack could be key to world wide economic stability if the House of Saud gets the boot and the country is taken over by ObL sympathizers.
Too early to tell per se, recall the Arab World distrusts such imagery, for they are used to seeing it staged.
Well, almost no one liked Sadaam to begin with, ex-radicalized youth in Palestine since he seemed to be the only champion for their cause.
I would not say that much of the Arab world thinks that we removed him as delicately as possible – quite the contrary as most people I know have an almost Hollywoodesque vision of US power and what special forces etc. can do. You frequently hear arguments that if we “really” wanted to just get rid of Sadaam, we could have just gotten him, that this is all just a facade for siezing Iraq.
Now, given the history of the region and the history of cynical and often short sighted support for… well Sadaam by the US… it is not hard to see there is some grain of truth in this view. Exagerated, blow out of proportion but there.
As I had said before, ‘liberating’ the Iraqis is not a phrase with resonance as no one believes it. No one. Given our continued support for regimes almost as bad, in terms of internal repression
Saudi
I have not read the article, however holding Iraq as a card against SA is pure foolishness.
(a) I do not believe the House of Saud is in real immediate danger, above all if they get rid of American troops. Much of their attributed wealth is actually distributed away down through clientelistic networks, via the tribes. SA society has not changed enough to up end this.
(b) On economic terms, SA oil is about the lowest cost in the world, in terms of cost to extract. With improving infrastructure, through partnerships with western hydrocarbon concerns, this is only going to get better. Further, they sit on the largest confirmed reserves, with little effort to add until recently. They will remain the swing producer, Iraq will not change that. With moderate economic reforms, SA can really stave off, for a while longer, and may be able to get out of their problem. May.
I see little basis for short term chicken littlism in re SA, and I suggest much of the current screeching over SA is politically motivated by the perennial Saudi haters in AIPIC and others. (Not that I personally care for the corrupt, arrogant fucks myself, but analytically I hardly see SA as about to collapse) I would be far more concerned about Egypt and Yemen for somewhat different but related reasons in re socio-economic/environmental crisis and collapse, which in the case of Yemen could truly threaten SA.
I should reproduce my other message here, for comment:
First, let me observe that should, and perhaps I am engaging in sheer optimism here, we be looking to medium and long term results, then petty playground sandbox politics is not a particularly productive path to take.
A few sociological observations first, for those who have missed my thread.
First, the celebrating and looting, etc., with the end of the regime is not seen in this region as “Iraqis,” an undifferentiated group, but by the social layers that people here know exist. Shiite vs Sunni is also a class difference. Many of those being looted, or in the case of government offices, having their offices looted are Sunni, the majority in fact. The celebrators-looters are without doubt largely Shiite, for that is the sociological reality of the regime, the Shiite majority was shut out. Have care not to dupe yourself into thinking things are simple. As I argued in my thread, it is now that the real danger starts, with a head that will come up in I would estimate 6 months to a year.
If one follows either my thread or the many links therein, one clear picture emerges, whatever sort of ideological pimpery may claim otherwise: Many Iraqis wanted to be rid of Sadaam, few wanted an invasion and none, excluding perhaps the exiles who may need protection if installed as pro-consuls, want the Americans to rule or otherwise revamp their country in an American image. Arab nationalism, emerging and fragile Iraqi nationalism together.
The threat here is Beirut, 1980s. Roula Khalaf in the Financial Times has it on the money. There will be little patience on the Iraqi side for a second colonial experience, and many, many hidden agendas, jockeying for power and influence. And in a country awash in arms.
Second, the entire operation has had little to no international legitimacy. Celebrating Iraqis is helpful but not the entire game, for all that anyone who looks closely knows there is a clear socio-economic and ethnic divide to take into account (as well as it being important to recall the habits of a dictatorship do not disappear overnight, one day chanting for Sadaam, the next USA, but where the real feelings lie? With neither in the end, for the moment). Pre-emptive attack on a fairly prostrate country by the worlds most powerful nation generates fears and resentments, and not just in dictatorships. These are not merely trivial jealousies but also reactions to a rising perception of threat coming from a United States that many perceive as not being willing to abide by the same rules it wishes to impose on others. Certainly the Wolfowitz crowd make arguments that fit this precisely. This implies lack of trust, lack of trust implies impaired cooperation in other fields. Impaired cooperation implies rising opportunity costs to achieve policy goals, and indeed perhaps excludes certain win-win kinds of multinational cooperation.
