So? Given the nature of the regime, and the fact that its leader has modeled himself to some extent on The Godfather, it seems appropriate. What’s your complaint here?
Really? As I read it, what you have been told is that, given the overwhelming odds against the Iraqis and the enormous consequences to them of losing the war, some people in the region would understand such acts, if not condone them.
[Chris Rock]
I’m not saying O.J. should have killed her. But I understaaaaand.
[/Chris Rock]
[quote]
I condemn both the American aggression and the barbarianism of the Fadayeen Saddam.
Which barbarism? I have not seen the video you refer to of a fighter hiding behind children, though I would certainly condemn that if it were true. Short of that, however, all we’ve seen on this “human shields” thing is various reports filtered through the American military and the Bush Administration–not the most credible sources, in the eyes of most people in the region (nor with me, given their record of reporting numerous stories during this conflict that turn out have no basis in reality).
If such things are happening, they should of course be condemned, and I have no doubt most people in the region would do so. It is not, however, an established fact at this point, so expecting that kind of condemnation is not really reasonable.
If the war goes on too long, there is a real risk that Saddam Hussein will actually become extremely popular with Iraqis. Something similar happened during WWII in the Soviet Union. Stalin went from being universally loathed and feared to being extremely popular as an emblem of resistance.
**
Such irony. The adminstration started pushing this line precisely to counter the rumour that the U.S. wanted to invade Iraq to steal the oil for itself.
**
I think this is actually an easy one to answer. I just doubt whether the administration is willing to take the risks to make it happen.
The best way to make it not look like a colonial government is to make it not look like a colonial government. Of course, in the medium term, you do this by turning over more and more governmental function to native Iraqis. But in the short term, you do this by bringing on-board adminstrators who do not look like the stereotypical Americans. In order of desirability:
Gulf Arabs. Getting a couple of competent, pragmatic Muslim Arab administrators to take responsibility for some high-profile areas like health care, civilian police, the judicial system, utilities, etc. would go a long way toward reconciling the Arab street to American and British actions. It’s no longer the Westerners occupying an Arab country (which is too evocative of the creation of Israel). It’s their Arab brethren cooperating with the West in an act of charity. Jordanians would probably be best but Qataris or Bahrainis would also probably be acceptable to the locals. Even Kuwaitis would do in a pinch. After all, the Iraqis think of them as practically part of Iraq.
Other Muslims. Not as good as fellow Arabs but better than Joe Smith from Kansas. Turks would be a good choice but there is a whiff of animosity there (with respect to the Kurds it’s a good deal more than a whiff!) that might rub some people the wrong way. On the other hand, Turkish reluctance to participate in an attack may give them a bounce in popularity with the average Iraqi. One key point here is to make certain that a great deal of infrastructure construction work is let to Turkish construction companies. It will be a boost for the Turkish economy and having a bunch of Turkish construction workers rebuilding Baghdad will play a lot better than having only European and American ones. I also point out that the West could do far worse than an Iraq heavily influenced by Turkish political and social thought.
Anyone besides the U.S. and British. For geopolitical reasons, it is extremely unlikely that the French will get much of a role. But the U.S. could certainly do with the odd Swede.
Arab-Americans, especially Iraqi-Americans. The U.S. has made good use of the Afghan diaspora. Hopefully it will be able to make good use of the Iraqi one. I’ve often wondered why the U.S. doesn’t do more of this… For example, (for a while, I don’t know if they still do this) the U.S. finally started putting an Arab-American undersecretary of state in front of Arab media. That sends a powerful message about the nature of American society.
From reading English language arab media, my impression is that anger at what’s going on in Iraq is about 25% anger at having foreign troops invading an Arab country and about 75% bitter cynicism regarding what America will do when the shooting stops. Progressive Arabs have a long-standing complaint that the U.S. is willing to tolerate brutal regimes in the interest of stability. The U.S. has a uniformly lousy track record in promoting democracy and social progress in the mid-east. The Arab street is justifiably dismissive of America’s claimed intentions to transform Iraqi society. Indeed, it’s almost insulting. “How stupid do you think we are, anyway?”
