If this is true, then I would say they are.
Zelenskyy Says Russians Are Carrying Cremation Chambers Into Ukraine
The “official” explanation as presented by President Zelenskyy is bad enough, but given Czar Dobby’s fixation on Nazis, my mind went to some even nastier places.
If the reactor isn’t operating, it isn’t providing its own power. Half the reactors (at least) have been shut down.
If it isn’t providing its own power for cooling, then it needs to draw from the power grid. Grid power is not a reliable guarantee in a war zone.
If the power grid isn’t reliable, there are diesel generators for how long… I don’t know… a few days? Not weeks or months.
It’s important to understand, the reactor isn’t going to accidentally crack and spill from military action surrounding it, but on the other hand the cooling system is at risk if power and maintenance to the plant are interrupted.
NY Times: “Ukrainian troops have mounted a stiffer-than-expected opposition to a superior force in the early days of the war. But U.S. officials say it may not last.”
The article is probably paywalled, but some excerpts:
Ukraine’s soldiers have blown up bridges to halt advancing Russian ground troops. Its pilots and air defenses have prevented Russian fighter jets from conquering the skies. And a band of savvy Ukrainian cyberwarriors are so far beating Moscow in an information war, inspiring support at home and abroad.
To the surprise of many military analysts, Ukrainian troops are mounting a stiffer-than-expected resistance to Russian forces up and down battle lines across a country the size of Texas, fighting with a resourcefulness and creativity that U.S. analysts said could trip up Russian troops for weeks or months to come.
U.S. officials have been impressed with the fighting prowess of the Ukrainians, but their assessment that Russia has the superior military has not changed.
Ukraine has succeeded in slowing the Russian advance, but has not been able to stop it, nor is the resistance strong enough to shift Russian President Vladimir V. Putin’s war aims. Over the long term, U.S. officials said, it will be difficult for Ukraine to continue to frustrate the Russian advance.
While it is often easier to defend than attack, especially in a complex multifront invasion, the Ukrainians have taken advantage of the Russian decision to use too small a force, sometimes only two battalions at a time, to take key points.
“They have been much more evenly matched at the tactical level than they should have been, had the Russians conducted the operations well,” Mr. Kagan said. “The Ukrainians have just been much smarter about this than the Russians.”
The Ukrainians have been far more successful in the north, defending Kyiv and Kharkiv, the country’s second-largest city, than they have been in the south, where better trained Russian forces in Crimea have had more success.
“In the south, on the Crimean front, when the Ukrainians are engaged in mechanized combat they are losing,” Mr. Bullock said.
I just read that very article. While I am primed to agree with the thesis presented in the headline, I don’t see where the actual content of the article supports the “but it may not last” bit. I have no doubt it’s true (that is, I have no doubt it’s true that there is a possibility Ukraine won’t hold out for as long as the Russians will continue to push), I just don’t see more than a very cursory discussion of that point.
I think it’s important that we keep some perspective. Russia is winning its war against Ukraine. Winning slower than many (including Russia) expected, but still winning. Ukraine is putting up a great defense, but they are unable to push out Russian troops. Any Russian withdraw will be because of internal Russian decisions, not because the Russian lines are forced to retreat.
I’m cheering on the Ukrainian people, but their costs are going to be very high, much higher than the Russian people’s.
Yeah, this ^^^ is where I’m at.
Ukraine has no path to a military victory as it’s conventionally understood. Their only way to prevail is to make the cost of a Russian military victory so high that it changes the political calculus within the circles of Russian leadership.
Entirely possible, particularly since both sides are using the same or similar equipment.
I think this is the most likely explanation. There are several power plants in the larger area and given the… ah… less than awesome navigational skills on display by some of the Russian forces, miscommunication common in wartime, and just plain mistake(s) there may have been no intention to shell a nuclear power plant but it wound up happening anyway.
Or maybe not. We really don’t know.
The administration building, not the reactor.
I suspect this is the case. It would not surprise me if Putin’s attitude is that if he can’t have Ukraine no one else can either, burn it all down.
Yeah, I was going off inaccurate reporting from the BBC at the time.
I would like to respectfully point out that even the very worst case for this sort of rector would NOT result in an explosion that would “vaporize” anyone in the sense you seem to mean.
This is not the same design as Chernobyl. These reactors (from what brief research I can find) have “core catchers” to contain a melt down, actual containment buildings, and automatically shut down (as intended) when the shelling started shaking them up.
