What happened is what MIGHT HAVE happened. It’s not my fault it actually happened. My argument against it is that what DID happen COULD HAVE. The fact that it actually DID happen strengthens my case, but you act like it invalidates it.
Yes, we are; people have explicitly looked at the difference in these percentages in this thread.
Well, if you insist.
You know who else always punted? Hitler.
Amusingly enough, the Pats did it not so long ago - 2004, maybe - but I can’t find the game in which it happened.
Look, I fucking hate Belichick. If he and Brett Favre died tomorrow in a fiery plane crash all would be right with the football world. However, in this case I knew he’d get lambasted by the media, and for once he doesn’t deserve it.
cricetus: About how likely do you think it is that the Pats convert that 4th & 2? About how likely do you think it is that the Colts score from the Patriots’ 30? About how likely do you think it is that they score from their own 30?
I’d think that the odds of scoring on a short field with the momentum of the Pats having blown it very high, close to 100%. The odds of scoring after a punt, no better than 50%. And the odds of converting the fourth down when the Colts know what you are going to do less than 50%.
Maybe the problem is just that I have different made up numbers.
[quote=“cricetus, post:155, topic:517374”]
No better way to evaluate a decision than the outcome,
Actually outcome is a terrible way to evaluate a decision. If they punted on 4th and 2 and lost would that have been a bad decision? Was starting Brady a bad decision because they lost?
Potential for outcome… that sounds like odds no? You are saying that the potential for the Colts to come back was greater if they went for instead of punting right? Well, the numbers don’t seem to agree with you. So how you kill your preconceived conclusion for a bit, look at them, and see if the assumptions make sense. If you wish you make different assumption than go ahead, and see what the results are. Then perhaps you can understand why the decision is at the first least defensible.
You know what, this is fair. I don’t quite agree with your numbers, but it is much better than it was a bad decision because it didn’t work.
If anyone WOULD do it, it would be Belichick. Especially after the first gamble didn’t pan out.
The tougher part would have been for the Pats to not reflexively tackle Addai.
Remember that less than two minute before this decision, the Colts wrapped up a 6 play, 79 yard TD drive that took 1:49 off the clock. The Pats didn’t even slow them down on that drive, and they haven’t had any time to rest or regroup.
If Addai saw what was going on, he could actually just stand around at the 1 yard line running time off the clock until someone tackled him. I doubt that would actually occur, since he would have a single minded desire to score, and it’s such an unconventional thing to do that he’d never expect it, but that’s one theoretical weakness. I guess you could not tackle him, and if he catches on, then go ahead and tackle him.
Maybe the problem is that you can’t tell the difference between made-up numbers and numbers.
The odds of converting the fourth down are over 60%, assuming that the Pats have an average offense.
The Pats are at the time of writing 2nd in the NFL in total offense, and 4th in yards per play - averaging 6.0 yards.
Not really. The officials can rule that a play is over if a runner is making no attempt to advance the ball. Brandon Stokely ran along the goal line in that Bengals-Broncos game that ended with the bizarre tipped pass for an 89-yard touchdown and Mike Pereira noted afterward that if he had kept running for a few more yards they would have ruled the play dead.
ETA: I think lost in all this is the brilliance of the squib kickoff the Colts launched after scoring the previous touchdown, which pinned the Pats inside their own 20 (because they were set for a possible onside).
This is a better argument, although I would disagree with your numbers. With these numbers the decision is basically a wash, with the Pats having roughly the same chance of winning whether they go for it or punt. (Unless by “no better than 50%” or “less than 50%” you mean much less).
Actually, I assume that the Colts will score about 65% of the time from 28 yards out, and about 40% of the time from 63 yards out.
These are reasonable assumptions, based on actual data, but you don’t want actual data, you want to criticize the Patriots regardless of whether the facts support your case. Far be it from me to stop you there, but stop misrepresenting my argument. I have never said that the Colts will score no matter what. In fact, I specifically said the opposite.
So, let’s boil this down:
Chance of gaining 30 yards for a TD: close to 100%
Chance of gaining 60+ yards for a TD: 50%
Chance of gaining 2 yards: <50%
For God’s sake. “Made up numbers?” Maybe yours are made up - mine are actually data. You know, hundreds of teams do hundreds of things over dozens of years, and they add up the results. It’s pretty trivially easy to say hey, a team going for it on 4th and 2 from their own territory will gain 2 or more yards X% of the time. People have done this. X = approximately 60%. I boosted it to 70% because the Patriots have an above average offense and the Colts an average defense, but you know what:
Go with ONLY a 60% chance for the Pats to make it on 4th and 2;
Say the Colts score 95% of the time if they don’t make it (100% is silly, just silly; frankly, 95% is silly, too, and unsupported by any data that exists, but );
And say the Colts score only 40% of the time following a punt; and
You still have a (slightly) better chance of winning by going for it than by punting.
The only way you can make it a bad decision is to assume that while Manning and the Colts would have been magical - literally unstoppable - from the 28, they would have succeeded at a rate below 40% from the 37. That is making up numbers to suit your conclusion.
Why am I letting myself get annoyed here?
Want to know what numbers I didn’t make up? 35-34.
Ok, going by your numbers, say the Pats convert 4th down 45%, lose 95% of the time if the fail on 4th down, and lose 45% of the time if they punt.
In that case, going for it yields a 47.8% chance of winning: .45 + (.55*.05) = .4775.
Punting, OTOH, leads to a 55% chance of winning.
By your estimation, then, it’s pretty damn close, and you should acknowledge that. And there are also some simplifying assumptions we’ve made that skew the results a tiny bit. After a punt, the Colts are more likely to have less than 70 yards to go than more than 70 yards to go. Also, with a short field, there’s some chance that a Colts TD will be an unexpected quick strike that will leave New England enough time to come back and potentially kick a field goal. With a long field, that’s much less likely. But these are relatively small matters.
I would strongly dispute that the Colts have a 95% chance of scoring a touchdown from the Pats’ 30. For one thing, as you say, Manning had already thrown 2 interceptions. Even if the Patriots have only a 20% chance of stopping the Colts from 30 yards away (which I doubt), that gives going for it a 56% of leading to a victory, making it a better decision. I also find it very unlikely that the 4th down conversion succeeds less than 50% of the time.
Note: I’ve made errors on these back of the envelope (literally!) calculations in this forum before, so don’t just assume that I haven’t made a mistake above.
Stats like yours have no context. It’s like looking at a pitchers overall numbers against a batter and ignoring the fact that he’s slumping and looks like a lost child in a game of men.
It’s called Gradylittleitis.
Or like looking at the Patriots defense, and ignoring the fact that they are totally gassed because the Colts wouldn’t let them substitute and that Manning would carve them apart with minimal effort?
Not results oriented at all.