I think that’s part of it: for instance, imagine if Russia had invaded Japan, or more realistically, if North Korea had invaded South Korea. While Asians these days probably face around the same level of overt discrimination as people from the middle east, the countries of NATO would not stand idly by while those countries were being invaded.
However, being invaded is also part of the equation. I can’t think of an example in the past 40 years of such a large conflict that would test the theory of cultural closeness that was also an example of one country invading another, and not something that could be characterized as a civil war.
I live three miles from a airforce base near Little Rock. Hosts the C 130 Combat Airlift. It would be on Russia’s strike list.
The big question is the old decommissioned missile sites. I wouldn’t count on that getting updated on the old Soviet systems. Arkansas hosted Titan missiles at Damascus. There was a incident there in 1980. It’s decommissioned. It may still be on the old Soviet target list.
Reports that Russia’s only tank manufacturer has shut down for lack of parts. So no new tanks, currently losing all their current tanks, and are running out of tank crews as they get blown up. Now, I’m pretty sure I’ve seen a solution to Russia’s problem. They get a bunch of schoolgirls, put them in T-34s, and see how that goes.
I’m surprised the Russians still depend on Armour. US and Coalition forces smoked thousands of Russian tanks in Kuwait. They’re sitting ducks with modern infrared weapons.
Tanks are still effective against lightly armed infantry or civilians.
That was two things: operating armor without significant air defenses or at least contesting air superiority (so your opponent’s air force can treat your tanks as a target range), and “operating” your tanks as pillboxes instead of a mobile strike force or a combined-arms defense (ridiculously easy to flank and engage with low risk of effective resistance).
It helped that our tanks could outrange Iraq’s and engage in visibility conditions that blinded theirs, at which point it becomes a sharpshooting contest with sitting ducks.
The chief distinction between Ukrainians and Russians lies not in language, religion or culture — here they are relatively close — but in political traditions. Simply put, a victorious democratic revolution is almost impossible in Russia, whereas a viable authoritarian government is almost impossible in Ukraine.
The reason for this divergence is historical. Up until the end of World War I (and in the case of western Ukraine, the end of World War II), Ukrainian lands were under the strong political and cultural influence of Poland. This influence was not Polish per se; it was, rather, a Western influence. As the Harvard Byzantinist Ihor Sevcenko put it, in Ukraine the West was clad in Polish dress.
Central to this influence were the ideas of constraining centralized power, an organized civil society and some freedom of assembly.
I do think there’s another component, besides the ones already mentioned: in the regional wars, it usually doesn’t seem likely that if one side has even a relatively easy win they’ll then proceed to take the next country over, and the one after that, and the one after that . . . some of the religious groups might like to, but they don’t seem likely to be able to pull it off.
The disadvantage of building Russia up as Still A Great World Power is that Russia gets seen as capable of pulling that off; especially given their history.
Of course, that explanation kind of falls down if one considers China; which also has a distinct tendency to take “all the land that joins mine.” But I still think that’s part of it.
If there was some sort of guarantee that a diplomatic solution would leave Russia content with its territorial ambitions & security concerns, and everyone else in the world can go on their merry way, sure. Sucks to be Ukraine, but oh well, better than getting nuked, I guess.
But Russia has grievances and security concerns everywhere. Once Putin gets a big popularity boost, and is riding high on the conquest resulting from just implying the threat of tactical nuclear strikes, and the entire world backs down, what then? What happens after the Russian economy has recovered (better ease of those sanctions too, don’t want to upset Russia further after all…) ? Is Putin still going to be content with the paper of the diplomatic solution, or is he just going to use the opportunity to rearm for the next big bite? When does it end?
Or is the better approach to just stand firm, continue to bleed Russia out, denying Putin an easy victory, but ensuring that there are always still offramps available?
Georgia and Moldova next, certainly. Azerjaijan has only been independent since 1991 - next on the list for officially absorbing into Russia. Probably Finland next, on some pretext. Sweden is next door, and if they make noise about joining NATO - then Putin will see that as a threat. Maybe do a bit of testing with disputed islands north of Japan.
Finally, the Baltic states. They are NATO, but by then… Putin won’t care.
This was probably his master plan. We need to stop this in Ukraine now.
I live within 40 miles of Philadelphia and a mile from an active nuclear power plant. I expect both to be on first strike lists and it’s just as well. I’d never survive in a post-WWIII world. If it’s going to happen, I’d just as soon it were quick enough that I’m unlikely to know it’s happening before it’s too late to know it’s happening.
Don’t know if it was posted above already, but Eliot Cohen had run an article in The Atlantic in which he laid out numerous stats, figures that indicate Ukraine is most definitely winning the war, but that most Western analysts can’t or won’t say so out loud because they’d rather err on the side of claiming Russia will win and being proven wrong, than claiming Ukraine will win and be proven wrong (more egg on their face in the latter scenario.)
I’d love to see that, because, frankly, I’m not seeing that in what I’ve been looking at or reading. Still seems to me that Russia is grinding, slowly, forward. And it seems like, increasingly, they are willing to disregard civilian casualties in doing so.
To me, it looks like Kyiv has, maybe, 2 weeks before it’s in the same level of combat (and destruction) currently happening in Mariupol. Mariupol itself looks to fall within a week or so, tops, and that will free up a bunch of troops and resources, as well as open things up even more as a conduit between Crimea, the break-away provinces, and Russia. Kyiv itself is pretty static so far, but the Russians have stepped up bombing operations. The force from Belarus seems pretty well set, logistically, with consolidated positions and supplies as well as FOBs and artillery firing positions to range on Kyiv.
To me, this looks like a stalemate, with Russia slowly grinding through its objectives while Ukraine continues to put up stiff resistance. Neither side is winning, neither is losing…yet. I think it will come down to something like WWI, where the side the collapses last…‘wins’…for some definition of that term.
They’ve barely moved in weeks and their materiel and personnel loses are not sustainable. That’s what losing looks like, they are not making any significant forward progress and they can’t keep up even this middling pace for long.
It looks like I need to dust off my copy of Twilight 2000 and run a few simulations stateside to see the best course of action to take in case WWIII breaks out.
I don’t know much, but from reading this thread and other places - how many resources will be freed up (assuming they actually manage to capture it)? They’ll need a force to occupy it, and in the meantime are using up people/bombs/shells/bullets/tanks that they can’t easily (or at all?) replace. Ukraine is being resupplied from everywhere, so all they need to worry about is actual bodies.