If (and it’s a big if) successful, concrete steps are taken to transform Iraq, I think much of the current anti-american mood will evaporate fairly quickly. If America blows it, we’ll be living with the fallout for a very long time to come. There’s no question, however, that Bush has rolled the dice in a big way and for huge stakes. If his number comes up this could be one of the most transformative geopolitical events since WWII. If he craps out, this will be one of the most transformative geopolitical events since WWI.
BTW, I don’t recall who mentioned it, but the Iraqis are, of course, playing heavily to the Arab street. I just saw some footage of Iraqi children “injured” in a bombing raid. Three were sitting up in hospital beds, appearing slightly bemused by all the attention and sporting identical bandages wrapped around their heads. I don’t doubt that there are many civilian casualties but it is a truly precision weapon indeed that can inflict identical head-wounds only on doe-eyed six-year olds. For variety, one other victim had a single piece of gauze perched on the top of her very full head of hair. These images were quite obviously chosen to inflame Arab public opinion.
For those who are interested here is the link for the article that Coll is referencing for the above quote and the second part of his economics discussion ( it’s not the same as the Egyptian article he linked to, but rather an analysis on fiscal regimes in the Arab world I sent to him with a question ). It’s the author of this one that he mentioned having met. http://www.menafn.com/qn_local_detail.asp?news_id=919
Wellll…Not a complete crock, but largely so I’d say.
Arab nationalism long pre-dates WW II and even pre-dates WW I, being rooted in the reformist milieu of the very late Ottoman empire, with ideas echoing those of the ‘Young Ottomans’ ( precursors of the ‘Young Turks’ and originators of the Tanzimat reforms ) being expressed as early as the late 1860’s by writers such as Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi ( and a little later many others, really accelerating in the 1880’s ). As early as 1868 Ibrahim al-Yaziji was calling for an independant Arab world, free from Ottoman domination. By the opening years of the 20th century there was an increasingly articulate and thought-out Arab nationalist view percolating throughout intellectual circles. According to C.Ernest Dawn, There is convincing evidence that the prevailing ideology of Arab nationalism in the 20th century was formed in the 1920’s, at the latest, from Islamic modernist roots. Obviously this well before any Nazi/fascist ideology could have been filtering into the Middle East.
Nazi ideology, or perhaps just as realistically Nazi success against the old colonial powers, did have a resonance in the Arab world. Certainly fascist ideology did become a minor cause celebre in the inter-war years, for reasons of its success. One clear descendant is the Phalange founded by Pierre Gemayel in Lebanon. But Michel Aflaq, the main Ba’athist theorist and one of its co-founders, as well as other early Ba’athists were equally facinated with ideologies like Marxism. In the end, it was less about European ideology. Rather the Ba’ath were ardent Arab nationalists and anti-colonialists who thought in terms of a singular, universal Arabism that derived from the history of the Caliphate ( it should be noted that Aflaq was technically Christian, but the part was secularist, pan-Arab, and from the 1950’s increasingly socialistic ) and were more intellectually descended from the Arab nationalists of old. In addition it arose in the context of a challenge to Syria’s dominant land-holding elite, drawing especial support from more traditionally disenfranchised communities like the Druze, Alawis ( the al-Assads, one might note, are Alawi ), and Christians. The reason for founding 1940/41 is not a coincidence, necessarily. But remember Syria was a French colony ( ‘mandate’ ) in 1941. And remember what state France was in 1941 :). It’s less Nazi dominance but it’s semi-corollary - French weakness. Rather quickly the failure of Nazism caused most of these vaguely socialist Arab parties to turn away from their flirtations with it and focus more in the direction of the U.S.S.R. ( obviously to ultimate failure here as well ).
Regardless, though the modern Ba’ath is little beyond the pliant toys of dictators these days, I don’t think one can consider them in any way lineal descendants of Nazism in any real intellectual sense.
Quote from C.Ernest Dawn, The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, publ.as Chpt. 1 in The Origins of Arab Nationalism by Rashid Khalididi, ed. ( 1991, Colombia University Press ).
