I’m assuming that connecting the dots between Ukraine’s acquisition of F-16s and the recent attacks on Russian anti-aircraft batteries isn’t completely unwarranted.
Ukraine won’t have F-16s in operation until the start of next year at the very earliest. And if that happens it will be a very limited number which they might not be able to support until a bit later in the year with the necessary infrastructure. F-16s are definitely a ‘next year’ thing.
Because it almost certainly makes no difference. Russian foreign intelligence is generally decent enough that they probably would know anyway. Particularly in Ukraine where divided loyalties may be far lower than Russian leadership (but not Russian intelligence) expected, but are still there. Maintaining secrecy for large shipments like that is extremely difficult and secrecy around military equipment offer no great advantage in context. You get surprised maybe once and said surprise in a grinding high-intensity war like this is extremely unlikely to be a make or break issue. Russia has known about F-16’s and Leopard tanks for decades and have already specifically built their military to engage them. A few months extra prep means very little.
As and ammo and explosives guy; the article and video make me twitch involuntarily:
It’s not that bad, “he said cringingly.” Forget the flip flops, lack of eye/hand protection, minimal clamp fixture, flying sparks, no guard for abrasive wheel, cutting into an explosive projectile - these are drone nerds (I say that with due respect). The ogive where they are cutting is aluminum; a strong alloy with some thickness, so there are a lot less sparks. They won’t come into contact with the grenades there so it’s industrial safety that’s amiss.
Now the DPICM grenades. The two types function the same, the grenades at the bottom of each stack have a non-prefragmented sidewall for strength. There were some premature explosions with initial rounds - the setback “G” force would crush the lowest grenades at high propellant zone charges (max range). Completely safe with the ribbon streamer in place holding the spring loaded slider in the safe position. Even with the ribbon unfurled, still safe until it’s twisted enough to unscrew the firing pin from the slider. When that moves across, the detonator is now directly in line with the firing pin. Don’t drop it! They then move the slider to the “safer” position and hold it with a metal wedge when loading into a drone. Wedge comes out, drone leaves, finds targets, drops and boom. The shown penetration capability of the grenade is ~2.75" of RHA (rolled homogeneous armor - standard NATO target at 90 deg.) unclassified. It will kill a BMP, older tank, artillery piece, truck, bunker. The prefragmented bits cause casualties out to 15 meters for exposed soldiers.
The article and comments harp on sending Rockeye cluster bombs so the Ukrainians can harvest the internal bomblets for similar use with drones. Write/email your congresscritter with this suggestion - it/the bomblets are way safer than this operation. The Rockeye munitions aren’t being used by the US in any number (lots of old ones too). 155mm projectiles are in short supply and cutting them up for grenades is not helping. The government/DoD is well aware of the Ukrainian ask - just needs more congressional push.
I guess the next 15-20 km are crucial … as those secondary and tertiary defense lines are progressively weaker
I’d love to play fly-on-the-wall in UKR headquaters … I mean they know they need to throw a “shitload of everything” at that soft spot to widen/deepen it… and just like water finding the weakest spot and wearing it away …
they are prob. smart enough to bypass/side-step the bigger urbs (Tokmak) to keep up the momentum - and then take care of those, later on …
I wonder if this is the beginning of the end, at least for Ukraine ex-Crimea, for several reasons. Not only the chance of breaking through to easier defense lines, but also every kilometer brings you within safer range of more weapons to cut the Melitopol corridor.
Plus, a third reason. It’s no big secret that the Tokmak region is one of the most important, if not most important, keys to the defense. And because the Russians knew this they heavily fortified it. Yet Ukraine has advanced anyway. If they can’t defend the keystone sector of their occupation, it doesn’t speak well for their ability to hold the rest of it either.