There is a considerable difference in effect. If our Cheesemeister is wrong, the consequences amount to little more than mild embarassment. If Fearless Misleader is wrong, and I very much suspect that he is, the consequences are catastrophic.
This isn’t exactly the ‘bad shit’ that was predicted:
[url=http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20030412-122035-6148r]Iran may consider resuming ties with U.S.
[/quote]
Yes, but the predictions of catastophic consequences seem more and more chicken-little-ist, seeing as almost none of them have come true.
That is an impressive list of willful distortions or failures in understanding.
Vietnam comparisons: Raised by other posters and answered differently by Col who did not make any such comparisons. His only comment on Vietnam was to scorn the notion that “we could have won” if only we had fought differently and he specifically avoided comparing Iraq to Vietnam.
body bags: A specific comment about what would happen if we attempted to treat Iraq the way we treated the Philipines 100 years ago (and if we acted in the manner that got us chased out of Lebanon and Somalia). He did not claim that this war would result in enormous numbers of body bags.
Iraqi citizens enthusiasm for liberation: Apparently you are pretending that a few hundred people in the streets of a city of 5 million is some sort of overwhelming enthusiasm. Col specifically talked about a honeymoon period on a couple of occasions.
fighting in the cities, the Battle of Baghdad (30 hours, o my!): I saw him express a fear that they could be a problem. I saw no prediction that they would. He expressly said that we needed a short war, but that we could not use massive destruction of cities to achieve it. He did not claim that the cities could not be won swiftly. He also expressly refused to make any predictions of military actions.
Saddam’s fighting until the end: If Hussein died in one of the attacks, would that not count as fighting to the (his) end? Have you seen him lately?
the “cohesion of the regime”: Which Col has not made any strong claim for (and which would have been based on the continued presence of Hussein. If he has gone, (or if he is incommunicado), then the cohesion slips.
You’d do much better to scatter that straw on newly seeded lawn or to bed the goats than to make such silly and easily noticed straw men. I’m sure that Col has made statements that can be challenged and he has probably made a few predictions thay may turn out wrong–but you have not pointed to any of them.
Not so far they haven’t. But would you put a revolver to your Naughty Bits and play Russian Roulette if the prize was a toaster oven? Fearless Misleader may be a stubborn and self-righteous little twit, but he’s a darn lucky one!
I’d prefer not to rely on that, however.
The last refuge of partisans: “Okay, everything happened exactly the way he predicted. He just got lucky”.
Yes he did. To wit:
Looks like a strong claim to me. And a demonstrably false one, to boot. If anything, C overestimated the cohesion of the regime, by a factor of many times.
Depends on what you mean by “predicted”. When things weren’t looking all that hot, the Bushistas were at great pains to deny they ever predicted a “cakewalk”. Yes, indeed, we have thoroughly routed a third-world “paper tiger”. Well, whoop-de-fucka-doo! A military challenge on a par with the one faced by Santa Ana at the Alamo.
It is further predicted that the Middle East will undergo a wave of transformation to Amway distributors and Starbucks entrepreneurs. You will forgive me, I trust, if I await further developments before I celebrate that triumph. Of course, now that this advance in the War on Terror has been achieved, surely we can expect a drastic reduction in the terror alert level? After all, are we not, as we were promised, much safer now?
(PS to Sam: your identification of moi as a partisan, presumably implying that you are not, is chucklesome. I am blindly partisan, while you are the calm voice of sweet reason. Right. Sure thing. You betcha.)
Underestimating the cohesion of the regime? I did not fall apart (if it is not still active in Tikrit–which it may not be, of course) until it was ripped apart by the invading forces. Many Bushistas, while hedging their bets with statements about “as long as it takes” implied that “Shock and Awe” would roll up the Iraqi defense completely. I suppose that one can argue what was actually said and actually meant, but I see no great claim by Col that the Ba’ath would be fighting us in the streets for years to come.
And I notice that you had to pick this single arguable claim to defend, since the rest of your rhetoric was “demonstrably false.”
I’d like to see some comments here about what happened to the Brits in Iraq during and after WWI. The New Yorker ran an article re a certain British general named Maude, and Harper’s, in this month’s issue, ran his proclamation to the residents of Baghdad when he apparently entered the city. From what I can figure out, the British fought and defeated the Turks for the right of having Iraq, or whatever it is they told themselves back then, and then got their heads handed to them a little later in a rebellion, with Maude being assassinated.
Some details to fill this in anyone?
