Long article on Russian defenses and Ukrainian capabilities.
I hope the General is correct that the next two layers of defense will be less densely protected.
Unless I’m badly mistaken, Tendar is German. Between the German flag in his bio, and his absolute apoplexy over various of Scholz’s slow-walking military aid decisions, it’s not exactly hidden.
Well, not that your comparison breaks down completely, but I think it could benefit from some refinement. It’s not so much that Washington inflicted, even in defeat, losses upon the British that they could not sustain, but rather that, in his many defeats, Washington didn’t lose any battles so badly as to lose the entire war.
Or, put another way, it’s not that Washington inflicted anything like one or a string of Pyrrhic victories upon the British, but rather that he managed to avoid following up his own tactical losses with strategic defeat, this maintaining as army in being until such time as external actors interceded. Had the French not intervened, it remains possible that the British would have worn Washington’s Army down before he could do the same to them.
Extrapolating that to Ukraine, it is not a given that “success” at losing on the tactical level will translate into strategic victory absent external support allowing Ukraine to maintain and field an army in spite of serious losses.
This. UKR folds not long after the West loses interest.
Putin is now more or less playing for time, trying to lose men and materiel slowly enough that the Western public eventually gets bored/tired of the drain, or the Western economy tanks as it periodically does, or the correct folks get elected in certain countries such that Western support falters, then dwindles to nothing.
Which also gives the necessary prescription for UKR & the West winning: Don’t lose interest no matter how long the marathon takes or what the cost adds up to. And don’t elect the wrong sorts of people who will foment giving up for their personal gain.
Zelenskyy has dismissed his defense minister. Apparently he’ll be moved to another position so not being fired, but hopefully the new person can slide in quickly and keep things going.
The West isn’t going to lose interest because the nations around Russia are next. The recent requests to join NATO shows the mindset of the region. Putin is losing serious assets that can’t easily be replaced and even if they were there isn’t the money to buy them. He’s burning Russia down from within.
Even if the West cuts off all aid and the government and military fold, Ukrainians have had a year and a half to squirrel away enough small munitions for a decades long insurgency.
I feel this is simultaneously dismissive of what Ukraine has accomplished to date, and misreads the nature of “the West’s” support. I see no likelihood of a scenario where Ukraine folds. I can see scenarios where the conflict freezes along roughly the current contact line, but I see no likelihood of Ukraine being overwhelmed, ceasing to exist, or having to resort to partisan resistance at this point.
Ukraine fought off the initial Russian advance on Kyiv almost entirely with their own forces. The only western aid that arrived in time for that fight were the initial shipments of man-portable ATGMs. Javelins and NLAWS, mostly. The Ukrainians won the Battle of Kyiv pretty much on their own. Following Russia’s abandonment of the northern offensive, Ukraine fought a long, slow defensive action around Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, culminating in the loss of those cities. By that point they had received some M777 towed howitzers and a bunch of IMVs of various types (Humvees, M113’s, Bushmasters, and others), and a bunch of old Soviet equipment left in eastern European inventories, but little else. Shortly after the fall of Lysychansk, the first HIMARS and M270 arrived, and ever since Russian offensive capabilities in the face of Ukrainian defense have been virtually nonexistent. Outside the Bakhmut sector they haven’t taken any ground of note, and even there Russian advances were nothing more than obliterating a section of the front lines with massed artillery fire and then moving waves of infantry into the rubble.
And it’s not clear that even this tactic is available to Russia any longer, as for the past few months Ukrainian counter-battery fire has been claiming several hundred Russian artillery pieces per month. Russia probably still has an advantage in raw numbers of artillery and available ammunition for it, but the NATO-standard 155mm artillery that now makes up the bulk of Ukrainian arty is longer-ranged and more accurate. It’s not clear that Russia can still overwhelm a significant section of the front with overwhelming artillery fire. Certainly the front-line forces in the Zaporizhzhia sector are loudly complaining about inadequate artillery support, and that sector is clearly the most strategically critical defense line in the war at the moment. If the Ukrainians break through anywhere along the southern defense line and advance significantly towards the Sea of Azov, the so-called land bridge to Crimea will be broken and the Russian ability to support its forces in the southern Kherson and Zaporizhzha regions will be heavily compromised, much like the situation in northern Kherson last year when the Antonovsky and Nova Kahovka river crossings were compromised. That is to say, if the Russians don’t have artillery superiority in areas of the southern front where Ukraine is threatening, it is either because they are mind-bogglingly bad at prioritizing, or because they simply do not have the artillery forces available to achieve that superiority. My money is on the latter, because for all the problems in the Russian army, knowing how and where to leverage artillery fire is not one of them.
