There are huge downsides to “promises” that are significant in cost / risk and whose implementation date is unknowable.
That’s true in personal relationships and far more true in international relations.
Strategic ambiguity is an extremely valuable commodity. No matter how frustrating that is to laymen watching from the grandstands.
Beyond strategic ambiguity there’s the inevitable fact the future is uncertain.
Beyond Zelenskyy and his innermost circle much of Ukraine’s business and government elite are still a post-Soviet kleptocracy. Far better now than 5 years ago, but absent the war those folks have no place in NATO or the EU.
Zelenskyy is not immortal. If he has a stroke or is hit by a missile the world changes instantly. What of our promise then as Ukraine tirns into Belarus over the weekend?
There was a major G7 announcement about Ukraine. Zelensky is wisely backing off his public criticism.
I understand Ukraine’s government could shift dramatically. There will be major challenges rebuilding after the war. Instability and lack of public confidence can be dangerous for any government.
Yes, and China and North Korea and Iran supplying Russia means this proxy war could go on for a very long time.
In the meantime, we are depleting inventories of everything from tanks to APCs to artillery and shells. China is certainly taking note. Some of the stuff being taken from inventory will take many years to replenish.
On this board over the years I have constantly taken the side of more spending in NATO against other users who wanted the military downsized because there were no current threats. My answer was always, “with the long lead times for new weapons procurement, you can’t build a military based on current threats, but the threats you might face in a few years or a decade or two.”
Well, here we are. Decades of low commitment to NATO have left many NATO countries shockingly unprepared for war, with no way to catch up in any reasonable time. And if we expend/destroy our critical weaponry and ammunition in Ukraine, we’ll be weakened for a decade or more until we can replenish expensive, high tech weapons inventories.
For example, the U.S. is building a new factory for artillery shells, but it won’t even be online until 2028. That’s a long time to go without adequate artillery reserves. And the temporary but long nature of that wait is more dangerous, because it basically opens a window for bad actors that will eventually close. So if China was thinking of invading Taiwan but had no specific timeline, this could give them one: Invade before the west rearms.
The weapons that would be relevant in a hypothetical confrontation with China are mostly disjoint from the weapons we’re sending to Ukraine. We’re not going to get into a land war with China, and our naval power is mostly irrelevant in Ukraine.
The US has not touched its M1 Abrams stockpile (more than 3,000 available sitting in the desert - not counting the ones in unit motor pools). Ammunition for these tanks is plentiful. US still has hundreds of Bradley Fighting Vehicles. TOW missiles, 25mm ammo, and machine gun ammo is plentiful. The Army has over a thousand M209 155mm howitzers not needed for the China scare. The 155mm HE ammo is the shortage recently alleviated by the release of DPICM rounds (~4 million in stock).
Ammo for the Ukrainian Soviet era artillery is a sticking point but feelers and 2nd, 3rd party buyers are working on it. The Ukrainian army is moving to the NATO standard 155mm weapons and ammo. More, but I have to go swimming with my granddaughter.
That would make for a strong incentive for Russia to keep the war going. That seems like a bad idea.
Have you seen what this administration has done to the Strategic Petroleum reserve? Down another 30% this year. Don’t count on careful, rational analysis of future needs from this bunch.