Not quite Tom, Collounsbury apologist extraordinaire.
Just one example, but your Saddam did not go down fighting to the last. He didn’t fight at all. As you said, who’s seen him lately?
You were expecting to see him in the street wearing a head-band and firing at the Warthogs with an M-60C cradled in his arms a la Rambo?
You’re just picking at the straws you’ve strewn around. There is already a Pit thread for bashing Col. If you’ve got nothing of substance to add, here, you might consider taking your ad hominems over there.
Sure Tom, call ad hominem if you’d like, just because some of the expert’s posts aren’t true, and I pointed it out.
Some excerpts:
1917- *It was evident that London was not aware of, or had given no thought to, the population mx of the Mesopotamian provinces. The antipathy between the minority of Muslims that were Sunni and the majority who were Shi’ites, the rivalries of tribes and clans, the historic and geographic divisions of the provinces, and the commercial predominance of the Jewish community in the city of Baghdad made it difficult to achieve a single unified government that was at the same time representative, effective, and widely supported…
…General Maude, in whose name the Sykes proclamation had been issued, was put in the position of preaching self-rule, while discouraging its practice. The compromise formula at which the British had arrived might have been expressly designed to arouse dissatisfaction and unrest: having volunteered what sounded like a pledge of independance to an area that had not asked for it, the military and civil authorities then proceeded to withhold it…*
1920-1921 - *…While he was prepared to administer the provinces of Baghdad and Basra, and also the province of Mosul ( which, with Clemenceau’s consent, Lloyd George had detached from the French sphere and intended to withhold from Turkey ), he did not believe they formed a coherent entity. Iraq ( an Arab term that the British used increasingly to refer to the Mesopotamian lands ) seemed to him too splintered for that to be possible. Mosul’s strategic importance made it seem a necessary addition to Iraq, and the strong probability that it contained valuable oilfields made it a desirable one, but it was part of what was supposed to have been Kurdistan; and Arnold Wilson argued that the warlike Kurds who had been brought under his administration “numbering a half a million would never accept an Arab ruler.”
A fundamental problem as Wilson saw it, was that the almost two million Shi’ite Muslims in Mesopotamia would not accept domination by the minority Sunni Muslim community, yet “no form of government has yet been envisaged, which does not involve Sunni domination.” The bitterness between the two communities was highlighted when each produced a rival Arab nationalist society…
…Unlike Arab nationalists, who were thinking in terms of political unity on a large scale, thre were those who questioned whether even attempting to unite the Mesopotamian provinces might not be too ambitious to be practical. Gertrude Bell, working on her own plan for a unified Iraq, was cautioned by an American missionary that she was ignoring rooted historical realities in doing so. “You are flying in the face of four millenia of history if you try to draw a line around Iraq and call it a political entity! Assyria always looked to the west and east and north, and Babylonia to the south. They have never been an independant unit. You’ve got to take time to get them integrated, it must be done gradually. They have no conception of nationhood yet.”
A leading Arab political figure in Baghdad cautioned her along different lines. Speaking to her on 12 June 1920, he reproached her with the fact that, more than three years after occupying Baghdad in the war, Britain continued to talk about establishing an independant government but still did nothing about it. He contrasted this with the situation in Damascus, where the British had set up Feisal’s administration as soon as they had arrived…
…Gertrude Bell discounted the danger of a native uprising. Her chief, Arnold Wilson did not. He warned London that demobilization had left his armed forces dangerously undermanned. The military deployed only a tiny force of mobile troops to patrol 170,000 sq. miles…
…In June the tribes suddenly rose in full revolt - a revolt that seems to have been triggered by the government’s efforts to levy taxes. By 14 June the formerly complacent Gertrude Bell, going from one extreme to another, claimed to be living through a nationalist reign of terror. She exaggerated, but in the Middle Euphrates, posts were indeed overrun, British officers killed, and communications cut. For one reason or another - the revolts had a number of causes and the rebels pursued different goals - virtually the whle area rose against Britain, and revolt then spread to the Lower Euphrates as well. A Holy War was proclaimed against Britain in the Shi’ite Muslim holy city of Karbala. On the northwestern frontier, Arab calvary, initially led by one of Feisal’s ex-officers, swept down on British outposts and massacred their defenders…
…The government of India poured in reinforcements of men and supplies to restore order. The main population centers were quickly secured, but regaining control of the countryside took some time. It was not until October that many of the cut-off Euphrates towns were relieved and not until February 1921 that order was restored more or less completely. Before putting down the revolt Britain suffered 2,000 casualties, including 450 dead.*
The above taken from pgs 307 and 450-453 of A Peace to End All Peace:* The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* by David Fromkin ( 1989, Avon Books ). A very highly recommended volume.
