Yep. In heaven it’s pretty much Karen Carpenter 24/7.
I’m going to take a WAG at it, yes God could and does often - through God living in and through man. God gives people great power including that of God Himself, and Jesus has said: Matthew 21:21
Jesus replied, "I tell you the truth, if you have faith and do not doubt, not only can you do what was done to the fig tree, but also you can say to this mountain, ‘Go, throw yourself into the sea,’ and it will be done
and
Matthew 19:26
Jesus looked at them and said, “With man this is impossible, but with God all things are possible.”
Which IMHO is the Spirit of God living in man, and the power He gives us.
It is possible every time a person ponders this question God creates such a boulder just for that person, and that person must overcome it with God living through them to display His glory and increase the faith of the believer.
I see what you’re driving at; I’m just not sure I can accept it as a resolution of the paradox (which might be more of a question of taste than anything) – to me, if there is a way for a being to accomplish something, then that being can do that something. So, if there is a way for god to change the laws of the universe in order to lift the boulder, then he can lift the boulder (and has therefore not succeeded in creating a boulder he cannot lift); if the emperor can change the laws such as to be able to kill somebody with impunity, then he can kill somebody with impunity.
Or, let’s push this back one level – can god create a universe so immutable that he can’t change its laws? Can god create a stone such that there is absolutely no way for him to enable himself to lift it?
Just as an aside, I’m not sure how much value the paradox as an argument has in and of itself – seems to me that it can easily be resolved by asserting that one cannot simultaneously hold that there is an omnipotent being and that there are immovable stones; if there is omnipotence, the phrase ‘an immovable stone’ is meaningless, since by definition, an omnipotent being can do anything, including lifting a stone of any given size. As such, the problem assumes inconsistent premises – that there can both be an omnipotent being and a stone not movable by that being. But if both premises are simultaneously valid, then I think the paradox is a genuine one.
One way to look at it, is that the question is really asking, “Could God suspend the laws of logic?” “Could God make P and not-P be simultaneously true?”
And you could ask essentially the same question without dragging God into it: is it in any sense possible for the laws of logic to be other than what they are?
That’s the way I see it. Lifting an unliftable boulder is logically impossible in our universe. But God wrote the rules of the Universe. Presumedly if he wanted to, he could change the rules and create a Universe where lifting an unliftable boulder is not a paradox. We can’t envision this, just like we can’t envision a tesseract, because we’re part of this universe and are bound by its rules.
Yes: there could be universes where different laws of logic are better than ours at explaining the workings of the universe. Which isn’t to say that the concepts would still not “Exist” inasmuch as our laws of logic can be said to “exist”, it’s just that they would not be as applicable as other ones.
God could just make the unliftable boulder, clone himself, and they could lift the boulder together. There’s lots of stuff I can’t lift by myself, but can lift easily with some help. I can even *make *stuff that I can’t lift, but together with my twin it’s no prob, dude.
Jeez, that was an easy one.
Right - the boulder argument is actually one of the weaker arguments to demonstrate that an omni-god is self-contradictory, because you can simply say “The existence of God renders all boulders by definition liftable, because he’s just that muscular.” (My favorite personal anti-omni argument the the POE, with the omnipotence/freewill paradox tacked on to kill the common excuse.)
A more interesting question along the boulder argument’s lines is, could God make an exact duplicate of himself, with all the same properties and powers and abilities? Unlike the unliftable boulder, you can’t say that god’s existence makes gods impossible by defintion - at least not without the argument becoming a fiat disproof of God, which the atheists probably wouldn’t mind.
And once you have God2 around, of course, the question is which of God and God2 would win at thumb-wrestling?
(On preview, I find the similar detail in this post and the prior one interesting.)
I know the answer to how God could create a boulder that he cannot not lift.
Step 1: God creates a boulder of any weight, shape or size.
Step 2: God declares that He shall not lift the boulder under any circumstances.
He has thus created a boulder which He both can and cannot lift, depending on how He bends His own word. God you sly devil you.
Now if you’ll excuse me, I must go make aeroplane noises while darting around the living room.