Could a very bad accident be created there? Yes. But it would not be a nuclear explosion, it would not be Chernobyl. Radiation leakage would be much more contained than at Chernobyl (although yes, some could get out). There is no graphite to set on fire.
I don’t want to imply this is nothing to worry about - it is a serious matter - but it’s not as bad as some would say it might be. I’ll give a pass to the Ukrainians - they’re under an unholy amount of stress right now and they’re desperate - but the rest of us should take a deep breath and try to keep things in perspective.
I don’t think Putin cares about anyone in Ukraine. Not a one. If the Russian-leaning population there happens to be exterminated along with everyone else it just “proves” the accusations of genocide and he’ll replace them with Russians from Russia. Not that he cares about the little people in Russia, either - they’re expendable pawns. Exhibit A: the Russian troops in Ukraine that are undersupplied, underfed, and otherwise ill-equiped.
I wouldn’t discount the possibility of a breakdown of very fragile Russian supply lines. Which, granted, blurs the line between “internal Russian decisions” and being “forced to retreat,” but much as quantity has a quality all of its own, endurance has a quality of its own too. Merely outlasting an invader is a viable path to victory, no less legitimate than a decisive battlefield defeat.
Graham should STFU about assassination talk - Putin will make propaganda out of it, and if anyone was thinking/planning along those lines they wouldn’t want to advertise beforehand. Loose lips sink ships and all that.
I’m going to point out that it was AFTER those fire-bombings, burning of cities, and nuclear bombs dropped on cities that the concept of “war crime” was defined and codified. They weren’t crimes of any sort back then because the notion hadn’t been conceived of yet. After various discussions and treaties, though, many of those actions, if performed today, would definitely be war crimes.
There have been reports of those all week. I have not been able to solidly verify or deny these claims. Even Snopes can’t say one way or the other.
You’re right about that. Russia could win the war and still be forced to settle on Ukraine’s terms.
If they are forced to settle on Ukraine’s terms, then they won’t have won the war, will they?
The notion of a law of armed conflict, to include of war crimes, predates WWII. It’s a nebulous concept to be sure—as international law tends to be—and one that saw renewed interest in the aftermath of WWII to be sure, but by no means does the notion of a “war crime” (or even trials for war crimes) have its genesis in WWII. To the extent WWII may have resulted in heightened efforts to codify the law of armed conflict, even there we can see it as a continuation of pre-war developments. Consider the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the First and Second Geneva Conventions. In the US, an early effort to regulate armed conflict was the Lieber Code, developed during the Civil War.
But all of that is kind of just window dressing. The notion that even in war some actions might be unacceptable, and therefore result in harsh reprisals, goes back to antiquity at least. And I think kind of gets at the heart of this question of “Is X a war crime?” The truth is…it depends. What do you mean by war crime? Who gets to decide what is and is not a war crime? Does it matter if a treaty exists, but one or both of the parties to a conflict is not a party to the treaty? What about customary limitations on certain kinds of wartime conduct that predate all such treaties, but that have nevertheless been generally recognized for centuries?
I think, at its heart, the true “war crime” here has to be the war itself. If the invasion were legitimate, I personally (and presumably the US government as well, seeing as it hasn’t ratified the protocol in question) would be prepared to consider the possibility that there might, under certain circumstances, be an instance in which a nuclear power plant is a legitimate military target. I just don’t see how that could possibly be the case here, since the war itself amounts to a criminal act, to the extent the term “war crime” has any meaning at all.
Possible sidetrack, but wasn’t poison gas banned after WWI? With every other possible atrocity committed in WWII, neither side used gas against the other.
Was this because of some unlikely, mutually observed ban, or because gas simply wouldn’t have been useful or effective in the WWII combat environments (or any since)?
Hasn’t that always been the case though? They have never had enough military power to stop Russia completely, but they can make it so painful and drawn out that it won’t work for Russia over the medium to long term. Nobody was expecting a full-tilt WWII-style series of front lines, battles, etc… between Ukraine and Russia, because Ukraine would absolutely lose that sort of fight.
Drawing it out and engaging in asymmetrical warfare causes any essential flaws in the Russian military machine to become more apparent (morale, logistics, and so on), and also increases pressure on the home front, as casualties mount and things like the effects of sanctions become more apparent and more onerous.
Even in WWI, gas wasn’t all that useful. There was more than one instance of units gassing themselves when the wind changed unexpectedly.
A weapon that is so hard to control isn’t really that great on the battlefield.
Thanks, that makes sense. A lot more sense than We’re perfectly willing to firebomb or drop atomic bombs on cities, but the rules say no gas so we’re not going there.