I left out a lot of relevant details, but I think you can get the gist. Some comments:
-
That aforementioned Sykes proclamation was Iraq-specific. It was not the famous one. Maude was very unhappy with it.
-
Maude died of cholera, he wasn’t assassinated. As you can see the revolt started three years after his death in 1917. As noted the grandiose, but never followed up on proclamation he issued started the unreast, but the culmination came later.
-
The officer that was assassinated ( at a parlay ) was Colonel Gerard Leachman.
- Tamerlane
Oh, the Maude assassination thing apparently comes from some contemporary ( to him ) speculation that he was poisoned. But subsequent follow-up seems to have disproved that hypothesis. Apparently what most likely happened was that he was infected by contaminated milk while campaiging in what was to become northern Iraq.
- Tamerlane
Thanks, Tamerlane. And I screwed up when I asked: I made Leachman and Maude a single person in my head when I was writing that question. I’ll definitely have to get and read that book. Looks like it could be very relevant.
--------- milroyjSure Tom, call ad hominem if you’d like, just because some of the expert’s posts aren’t true, and I pointed it out.
I take it that milroyj takes issue with the prediction that Saddam will, “…go down fighting to the last.” At any rate, I haven’t seen any further substantiation of his other (ahem) claims.
Prediction is always difficult, and Collouns displays a certain panache when playing this game.
If Saddam shows up in Syria, as other experts have speculated, Collounsbury will have been proven wrong on this single prediction. If, OTOH, Saddam died during the bombing, it can be said that the dictator indeed did go down fighting to the last - to the end of his life.
At the same time, Collounsbury’s larger point - that Saddam is (was) a bastard but not a coward per se - remains unaddressed, IMHO. (I wouldn’t call a fleeing Saddam brave, but I wouldn’t necessarily call him a coward either. You know, he who lives and runs away, lives to terrorize with his billions another day.)
It might be more interesting to isolate Collounsbury’s central predictions - it would be remarkable if at least a few of them were not wrong. (A more fairminded assessment would also be appreciated: Col disavowed any military expertise in his very first post, for gosh sakes.)
As for the implied argument that Col expected Saddam to be involved in combat- well that’s just silly. Droolingly so. 
My my Milly, you really are a petty, are you not?
Let me respond then to the substance, and abstract away from the rest: My own comments quoted are in italics.
(a) Cohesion of the Regime: I am not sure myself whether I was right or wrong on this. At the time of writing I was thinking of the pre-war predictions that regime would instantly collapse, but I was also thinking the regime would hold out for about a month or two. So, I give you a 2/3 point on this one. Expertise, my dear milly, does not mean infallibility on timing. On the other hand, the Bushistas also clearly underestimated the cohesion of the regime, I still feel quite fine with that analysis, you can of course spend some time coming up with a coherent and rational analysis of why that is wrong, should you so desire. Just don’t forget to lube up.
(b) If we do not, then … well … you know my opinion, this will be the worst foreign policy disaster since Vietnam. Now this I suppose is quoted to imply that I was predicting that Iraq would be another ‘Vietnam’ militarily. The attentive reader, those having mastered joined up sentence reading for comprehension will note that I have not at all argued that. Foreign policy – not military. And I maintain that. Anyone who had been reading the thread for something other than some peevishly masturbatory delight in finding a few sentence to rip out of context would have noted my real concerns are best expressed in my phrase “Egypt on the Euphrates” and the creation of yet another pseudo-democracy. I shan’t bother to recap what should be clear, but again the attentive reader can go back to see the context.
© One month is the maximum before we begin to see bad shit.
: Yes Milly, 22 days is just barely short enough for me, for all that the real issues are ahead of us. Did you actually have a point here?
(d) If one follows the quotes from Iraqis on the ground in these articles, from diverse sources, it is very clear that there is almost no popular enthusiasm for a foreign invasion. Reluctant acceptance in some quarters but not enthusaism.