Now it certainly is true that Ukraine has to date been heavily dependent on outside support to match the overwhelming advantage the Russians started the war with in terms of armoured vehicle numbers and materiel. However, this massive advantage has already eroded to the point of being nearly nonexistent. Russia doesn’t have the production capacity to replace even a small fraction of their armoured vehicle losses, and has been fielding older and older leftover Soviet vehicles pulled out of deep storage. They’ve fielded a few T55’s, ferchrissakes, a tank that, in Egyptian service, was outmatched by Israeli M48’s and Centurions during the Six Day War.
At this point, I would estimate that the only outside support Ukraine needs to continue fighting Russia to a standstill is ammunition and enough vehicles & materiel to match current Russian production. That would not be enough stuff to enable Ukraine to drive Russia out of currently occupied territory, but rather just enough stuff to enable Ukraine to stabilize the lines where they are now. They also need sufficient economic support to prop up their economy in the meantime, but this would seem to be forthcoming from the EU in the form of loan guarantees, and I think the likelihood of that stopping is very low.
Now, as to the prospects of “the West” losing interest. The West is not a monolithic bloc. The various nations providing support to Ukraine have differing motivations, and differing levels of commitment.
In the first tier of supporters, we have the former Soviet and Warsaw Pact nations. The Baltic states, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, etc. Most of these nations have provided support at incredibly high rates relative to their GDP, and have expressed extremely high levels of commitment to ongoing support. Most of them seem to think, not without some reason, that if Ukraine were to fall some of them might be next. The likelihood of Lithuania or Poland “losing interest” in supporting Ukraine is somewhere in the vicinity of me winning the lottery, and I have never bought a lottery ticket in my life.
In the second tier, we have the more enthusiastic Western European nations. The UK, the Netherlands, the Scandinavians and Finland, etc. There is a slightly higher possibility of ebbing support here, but completely losing interest seems extremely unlikely. The Finns are little less fervent than the Baltic states, the Dutch are still pissed about MH17, and I’m not entirely sure why the UK has been so enthusiastic. Perhaps it’s to avenge the Light Brigade.
Finally we have a 3rd tier, where the public has been generally supportive of aid for Ukraine, but where that support has not been as decisive. France, Germany, Italy, the US, etc. It’s here that we might see significantly decreased aid, and of course the US and Germany are two of the largest donors to date so loss of interest here could result in greatly diminished aid. But even here it seems unlikely that aid would disappear entirely. The worst case, a Trump 2024 victory and a complete cessation of US aid, would aside from being a full year and a half in the future also not result in a complete cessation of aid. Europe has made very large commitments in terms of artillery ammunition and that seems likely to continue, even if enthusiasm for finding more tanks or F-16s disappears in the future. Eastern Europe will of course do its utmost to keep Ukrainian artillery firing even beyond the current EU commitment.
Finally, indigenous Ukrainian military production is picking up steam on a number of fronts. Don’t forget that Ukraine was home to a great deal of Soviet military production, and while much of that capacity withered through the 90’s the potential is there to revive much of it. While Javelin and NLAW racked up headlines, the natively-produced Stugna has probably racked up just as many vehicle kills, and Ukraine has enough of them that it’s now unremarkable to see videos of Stugnas being used against dismounted infantry. Long-range drone production has increased to the point where large-scale attacks on Crimea are being made on a weekly basis. Natively-produced Poseidon anti-ship missiles have been modified to be able to target land-based targets and are in serial production. The list goes on.
I just don’t see any scenario where Ukraine folds unless circumstances change far more dramatically than a Trump 2024 victory and an isolationist government in France or wherever. Given the rate at which Poland is currently procuring military equipment, it might be able to keep Ukraine in heavy equipment and ammunition all by itself from 2025 forward, if the war drags on that long. Ukraine is probably on a clock to regain its lost territory, but likely result of failure to achieve that objective is no longer the cessation of the Ukrainian state, but rather a frozen conflict, permanent loss of currently occupied territory, and a mad scramble to arm itself sufficiently to prevent future Russian incursions.