These are important problems, less evident perhaps to the simplistic one off analysis, but they became very evident when one looks at the failure of US diplomacy, truly unprecedented given the circumstances, in the past year. Very clearly, the Blair Government understands this and is pressuring, publicly and privately, to get Iraqi policy back on a multilateral track – and short-circuit the ‘spoils of victory’ mentality I see here. Just as obviously, a failure in this regard will be serious political blow to Blair having staked his reputation on these items.
Very clearly then, spreading the responsibility is akin to spreading the risks. The profits to be had from Iraq, while perhaps important for smaller to medium sized companies, are not that great in the end. Iraq may end up rich, but not overnight. Serious money will have to be invested to repair damage, heal wounds, buy loyalties, patch over rivalries and spread enough good will to help allow the first seeds of civil society to take root. None of this will be easy either. Should the Bush team actually be thinking as prudent strategists, they should be thinking of spreading the risk for what is now the real challenge: defeating a second rate army crippled by ten years of sanctions was trivial – although a very decent job was apparently done of doing so and largely minimizing Iraqi civilian casualties. For all that I know some, which makes it hard to step back and be analytical, for me personally.
What purpose then, excluding the French and the Germans and the Russians? To show political immaturity and childish peevishness? To engage in pointless self-indulgence? What rational policy goals are served? Certainly in the case of private companies and participation in rebuilding Iraq, excluding private companies such as TotalFinaElf on the basis of their ‘nationality’ is not only ludicrously childish but also sends a number of bad policy signals.
First, it undermines the credibility of the argument this is not a colonial game. It is hard to overestimate the danger of this, for both Iraqi and pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic opinion are inclined – with the good reason of historical examples – to see this as a colonialist power play to seize the Iraqi market for the US. I personally find this to be a silly argument on a rational basis (as much as I find to be absurd and incoherent, even hypocritical, the frequent pimping of the claims that France et al aligned themselves with Iraq for commercial reasons, based on trivial private contracts and debt – which is more likely to be repaid now than before). However as noted there are rational historical, if not factually supported, reasons for the developing world to see things in this manner.
Second, it rather undermines what should be a policy of promoting adherence to commercially based free market contracting. American insertion of American preferences for no better reason than ideology and childish peevishness into the contracting processes does nothing more than set a bad example in a neighborhood already replete with bad examples and poor corporate and other governance. Should we actually wish to succeed in the stated aim of helping the Iraqis build a viable civil society with viable economics, then policies had best be based on a clear-sighted vision of medium term goals and results, not near term inanities about who was ‘against’ us.
I am likely going to be a part of financing certain aspects of this, and I certainly do not see anything good in the medium and even near term from adopting a “US” first program in Iraq, for the examples that will be set, and for the already stunning challenges one will find in operating in this environment. I speak to this as an on the ground operator, and I may add since we have American capital, I may be speaking against narrow self-interest but for a larger overall pie in the end.
Finally, on the corporate front, the spreading of participation also means the spreading of potential risk, especially blame, when things go wrong. While it may be superficially attractive to own the whole pie, this also means owning all of the blame, or all of the risk. Not a very good idea, in my opinion, and I know this region – this is not Kansas. Already the US by arrogating to itself the right to change this regime has bitten off a large portion of risk for success and failure in Iraq in the next 5-10 years. Whatever happens in the next half-to full decade here will be pinned on the US, for better or worse. While I am sure our navel gazers here will thoughtlessly throw up their shoulders in a so-what shrug, if one wants positive results from the policy, one has to follow it through. Given the challenges I have outlined elsewhere, I do not believe it prudent, for no particularly compelling long-term policy reasons, to exclude portions of the private sector for what should be ephemeral political tiffs.
As to the political side, while I can see reasons not to welcome French political meddling on one level, it strikes me once more from experience that getting potential stake holders and game spoilers in one the game is the best way to minimize interference. Already this process begins with little to no regional or international legitimacy. That needs to be changed to manage the risk, and to help increase the somewhat long odds for success.