: Yeah Milly my dear, a few hundred Iraqis, many of whom are looting. If one watches something else than Fox news, one quite sees a rather more complicated picture, although perhaps that may be a bit beyond you. But let’s get back to the meat: I stand by the analysis at the time, none of the sources or personal contacts let (or lead) me to believe there was more than, as I said, reluctant acceptance of invasion. Nationalist pride, fear of destruction and death. Post-facto cheering by small mobs & crowds does not lead me to change my opinion there was and is not popular enthusiasm for an invasion, and if one listens to interviews outside of Fox, one quickly gets something rather deeper and more dark than those facile little pictures you see (however predigested they are for you): a swath of population angry about the losses, fearful of American intentions, angry that much of their country has been wrecked. Of course, Fox is not presenting this, but one can catch it on the French, Arabic and BBC reporting. Of course, I know you prefer to simply select a few confirmatory nuggets rather than look to a big picture. In any case, as I have said throughout, the real issue is what things look like 6 months to 1 year down the road, not the “Medh” of a population so conditioned, however much it is convenient to avoid the real issues and declare victory. In the meantime, for those of us following this directly, such as myself, I see some deep problems with US troops being blamed for encouraging and allowing the looting (spare me the excuses, it is poor planning and worse than that not believed by the Baghdadis), with a society clearly coming apart at the seams – and note even more dangerous, it is the mosques that are forming the focal point of restoration of order. But more on this below.
(e) Knowing Sadaam’s history, there is one thing he is not. He is not a coward. He is a beast, a gangster, cruel and mean. But he has always shown he has balls. It may make people feel better to call names, but I think they at least should be accurate ones. This guy is going to go down fighting to the last. His sons… well they are another matter.
: Again of course Milly does not quote to what I was responding, and I would hardly call the past month ‘hardly a fight at all’ nor would the goodly number of Iraqis I know who have lost family members, but then I suppose it is easy to brag about the world’s largest military power crushing them. Leaving that aside, should we find Sadaam hiding in a bunker in fear trying to slip off into exile, I may grant you this, although my suspicion is that Sadaam, if he is not dead, believes he can go underground and make a guerrilla war style come back, make Baghdad into Beirut. Lacking any clear data at the moment, I will still lay my money on that being the intention, presuming he is alive, that not running away. But if Ocalan can collapse in the last moment and beg for mercy, maybe Sadaam can. I think not, but let’s just call this one undecided. Bowden was indeed wrong and by extension myself on the length of the fight for Baghdad, and I am glad we were both wrong. So on this subpoint we give Milly a whole point for him to crow on about and whank away merrily.
(f) Body bags without end.
: This of course is taken so childishly and transparently out of context that I feel sorry for you, pity even. Really my boy, I know you harbor some burning feelings for me, for all that they are unrequited, but come on now, this is just pitiful.
(g) The war, although going badly()*
: Well Milly my dear, that may well be true, although I rather would prefer for the fat lady to sing. Now of course the whole quote was, as of 1 April, “The war, although going badly() will be won in a purely military sense. However, military victories are themselves utterly meaningless if they do not achieve real political objectives. The frequently cited rubbish about ‘could have won in Vietnam’ is an example of such myopic pseudo-realism.”* Pity I whacked my own hedging footnote “(*)” – but what was posted was posted so I shan’t complain. Again Milly my dear, those reading for comprehension will have noted my commentary was focused on the issues of the après-guerre, a point of no small concern to the informed observer.
So, other than demonstrating that some painful encounters with myself several years ago still stings to the point that you feel motivated to distort (although I will grant no doubt you sincerely understand things in the manner you have so brilliantly, displayed), what have we proven here? It seems that we have proven that prediction is an art, not a science, that when petty little dislikes become involved in looking at things, small excuses will be used to distort, and finally that some people are consumed with envy. Now as to flowbark’s note, actually isolating my core observations and judging them is a good thing. Some of my predictions and fears, however will take, as noted some six to 14 months to play out, as in the case of Afghanistan where I feel my observations on the developments I believe to have been substantially correct.
Now on to the present situation:
Groups of Kurds Are Driving Arabs From Northern Villages
And similarly
As Most Militias Leave Kirkuk, Kurd-Arab Tensions Rise
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A19774-2003Apr13.html
Darkly, both articles note the Turkmen calling for Turkish intervention.
Now getting to the issue of support or not, some articles with key quotes and observations, readers can use these to judge my own observations prior.
“Financial Times “Iraqis express anger at damage to their heritage” Baghdad 14 April 2003
Wonderful PR.