I refuse to accept that “won’t” and “can’t” are synonyms, on principle. A god that can lift the rock but says he won’t lift the rock, is either unable to break his word/change his mind, or not. If he can reverse his declaration, he can lift the rock; if not, he can’t. Period.
Can, or can not. There is no Maybe.
(And, “cannot not”?)
My personal favorite answer is “He can, but He chooses not to”. If God ever did make that boulder, then there would be something that He can’t do. But since He hasn’t made that boulder, it doesn’t exist, and therefore there is still no task which God cannot perform.
Still a logical impossibility, I think, because if God and God-Prime are truly exactly alike, then they constitute a single Entity, not two. If they had different colors, say, then one could refer to the green God and the blue God. Or if they had different sizes, then one could refer to the big God and the little God. Or if different ages, the old God and the young God. But if they’re identical in all respects, then you’re just left with God and God.
That’s my favorite answer to the paradox. Still, I tend to believe it’s more of a case of “God can do anything, including violating our human laws of logic.”
Still a logical impossibility, I think, because if God and God-Prime are truly exactly alike, then they constitute a single Entity, not two. If they had different colors, say, then one could refer to the green God and the blue God. Or if they had different sizes, then one could refer to the big God and the little God. Or if different ages, the old God and the young God. But if they’re identical in all respects, then you’re just left with God and God.
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Sounds similar to some versions of the concept of the Trinity.
So your god isn’t omnipotent, because it is theoretically possible for a boulder to exist that your god cannot lift, meaning that there is something he can’t do.
I can’t eat a chocolate donut the size of the statue of liberty. The fact that no such donut exists is irrelevent to my capability to eat it; the mere facts that it could exist and that if it did I would be unable to eat it mean that I am not omniomnivorous, regardless of whether such a donut ever came to exist or not.
This makes no sense - identical things don’t shloop together on contact, not outside of bad sci-fi anyway. Just because you can’t tell them apart doesn’t mean they’re the same thing, any more than two otherwise identical X-boxes fresh off the assembly line shloop together due to their similarity.
ETA: Some versions of the concept of the Trinity don’t make any sense either. And the laws of logic are invulnerable to everything, since they are made up and true by definition in their made-up universe. If you change that you’ve just made up an additional new different logic; you haven’t removed the original version or made it untrue in its own context.
Could the rock be so big that it even pushed God out of existence?
Naw, God is omnipresent, so he can co-exist overlapping other matter without complications. That’s why his existence doesn’t infere with that of God2 - unlike normal objects where two of them have to be in different places, God’s copy can not only be exactly like him in every way, but also be in exactly the same place - and yet, still be distinct.
Homer Simpson asked whether God could microwave a burrito so hot that he himself would not be able to touch it. So it’s either him or Aquinas, whoever came first 
Goddammit! Answer the fucking question! How many fairies can dance on the end of a pin?
There’s a fundamental disconnect here. Part of the general belief structure that goes along with an omnipotent God is also omniscience, and omnipresence; in fact, I would argue that those properties naturally follow from omnipotence because, well, if you’re all powerful and you can’t use that power to learn everything, you’re not really all powerful, are you? Similar with the concept of omnipresence is that we exist in space time, and thus God is not only everywhere, but everywhen (if that’s even a word) as well.
So really, the concept of “reversing” his declaration doesn’t make sense. If something is simultaneously at every moment, then he must, from our temporal perspective, always be the same (and this is also a general belief of God). As such, for him to “reverse” a declaration would be for him to simultaneously be something and it’s mutually exclusive opposite at the same time.
Also, I think the pi example was a good image for why these sorts of questions don’t do anything to prove or disprove the existence of God; they’re pitting two mutually exclusive properties an asking if God can make them the same. With the boulder question you’re essentially asking if God can make something infinite finite, just like with pi. The answer to the question has nothing to do with the nature of God because, if the answer is yes, your question now doesn’t make any sense. Can God make black white? Can God make 1=0?
