Origin of God and Boulder Question.

Eh, this sets up a logical contradiction. Contradictions can’t actually exist.

To get around it you simply define omnipotence as being able to do everything that is logically possible. Most arguments along these lines are invalid.

Unless you then manage to show that some fundamental tenet of their belief system is logically impossible - at that point, let the games begin! :slight_smile:

The question itself is total bullshit. It’s similar to the paradox of “the irresistible force striking the immovable object” – the question presumes a force/object which is absolute. However, we live in a Universe where no such absolutes exist. (Think of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, the Wave/Particle Duality of Energy, etc.)

As for the follow-up question (can God make 2+2=5) – of course he can! Even people can do that, we don’t need God! Just redefine the rules of mathematics so 2+2 resolves to 5, not 4. Like language, mathematics is merely a description – it’s as simple as changing “I want a Big Mac” to “Yo quiero Taco Bell!”

And besides, why would God make a rock so impossibly big? That’s hardly an efficient way to strike fear into your believers…

Heh…best laugh I’ve had all week, thanks. :cool:

An omnipotent God is defined as being absolute, though, so if absolutes are out, then so is God. So you’re just asserting the same thing the boulder argument attempts to prove by contradiction.

No - when we say that God can’t make 2+2=5, we’re not talking about the symbols, we’re talking about the concepts. The concept of “2” is the same whether you write “2” or “two” or “dos”. The same goes for the concepts of 5, addition, and equality. The assertion here is that because the concepts are rigidly defined, God can’t change the fact that the rigid definitions have equally rigid derivable consequences. Which is, of course, the case - because the moment you change the definitions you are talking about a different problem entirely, which isn’t the same as changing the answer to the first problem.

Of course, as has been noted, the fact that God can’t do the logically impossible isn’t all that interesting - most theists are willing to surrender that ground as soon as they can understand the argument against it.

If we have to start answering why God does the crazy things he does, we’ll be here all day.

:smiley:

But again, we can illustrate the same dynamic without dragging in alethic questions (the tricky “can” modality). For example, two separate things God is presumably claimed to be able to do, which separately are quite reasonable and expected, but when taken together cause a problem: making my year of death even, and making my year of death odd. Either one is presumably within his abilities, but he cannot possibly do both.

Hmm.

If you keep this up, I may be forced to admit you have a point.

It may be best to stick with proofs revolving around things God supposedly does or has done, and/or attributes which make claims about what God would do (like omnibenevolence or perfect honesty), and leave boulder-style arugments by the side of the road. Well, unless we’re dealing with stubborn theists who insist that their god can do the logically impossible - I’m sure you’ll agree that those folk are fair game.

It’s actually a moot question, for reasons that are (or should be) obvious.

Incidentally, you’ve got to be careful about the logical impossibilities thing. One example that often comes up in discussions of this sort is “Can God create a triangle with three right angles”, for instance. But as it happens, Man can make a triangle with three right angles: For instance, put one vertex at the North Pole, and the other two on the Equator at 0 and 90 degrees longitude. Before you declare anything logically impossible, you want to make absolutely certain that you have a solid grasp of the logic involved.

The oldest cite I know of–I haven’t read enough Aquinas to know if or how he phrased it–was from George Carlin’s “I Used to Be Irish Catholic” routine. Not saying he originated it, just that that’s where I first encountered it.

Well, if backed into a corner, you can always declare yourself a dialetheist and accept the existence of true contradictions. This brings its own problems with it (for instance, if P is a dialetheia, this means that both P and not-P are true; however, could, conceivably, the proposition ‘P is a dialetheia’ be itself a dialetheia?), but you can always hope that by the time your opponent notices, you’ll have made for the hills successfully.

Err…be careful invoking time and cause and effect.

Assuming we could make a spaceship fast enough it is quite possible for us to have two people disagree on the order of events. About what came “before” and what came “after”. We’d both be right is the weird thing though.

Anyway, if you and I can disagree on the order of events, and both be correct, I can only assume God can deal with the same thing.

Well, causal structure is always preserved, though, so if there’s a way event A could have had any influence on event B (i.e. B did not occur until light from A had had time enough to reach it), all observers will agree on their sequence.

And disagreeing on the sequence of things not causally related is not actually a contradiction, though at first it might seem so: You might say that, because for an observer O the proposition P = ‘A and B occurred simultaneously’ is true, and for a relatively moving observer O’ not-P is true, there is a genuine contradiction – but in this case, both O and O’ would be making the mistake of believing their reference frame to be absolute, and neither gives in fact a complete description of reality; which would, respectively, be: ‘in the reference frame of O, A and B occurred simultaneously’ and ‘in the reference frame of O’, A and B did not occur simultaneously’, which both say exactly the same thing.

This one bothers me because the solution seems so simple to me. The irresistible force goes right through the immovable object and continues on its merry way. But people always look at me funny when I say that.

I hope this isn’t a hijack, but I have a few questions. Where did the idea of an omnimax God come from? I’m speaking of the Judeo-Christian tradition. A claim of eternal existence we get from several verses, but whence the rest? Is it in the Bible or something scholastic theologians made up in the Middle Ages? IOW, if we could establish that omnimax is incoherent (of which I’m not persuaded), what follows? Does Christianity and/or thesism suddenly collapse like a house of cards whacked with a wiffle bat?

BTW, I’m an atheist, so these aren’t burning questions for me. I’ve just never understood the point of the debate.

Oops, missed the edit window. Should read, “Does Christianity and/or theism suddenly collapse like a house of cards whacked with a wiffle bat?”

Could GOD create a boulder so big that even he could’nt lift it?

MU

Where in the section you quoted (or anywhere else in that post, for that matter) did I mention cause or effect? What I pointed out was that change requires time - because without the ability to have differing states at T and T’, no change can occur. From this we can conclude that any God that ever does anything at all must necessarily be experiencing a passage of time.