Baghdad Residents Begin a Long Climb to an Ordered City
“With fires still burning in government ministries, and the National Library and its centuries of archives added to the roll call of institutions ransacked and burned, the frenzies of the looters were not yet spent.” … “still smoldering in eastern Baghdad today were the city hall, the Agriculture Ministry and — so thoroughly burned that heat still radiated 50 paces from its front doors — the National Library. Not far from the National Museum of Iraq, which was looted on Thursday and Friday with the loss of almost all of its store of 170,000 artifacts, the library was considered another of the repositories of an Iraqi civilization dating back at least 7,000 years.”
In a country in love with its past, these losses are not going to go unnoticed.
Now some context which one can derive:
As one can see, and matching what I hear from Iraqis here, behind the “Bush is good” are different motives, among which is the 30 years of habit to praise the new strongman. Further to who is who, I include key quotes from a WP article below esp. in regards to the feelings of the Shia re US forces, but first some further comment from this NYT article:
As I noted earlier, the social chasms are wide and the passions deep, nor does American handling to date, either on the ground or in preparation indicate much of a concept of how to deal with such isssues.
Note well,
In simpler terms I have heard the same thing from less-well educated Iraqis, blaming the US for deliberately allowing the destruction of their culture etc., or the descent of Baghdad into armed camps largely divided by ethnicity and religion, proxies for social class as well.
We get a similar picture from Roula Khalaf (an excellent reporter and commentator on the region I add) in The Financial Times “Baghdad’s fall leaves power vacuum that terrifies the Shias” 14 April 2003 http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1048313726284&p=1012571727172
A further important note on “arrests” and de-ba’athification, the use of false or semi-true accusations to settle scores and feed fueds (lessons that should have been learned from the collapse of communism
And worse actually, outright manipulating our dear Anglo Saxons w/o access to direct information, and near total reliance on interpreters:
A disturbing yet completely foreseeable issue emerges in “Shiite Clerics Move to Assume Control in Baghdad” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A19652-2003Apr13.html which illustrates where real power is arising from. Overthrowing the rule of the mosque will not go easily nor lay a stable basis for the future, yet I am certain the Administration is not prepared to live with the Imams as political powers.
Key Quotes
““We order people to obey us. When we say stand up, they stand up. When we say sit down, they sit down,” Shawki said, his black turban framing the long beard of religious study. "With the collapse of Saddam, the people have turned to the clergy.”
“To the approval of residents, the clergy claim credit for preventing the bloodshed many feared would erupt in the tattered sector of 2 million people, which for decades bore the brunt of repression wielded by Hussein’s government. But the rise of the clerics hints at the formidable challenges that may face any new government in Baghdad: Sunni-Shiite disputes, the specter of warlords seizing and administering their own territory, and the potentially dangerous jockeying for position with U.S. forces that have become the lone power in Baghdad. The clerics are among the first to articulate their postwar intentions: a government shaped, if not controlled, by religious leaders who enjoy respect and authority among Iraq’s Shiite Muslim majority”
“The clergy’s response was swift. Mohammed Fartousi, a lanky 30-year-old cleric from Najaf, toured the neighborhood today in two cars with guards carrying AK-47 assault rifles. His followers said he was a delegate from the leading Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, and in an interview, he claimed authority over the dozens of mosques in the neighborhood. Hurried along by his armed retinue, he signed orders for dispensing medicine at the local hospital and carried a clear plastic bag packed with rounds of ammunition to distribute to young guards. He was calm and assured, with an air of intimidating authority. “We don’t need the Americans,” he said at the hospital. “They got rid of Saddam – nothing more, nothing less.””
Further:
““I’m in charge, only for the sake of God,” said Sayyid Sadeq Aalaq, 60, the leader of the small, modest Imam Ali Mosque, the first to be built in the neighborhood. But he added, “I don’t covet power or authority.” Claiming control over six of the neighborhood’s 79 districts, he seemed to have both … Since Hussein’s fall, he has used the mosque’s loudspeaker – powered by a generator during Baghdad’s lingering blackout – to broadcast an edict by Sistani forbidding looting. He has organized meetings with former police officers and is eager for them to return to their jobs. He has also started forming popular committees that would oversee the return of electricity, water distribution and food handouts, once the task of the Baath Party that crumbled hours before U.S. troops captured the city.
On his own initiative, Aalaq organized a meeting Saturday for leaders of the neighborhood’s mosques. Among their priorities is to ease tensions between Sunnis and Shiites that erupted Friday at Abrar Mosque – a rare Sunni place of worship in the neighborhood. In the dispute, a gun battle broke out that lasted four hours, until dawn. Although no one was killed, it was a sobering reminder of underlying tensions.
….