I suppose one could say that, sure, God can rewrite the natural laws so that, theoeretically he could make these nonsensical answers the same, but then they wouldn’t be nonsensical anymore and, instead, what we see now would be nonsensical in that universe.
42, of course. Geez… :rolleyes:
Nah, I don’t think this holds. Reasoning follows:
Action requires time to be passing, by definition, because action requires change, and change requires having two times which have different states (“before” and “after”). So, a God that does not experience time is not omnipotent because he can’t do anything. At all. He’s not omnipotent, he’s nonmnipotent - competely powerless to act, think, emote - anything.
Does that mean that God can’t be outside of time? Actually, no. It means that he can’t be outside of all time, but he can be outside of our time.
Take, for example, the fine movie “Super Mario Brothers”. The movie has a running time, and as you play the movie through, events happen as that time passes, and the characters in the movie react to the passing of that time. We viewers, on the other hand, are outside of the time on the video tape. We can move freely within it, observing any part in any order, or if we have enough screens for every frame in the movie we can observe the entire movie at once.
Now, suppose, we are editing this movie. If so inclined, we can choose to cut out Luigi, and CGI Jar-Jar Binks in his place. (I leave it as an exercise to the reader whether this would improve the movie.) If we do this, to the characters in the movie, Jar-Jar has always been there. Unless we keep Luigi in the first part, and then swap him out in the latter part of the movie - in that case they would observe a change within their linear view of the timeline. From outside the timeline as an editor, we have complete control of the movie at all points within it -to the characters of the movie we are literally omnipotent - like unto gods in every way. However, from outside the movie, there was a point when Luigi was in the movie, even if in the movie’s timeline he was competely removed. This is because for the editing to occur at all, it and the editor have to have a timeline of their own to do the editing within.
So, what does this say about to the god disproof? Well, the first thing it says to me is that if God’s outside of time, we don’t have libertarian free will - all our decisions exist in the latter part of the tape long before we get there. But that’s not germaine to this god-disproof. 
The first relevent thing is that if God’s outside of time, it’s utterly unimpressive that god can do things in our universe - we might be nothing more than a flimstrip to him. To be meaningfully omnipotent, he needs to be omnipotent in the universe he inhabits. But in a way that’s not germaine to the discussion either, since being omnipotent to us might be enough for some folks. (In which case, I am literally a God, because I write fiction. Very very bad fiction, but I still write it, and have absolute power over all within!)
What is relevent to what you’ve posted is that regardless of what it looks like to us from within the timeline, a “timeless” god who is not completely impotent can indeed change his mind. We just wouldn’t know about it unless he decided to make it evident to us. Like, He could create a boulder marked “unliftable” appear at minute 20 of the Mario movie, and have it sit there for the duration of the movie unmoved. But it’s not really unliftable, because he could go back and change its properties to be liftable - and in fact he could make it so that, to us, it had never been unliftable, because he could change its properties back at the moment in the movie timeline that it appeared.
Of course, even if God did label the boulder “God cannot lift this”, the label would have been meaningless from the start, because he could go back and change it. Things get only slightly more interesting when you realize that to interact with the characters in the timeline at all so that we would know about God, he would have to write himself into the story. A Mary Sue, if you will. And in that case, God could decide that the in-story God couldn’t lift this boulder that the outside-story God put in it, and write the events in the story accordingly. Though this is still an arbirary limitation, because the actual God outside the story is really choosing to not have his in-story avatar be able to lift the rock. If he ever changes his mind, up the rock goes. (And since it’s a Mary Sue, you know it’s only a matter of time.)
Arguments that God can’t do logically impossible things aren’t interesting unless the person’s God is claimed to be able to do logically impossible things. (And even then they’re still uninteresting because those situations just mean that the person making the claims fails to comprehend what it means to be logically impossible.) Boulder-type arguments are interesting when they are able to show that the things the god should be able to, he can’t all do. Typically this would be done by two separate things he is claimed to be able to do, which separately are quite reasonable and expected, but when taken together cause a problem.
Like, say, having perfect foreknowledge and having or granting free will.