For example, lack of French and German, and other European recognition for the Government would, as in the case of the Security Council vote, give political cover and critical mass for developing world countries, including those in the region not to recognize the government. One disaster scenario would be to end up with a result approaching the Turkish Republic of Cyprus, a country only recognized by Turkey – obviously less extreme in this case, but when the weight of international legitimacy is not there, your operating costs rise dramatically. No WB access, no IMF – difficulty in shaking the colonial label, with attendant loss of legitimacy internally if this is a long-term problem.
I will not go on to delve into this further; I believe this is sufficient to show that the comments to date reflect at best an impoverished understanding of the requirements for moving forward successfully, and the myriad attendant dangers. I am personally deeply concerned with these issues for the very reason noted above, it has non-theoretical impacts on me. However, beyond that, I believe the analysis is clear – short sightedness got the US into the position where there was a Sadaam with the moderate regional threat capacity that he had – cold war support for the Baath, cold war support for his war with Iran, etc. More short-termism, however superficially appealing on some self-indulging emotional level, will simply create medium to long term problems.
I should say in closing I continue to be amused by the bizarre statements about how “France’s vote” “will be seen” and that somehow France will lose its position in the UN and even lose cred. in the EU. Really quite the contrary, the inverse indeed. Certainly in responsible levels, French opposition expressed the widely held belief that someone had to say no to the Bush Administration’s transparently fabricated case for toppling someone they did not like when they wanted to and fuck the views of others. That this did not stop the war, I would say is considered perhaps less important than, as in the case of the failure of getting the rest of the Security Council on board despite pressure etc,
Well, I was thinking more in my latent Jewish mother terms, i.e. “Get those filthy fatigues and combat boots off my nice white couch!” and secondarily, are the palaces considered by ordinary Iraqis as the property of the Iraqi people, for which foreigners should show respect, or as Saddam’s personal property, to be treated with, ummm, a rather lesser degree of respect?
Was 22 days short enough for you?
Uh huh, that’s why the Iraqi’s are kissing U.S. soldiers and chanting “Bush” and “America”.
Fighting until the last? There has barely been a fight at all. The regime has gone bye-bye rather quickly.
Oh yes, Baghdad fought until the end, they did.
Of course, one is too many, but there hasn’t been very many at all, has there?
So badly in fact, that it’s nearly over.
The cohesion of the regime? Snort. What are you talking about?
Everyone I know is quite pleased that the initial heavy combat phase of the war ended so abrubtly. The “neener-neener” posts of the likes of milroyj’s, above, are unfortunate in a thread like this one, that has, on the whole, stayed in the realm of polite discourse and discussion of, mostly, facts or thoughtful opinion.
As to certain specific portions of milroyj’s post –
That was wonderful to see, but you need to realize that, like everything else, you’re seeing only small groups of people dancing in the streets. And now some of them have turned from dancing to looting and burning. How long will they be praising Bush and the US if the hospitals don’t reopen, the electricity remains off, and anarchy continues and spreads? I don’t want to find out, but with Rumsfeld et al. continuing to issue defensive comments, instead of working to install some semblance of order, I worry that we might. (If we don’t and order is quickly restored, and the Iraqis are still cheering for Bush in 6 months, then I will be extremely happy and relieved. And milroyj, I’m sure, will still be saying neener-neener.)
I would point out that the “body bags” comment was addressing the results of a medium/long term failure to install a workable “New Iraqi Regime”.
I was annoyed to hear yesterday on the radio that “Pentagon lawyers” are claiming that since, technically, the “war” is ongoing, the US is not violating the Geneva convention by not instilling order in Bagdhad. Anytime you release a statement from your lawyers, you’re not winning hearts and minds. It’s not as if this period of anarchy was unforeseeable. The fact that they are now “formulating a plan” is maddening. They’ve been planning the war for 18 months or more, but failed to consider this phase?
Thoughtful opinion? Apparently not by the OP. Our very own, self-annointed, MENA expert has thus far been wrong in his “thoughtful opinion” in terms of Vietnam comparisons, body bags, Iraqi citizens enthusiasm for liberation, fighting in the cities, the Battle of Baghdad (30 hours, o my!), Saddam’s fighting until the end, and my personal favorite, the “cohesion of the regime”, which fell apart quicker than a house of cards on a mild spring day.