In Aalaq’s remarks are signs of what will be required for credibility in postwar Iraq – a record of resistance to the Hussein government and independence from the Americans. He said his authority was derived, in part, from his family’s suffering. …. With far less bitterness, he carries the same reticence in dealing with U.S. forces, refusing to meet any as long as they stay in Iraq. “The Americans asked to talk to me, but I refused,” Aalaq said, sitting in an office at the mosque. Overhead was a portrait of Ali, the prophet Muhammad’s son-in-law whom Shiites believe was his rightful heir. “If I met with them, my popularity would collapse.” That same independence, he said, doesn’t go for Shawki, the gun-toting mosque leader who is similarly exerting his authority. He insisted that Shawki was too close to the Baath Party for too long, and suggested that he was too eager to cooperate with U.S. forces.”
….
“Shawki stopped short of saying how far that leadership would go, although others were more forceful. Abdel-Nabi Badeiri, 30, a leader of the Imams Mosque, said the clergy themselves should inherit the state. “We wish from God for an Islamic government,” he said. “We want a clergyman to be president of the state.” Shawki was less vigorous but – for U.S. officials who will help shape that government – perhaps more direct. “The Americans,” he said, “should not neglect the place of the clergy.” ”
Further to the Shia issue, the Financial Times treats us to this fine piece of reporting,
“Struggle to control Shia Muslim holy city begins”
And further
As I noted in this thread earlier, much of the nonsense spouted in the US press about Iraqi secularism forgot the Shia and 15 years of social crisis. We now have fertile ground for the spread of radicalization across both Shia and Sunni communities.
[Added quote tag. – MEB]
Now regarding the “Afghan ‘Model’” that many like to pimp:
This timely article makes the points I have been making, and does not differ in substance from recent reporting from BBC and The Financial Times
U.S. Role Shifts as Afghanistan Founder
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A19438-2003Apr13.html
“Sixteen months after the ruling Taliban fell and Hamid Karzai took over as president, Afghanistan is still struggling to establish the basics of a working government” …. “The military is splintered by factionalism, the police force is untrained, the justice system is dominated by religious conservatives with more in common with the Taliban than with Karzai, and tax collection is largely ineffective.” …. “A look at the pace and nature of reconstruction in Afghanistan over the past three months shows that the United States is often acting with a sense of urgency and that U.S. rebuilding efforts reach into almost every aspect of Afghan life. U.S. officials say the total budget for Afghan aid this year – excluding the cost of maintaining the 8,000 U.S. troops – will probably match last year’s $935 million. But the needs of the continuing U.S.-led war effort are frequently at odds with the needs of Afghan nation-building, and the nation-building often suffers as a result, a dynamic that limits the credibility of Karzai and ministers in his government, top Afghan official and foreign officials in Kabul say. For instance, while spending millions to help train a new Afghan national army that will become the muscle for the central government, the United States is still funding local militias and warlords that its military believes it needs in the war against Muslim extremists. Those provincial leaders are often at odds with the central government and sometimes defy its orders.”
[Emphasis Added]
“*U.S. troops also continue to capture and hold without charges Afghans suspected of involvement with terrorists. The practice regularly brings hundreds of aggrieved Afghans to Kabul to argue for the release of their relatives or tribesmen * – most notably in the case of Naeem Koochi, a tribal leader with a large and loyal following. Karzai has said for months that Koochi should be released, but instead he was recently moved to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”
[Emphasis added: of course these events in no way resemble colonial rule, now do they?] ……
“This kind of U.S. and other international aid, in addition to the relative security being provided by U.S. and other troops, has encouraged millions of Afghan refugees to come home and has led to mini-building booms in Kabul and other cities. While many Afghans appreciate the improved security, they are increasingly critical of the reconstruction help they are receiving. They often speak harshly about the many luxury cars in Kabul that ferry United Nations and aid officials to meetings, while few visible improvements have been made in the lives of Afghans.”
However:
“But there has been less progress on other important fronts. For example, there are no voter registration rolls for next year’s election, a census has not been taken in decades, political parties are still not legal and the $50 million to $60 million that the United Nations says is needed for the election has not been raised. In addition, the security situation remains precarious enough that Karzai, who narrowly escaped assassination in September, seldom leaves the presidential compound, and when he does, a crew of largely American bodyguards accompanies him.”
Similar reporting in
Danger still looms in Afghan mountains Financial Times 7 Apr 2003 wherein the key issue is held in the opening:
Yes, things are just bloody cheery.