In more breaking news territory, Ukrainian forces continue to advance in the vicinity of Robotyne. They’ve crossed the so-called Surovikin line (the anti-tank ditches & “dragon teeth” obstacles) between Robotyne and Verbove, and persistent rumours have them on the cusp of a major breakthrough. If they should achieve a major breakthrough on this axis, it could result in the eventual collapse of all Russian positions north of Crimea and west of the breakthrough. And that would in turn put massive logistical strain on Crimea itself, especially if Ukraine eventually brings down the rail portion of the Kerch bridge.
What I’m starting to get concerned about is how much more good weather there will be before Fall/Winter sets in. I’m wondering if Ukraine will run out of good weather before they achieve a major breakthrough.
That’s a good analysis of the different tiers of support, but you forgot the zeroth tier: Support from Russia. Last I saw, Ukraine had captured more tanks from Russia than they had lost in total, and I’m sure that they’re capturing plenty of other sorts of Russian materiel as well. And due to their shared history as part of the USSR, captured Russian materiel is even easier to integrate into their logistics than materiel from Western countries. And that line of support can’t dry up until the end of the war.
Personally, I’ve suspected for a while that we’ve passed the point where an eventual Ukrainian win is assured, even without any support from allies. Our support will just mean that that eventual victory comes more quickly, and with much less human suffering. Though of course, I have no desire to test this hypothesis.
Turkish president met with Putin in Sochi. I get the impression that Erdogan was bigging up expectations of making a new grain deal to put pressure on Putin, but ultimately no agreement was reached.
At the beginning of the video, Putin performs his signature foot dance.
Looks like Putin will be meeting with another head of state in the near future:
Kim Jong-un and Putin Plan to Meet in Russia to Discuss Weapons
Russia seeks more weaponry for its war in Ukraine, and a North Korean delegation recently traveled to Russia by train to plan for Mr. Kim’s visit this month, officials say.
North Korea is set to become the arsenal of autocracy!
I have to think their gross production capacity isn’t all that great either. Not a large country and not heavily endowed with raw materials. Nor with non-starving enthusiastic workers.
If they did get weapons from North Korea, how quickly could they be brought to the front?
I read about a washing machine manufacturer in NK. They where proud of their production capacity - One washing machine a week.
According to Russian state media, about “about 280,000 people have been accepted into the ranks of the armed forces on contract service,” many volunteers or conscripts.
There are also reports of immigrant workers being pressed into service and adverts in neighboring countries encouraging enlistment. We don’t know casualty numbers from Russia, of course. Story here: Tens of thousands have signed up for contract military service this year, former Russian president says
Darn hard to say.
First question is whether the weapons (or munitions) are already built and being delivered from warehouse storage or are being pulled from the ranks of existing NK units, or are being produced at whatever rate. Next question is what shape they are in; old & rusting will need some work to be usable, whereas factory fresh would not.
Next question is transport; NK is a long way from UKR. There is a very short land border between NK and Russia near Vladivostok which includes a railroad bridge but not exactly a road bridge:
As pointed out in that article, anything transported by train needs to be trans-loaded from NK wagons to RU wagons on the RU side of the border due to incompatible track gauges in each country.
Or stuff could be shipped by ocean freighter, but that invites foreign navies to get involved as they routinely do when NK ships arms to the mideast, typically at Iran’s behest.
In any on-going logistics operation you have two intervals and one rate that matter: interval from decision to first item moving from wherever it was. Interval from when the first item starts moving and filling the logistics pipeline until that item gets to its destination. Then what is the sustainable rate of flow in the now-loaded pipeline.
Assuming the stuff is in a warehouse already you might imagine a week to start it moving, 2-3 more weeks to get it to staging areas in Russia near the war, another week to get the stuff to the units using it. Rate? Hard to say. Neither RU nor NK have a great railway system with lots of fully functional spare capacity. How much will disappear in transit via corruption? Maybe very few tanks, but lots of tank ammo and small arms.
All guesswork at this point.
The Cuban government has claimed that it’s citizens are being trafficked into Russia to take part in its war against Ukraine.
On the other hand, they’ve had several decades without open warfare in which to build up a surplus.