[QUOTE=AskNott]
One of the biggest mistakes in this adventure has been not employing the local people in the civilian support functions. A young Iraqi man with a job driving a Halliburton truck, that pays enough to support his family, is not desperate enough to be a suicide bomber. Why do we assume Iraqis don’t know how to drive trucks and serve food?
[/QUOTE]
True, but does this not substantially increase the security risks?
I completely agree with you that, in general, the vast majority of Iraqi’s, when presented with viable work opportunities would apply themselves and not cause trouble. But, using in-country support personnel allows the small minority to infiltrate those bases and supply convoys. This could be really dangerous.
Also, you cannot underestimate cultural differences in work behavior and patterns. I went to listen to a speaker who worked with my husband. He was part of the team that went in after the invasion to help the Iraqi’s set-up a proper corrections system. The conditions in their jails were deplorable (yes, even worse than the things at Abu-Ghraib). They, many times, had 20 inmates in a single 12X10 cell, with no toilet faciltiies. Their lack of records and organization resulted in no classification system (i.e. putting violent people with non-violent people) and some people were “lost in the system” (i.e. imprisoned for long periods of time and no one knew why). These are just 2 of the 25 major problems he identified in his presentation.
Their team helped sort through all of this, cleaned up the conditions as much as possible, and then gained releases for many of those “lost in the system”. Their work was really amazing, it was also a good speaker.
But, back to the point, one of the things he talked a lot about was the working culture of the Iraqi people. He was genuinely impressed with their hospitality and friendliness, but their work ethic was completely different. Apparently, they had a 100% employment law, so everyone was supposed to have a job. He told a story about going into a record room for a 500 man facility. In the record room there was 1 file cabinet for every single person in the facility. There were also 8 people employed in the record room. When he asked what they did, he was told the following: 1 opens and closes the doors for visitors, 1 answers the phone, 1 is a runner to other departments, 1 opens the drawers, 1 takes the files out, 1 closes the drawer, 1 makes update to the file (filing) and 1 supervises. When asked to do anythign different, many of them took umbrage with the brash request they do anything more.
The notion of working overtime was also non-existent. If people did not show up to work the next shift, everyone just went home. He drove up to a prison one time at 10:00 p.m. He went up to the main gate, it was unlocked. He walked into the guard shack, no one was there. He checked the towers, no one was there. He went on the roof where another post was supposed to be and there was a guy sleeping. He told him everyone else went home. They left the gate open so that the next shift could come in. They locked all the cells and doors and he was the only person who showed up to work so he went up there with a rifle to shoot anyone who tried to leave.
He had a great many stories like this. Now, mind you, he was quick to point out that most of the people were genuinely good people. When you worked alongside them, and explained the importance of various things, some of them would rise to the occassion. He was careful not to allow the audience to walk away with the simple conclusion, “The Iraqi’s are lazy”. He simply stated, this was a CULTURAL BARRIER that had to be overcome.
I imagine the same culutural barrier, coupled with the security risk, could also result in the failure to use a large amount of domestic labor in support of U.S. troops. The moral of the story is that not everyone thinks and acts like people in the U.S. or other Western nations and these differences cannot be overlooked. Sadly, they have been, in many cases, by the planners of this crusade.