** AZCowboy** – okay, I see that now. It’s down but I’m posting what I found for general info purposes:
Well, this is seemingly the Arab language site of al-jazirah / al-jazeera, which offers an unconventional experience for the linguistically impaired amongst us (including me) … so we know that baby’s up and running (still)
I found this as an interesting option (you’ll notice the link to the URL you cited from the Moscow Times is top right of the page). Some good reading here, though:
Let’s see. I’m in my home. Soldiers in tanks are a hundred yards away. The safest thing for me to do is push my children out the door in front of me and then shoot at the tanks? No.
I’ve stated my complaint plainly. I am complaining that rather than condemn the Fedayeen Saddam, people are pleading that we understand them, and I am complaining that Arabs are being painted with a broad brush as savage parochial idiots who do not understand democracy.
I think that sort of approach is Neanderthal. Why not say the same thing about the stupid parochial Americans? If only the Arabs understood us, all the problems would go away. Nonsense.
What are they doing, intercepting the signals in space and inserting computer generated figures? This was during a live report from the four-hour battle outside Nasiriyah.
Not yet, but I’ll take a poke around (I’ve been on airplanes all day, plus glued to CNN in airport lounges). But first I’ll have to Cyrillicize my dad’s computer.
Incidentally, a State Department spokesman today said that Powell was mistranslated at times in his interview with Al-Jazeera. For example, when he spoke of “allied forces”, it was translated as “occupation forces”. Despite that you seem to believe that only the American press lies, I submit that both sides are neck deep in propoganda and subjectivity.
Apparently Windows XP is different; it deals with Cyrillic just fine. It will take me a while to survey regional papers, but in the meantime, from Radio Free Europe’s Newsline, today’s issue (www.rferl.org):
Armenia:
“ARMENIA CONCERNED BY TURKISH INCURSION INTO IRAQ”
Georgia:
"IS U.S. ASSESSING GEORGIA’S MILITARY AIRFIELDS? "
Kyrgyzstan:
“MUSLIM RADICALS IN KYRGYZSTAN REPORTED TO INTENSIFY ACTIVITY”
Tajikistan:
“GOVERNMENT CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE EFFECT OF IRAQ WAR ON TAJIKISTAN’S SECURITY”
I’m going to switch computers now, because I’m told I’m a distraction to my brother, who is supposed to be doing his homework. More later.
Lib- I don’t think that is what is being said at all. I think the more nuanced, and more accurate way of putting this is that there is no historical experience for a representative democracy in Iraq, particularly in light of the nature of interpersonal relations in the dominant culture of the area.
Democracy is not self evident. Expecting the people of Iraq to suddenly realize that representative government is the way to go is not very realistic.
Lib, you’re setting up a strawman here. If one were to reverse the arguments, we would have people accusing war proponents of having to liberate the poor Iraqis because Arabs couldn’t make a democracy by themselves, playing the “Great White Father” to the brown-skinned peoples.
Neither characterization is fair.
I’d ask you to step outside your Libertarian perspective and consider that many observers believe that democracy requires a balanced amount of internal security, perhaps more than you might opine, to remain democratic. (See examples of elected dictators, both with too little security or a police state.) If you accept that premise, and then examine that the politics of the region in question are currently so divisive that (for example) people are willing to kill each other en masse over seemingly unimportant religious interpretations, it has nothing to do with racism and everything to do with recognizing the practical limitations of global policy. One would have just as difficult a time trying to promote the practices of Roman Catholicism to Red China–it would be a bit naive to expect that they would instantly embrace my effort and reshape their ingrained culture, even if some were inclined to accept the idea.
Rome was not built in a day, as the saying goes.
And I’ll not even get into the pragmatic differences between promoting democracy and promoting democracy at the point of a gun in a region that is already heavily inclined to dislike us…
I hate to say it, Lib, but you seem to be the only person in this thread who is receiving those messages. The rest of us seem to be getting the rather more nuanced message described by blanx, myself, and others. May I suggest that you re-read the posts you find troublesome and determine whether they are really saying what you think they’re saying?
And as I said, I have not seen it, nor have I seen any reporting about it (which is surprising–you’d figure that Bush & Co. would jump all over that kind of thing). The larger point remains: there is simply no solid evidence, just the assertions of parties who obviously have their own propaganda motives, that the Iraqis are using human shields in that manner, particularly not as a matter of course.
