All the more reason not to give the Colts a short field.
Yes, but there is considerable reason to think it would be lower in this situation. On a normal 4th and 2 (on the 50 yard line, mid-game) the defense is going to keep one or two safeties deep. In this situation, they shouldn’t, and they didn’t. I think 50/50 may be more like it.
Wait, so my stats have no context, but yours have accounted for the context precisely? No. We just disagree about the probabilities involved in that specific context.
FWIW, my rough estimates would be that going for it converts 55% of the time, the Patriots stop the Colts from gaining 30 yards one third of the time, and the Patriots stop the Colts from gaining 70 yards 60% of the time = 69.9% win by going for it, versus a 60% win by punting. In other words, I think it’s close.
Why are we even talking about the Gaytriots? It’s the Bengals that are in second place in the AFC!
…sorry to ruin your Black Panther Party, guys.
That’s not a “normal” 4th and 2. Most fourth-down attempts occur inside the opponent’s half, and at least a third are inside the 10.
Can we discuss for a second the third down call by the Pats? The decision to go for it on fourth has to be made actually on third down. It was 3rd and 2 and I don’t know why the Pats didn’t run the ball there, with the thought that they would go for it on 4th down. Running the ball would hacve either run some time off the clock (8 seconds) or forced the Colts to use their final timeout.
When did you start watching football, Joe?
Anyway - say “hi” to Mrs. Morgan for us.
This is true, but there’s also reason to think it would be higher, since the Patriots have one of the best offenses in the league, if not the outright best.
Also all the more reason not to give the Colts the ball.
That’s a good point; if you know you’re going to go for it on 4th, then you must run the ball on 3rd. This is either a matter of Belichick not thinking ahead or, if he’s not the one calling the plays at that point (is he?), not communicating with the person who is.
So it’s not like anyone here (I assume) is just giving Belichick the benefit of the doubt because he’s a genius. He fucked up 3rd down, and he fucked up his timeouts. That said, once they get to that specific 4th down situation, going for it is, at least, not bad.
Math:
f = Odds of making the first down
d = Odds of Pats stopping the Colts after a punt
s = Odds of Pats stopping the Colts after a missed 4th down try
So, if
f + (1-f)(1-s) > d then it is a good decision
this can be rearranged to look like
s > (1-d)/(1-f)
Is this correct?
The Packers admitted after the Superbowl they lost to the Broncos that they let Denver score on purpose near the end of the game to give themselves some time to try to answer.
Ha, something just occurred to me: if **cricetus **is correct that Indianapolis scores a TD 95% of the time following a failed conversion, then the only logical move for the Patriots is to let the Colts score a TD on the first play of their drive, since New England would have a very good chance of driving for a game winning field goal with ~1:40 left. I don’t think this matches up too well with reality.
Odds of my making a mistake on the algebra for that last step are >50%, so I’m not going to bother evaluating that. Looks good up until then, I’m pretty sure.
ETA: again, if we make certain simplifying assumptions. Odds of quick strike Colts TDs, blocked punts, big returns, fumbled punts, etc. would change the numbers. A more rigorous analysis is possible.
You know perfectly well what I meant. According to your cite, conversions inside the 10 are more like 55%. I’d guess they are closer to 50% if you look at the 2 yard line.
I can understand that people get militant when faced with determined ignorance, but ya’ll might want to calibrate your certainty meter. I notice that most of the FO guys think it was at least questionable.
I concur. Despite my obvious frustration with cricetus, I hope it’s clear that the theme of my posts has been “it’s a very close call,” and not “punting is fucking stupid.”
I don’t think you are really frustated with me. You are frustrated that you can’t argue your way to where the Pats won.
This is from Peter King’s MMQB column today. Seems to fit rather well with some of the discussion.
*"At the two-minute warning Sunday, the Jags trailed the Jets 22-21. New York had no timeouts left, and Jacksonville was going down the field in big chunks. When running backs coach Kennedy Pola and coach Jack Del Rio told Jones-Drew to take a knee at the one-yard line if he got that far, he said, "Really?’’ And they explained why: The Jets were without timeouts, and if he could get to the one and then the Jags could bleed the clock, they could kick a field goal and go home with the win.
So on the next play, Jones-Drew burst through the middle – unbeknownst to him, the Jets were instructed to not tackle – and went down by himself at the one. A couple of Jets yelled, "C’mon! Score!’’ Said Jones-Drew: “The Jets guys were laughing. One of them said, ‘Why’d you do that?’ ‘’ The Jags let the clock run down, and Josh Scobee kicked the winning field goal at the gun.”*
This is true every time a team might need or want to go for it on fourth and short. But most teams seem to rarely look ahead to that situation, not just the Patriots. it drives me nuts. I’ve seen some awful clock management bloopers by NFL teams over the past few years, too.
No, I’m frustrated with the attitude you’ve exuded that ‘it happened, therefore it was bound to happen,’ or, ‘it had bad consequences, therefore it was a bad decision.’
In sports analysis, this is a trifling problem. In the real world, it’s much more serious.
An even handed analysis of the decision on the pro-football-reference.com blog. Concluding thusly:
Ok, that’s it for me.