I had previously feared that the ham-fisted and nuance-free approach to ME policy evinced by our Fearless Misleader was plunging us into horror, carnage and disaster. I see now that I was entirely too optimistic.
One question, for anybody: who the bloody heck are the “Fedayeen Saddam”? Never heard of them till a couple of days ago, has anybody? How could it be possible that a secular, ideology free tyrannical creepezoid could inspire fanatic-type loyalty?
This is just a guess elucidator but I distantly remember reports from before the war that Saddam had set up terrorist training camps and was threatening the US with them (if the US went to war). It makes sense that he may have been training and indoctrinating them there.
Lib
A functionind democracy depends on the general acceptance of a number of principles that are not self evident. Not every society accepts these principles as given.
Just for one example, democracy only functions when identify people themselves with fluid interest groups. If people always identify themselves in terms of their clan, tribe or ethnic group, elections become meaningless because the biggest, clan, tribe or ethnic group always win. The losers catch on to this pretty fast and the system quickly becomes a farce. On the other hand, if people think in terms of specific interests rather than broad allegiances, different coallitions appear on different issues and the situation becomes simultaneously more fluid and more stable. For example an older upper-middle class black person in a western country, might be want more money put into the pension system, strong anti-discriminaton laws and lower overall taxes. A young upper-middle class white person, might support cuts in pension benefits, lower overall taxes and a prohibition on affirmative action. These two people view themselves as having parallel interests in one area but not in others and will vote accordingly. This is very different from a person from ethnic group A who identifies his or her interests entirely with those of ethnic group A and, consequently, always supports ethnic group A in elections, regardless of the issues.
Thus, the more economically and socially complicated the society, the easier it is to establish a functioning democracy. If people are subsisting on a basic level, there is not much room for interest groups. Pension policy isn’t a political issue in countries with no pension scheme.
Another key element necessary for a functioning democracy is a wide acceptance that whoever gets to vote has a right to do so. By this I mean group A (however defined) must accept that the voters in group B have a right to help determine what happens in group B and vice versa. This is a big problem in many countries, especially those cobbled together from the detritus of empire. In Iraq, for example, it is going to be extremely tough to convince the Kurds that “the Iraqis” farther south, have any right to vote on what the Kurds do in “their” zone, right down to what currency they use.
They’re a paramilitary force recruited from areas with traditional tribal ( political ) loyalty to Saddam and his family. They are a fairly recent innovation ( only dating to 1995 ) and like the Special Republican Guard function as a loyalty-enforcing parallel military organization that helps maintain loyalty to the regime.
It is a common pattern in many of the countries in the region to create these sort of entities to act as a bulwark against coups that might be launched by another branch of the military. Accumulate to many assets in one branch and you run the risk of having no defense if that force rebels. One can cite numerous examples. Just across the border Saudi Arabia has a large National Guard that functions as a parallel military to the regular army and was traditionally recruited from Bedouin with strong tribal ties to the al-Saud family.
Saddam Hussein is particularly prone to this sort of hiearchical fragmentation of military assets.
1)There is the regular army, largely Sunni-officered, but mostly Shi’a staffed.
Then the Republicn Guards, originally a praetorian brigade drawn from Ba’ath party loyalists, was expanded into a multi-division elite force staffed almost solely bu Sunni’s and through the Ba’ath party auspices. This gave a superior fighting force with sueprior loyalty to act as a bulwark against any regular army treason.
Then, after an abortive coup by a Republican Guard officer, the Special Republican Guard division, a new carefully hand-picked praetorian force charged with defending Baghdad ( into which all other military units were now denied entry ) was formed in 1992. A less-armor heavy, but probably more versatile and larger force than standard Republican Guards divisions, since it is not tasked as being the main battlefied strike force the Republican Guards function as.
Then the Fedayeen Saddam in 1995, which presumable fills another gap - Lightly armed, loyal enforcers that can be deployed outside of Baghdad and do the will of the regime when the secret police needs some heavier muscle.
Having all these different commands one can play one off another and lean on the more loyal in hiearchical succession to keep lower-level forces in line.
What are they doing, intercepting the signals in space and inserting computer generated figures? This was during a live report from the four-hour battle outside Nasiriyah.