The fact that it’s in Russian court is what gives Russia the legal standing. Their country, their laws. They want to say their courts have standing, they can do that.
Which still doesn’t do anything for their ability to enforce whatever judgement they make, of course. It might be worth some propaganda value on the home front, but beyond that, it’s a completely empty gesture.
The quote you gave from the Guardian says that it’s “Wikimedia” that was charged. That’s the umbrella group that provides the servers and administrative support for all the various language versions of Wikipedia, so that would include Russian Wikipedia, as well as English Wikipedia, to the extent it can be accessed in Russia today.
Carrying on business by offering one’s services in a country is a traditionally recognised basis for a court to assume jurisdiction, and it also depends on the laws enacted in that country.
However, even if the Russian courts do have jurisdiction over the Wikimedia Foundation under Russian law, that doesn’t mean that the judgment of the Russian courts will be enforced in the US, where Wikimedia is headquartered.
There’s several factors which a US court will look at to determine if it will enforce a judgment from courts in another country as set out in the Wikipedia article (yeah, I know 
):
I"ve put in bold the ones that I would guess Wikimedia would likely be able to rely on.
You’re thinking about this all wrong. By issuing differently calibered weapons to conscripts, they are effectively creating a logistical problem for the Ukrainian military once those conscripts are either killed or captured and their arms end up in Ukrainian hands. Then the Ukrainians will have to figure out how to accomplish the Herculean task of delivering two different types of small arms ammunition to front-line units.
Unfortunately, the Russians seem not to have considered that any marginally competent military logistics organization would be able to supply two different kinds of ammunition as a matter of routine. The US military, for instance, while relying primarily on 5.56 mm rounds for assault rifles and light machine guns also still uses 7.62 mm ammunition for medium machine guns like the M240.
Thank you for clearing this up. I’ve heard parts of Wikipedia are blocked in Russia.
And in the worst case, the Ukrainians always have the option of just scrapping whatever incompatible equipment they capture. They might or might not actually do that, but it’s an option.
You are assuming that they even have ammo for these old weapons, or that they will even bother to try to get it to the front line troops. I think these poorly trained and armed Russian conscripts are just meant to be bullet catchers to try to wear the Ukranian army down. Putin does not care if a million of his citizens are killed.
New changes in drone tactics effect navies all over the world.
This hyped up buzz about the naval drones “changing naval warfare” makes me laugh. They’re tactically not much different that the fire boats that were used in the age of fighting sail. It’s an old tactic, not a new one.
I wasn’t thinking so much of delivering two different calibers to the lines. Most militaries, even the Russians, deal with that on a regular basis with success.
But those units are all standardized. Each is nominally equipped with the same weapons and likely consuming similar amounts of ammo. Maybe it’s 100 guys using 5.45 and 8 guys shooting 7.62 as needing standard unit load. In a worse case, if you can’t get exact usage, it’s fairly easy to tell driver that each time he meets an infantry unit, drop off 10 boxes of 5.56 and 8 boxes of 7.62. The way the Russians seem to be setting up, they’ll need great communication and effective logistics to get the right mix of calibers out to the units. Otherwise units with lots of conscripts will be trying to figure out how to make 5.45 fit a 7.62 chamber.
I would not be surprised if Putin has deliberately ill-equipped the conscripts. Donetsk to Moscow isn’t terribly much further than Donetsk to Kyiv, and the looting opportunities in Moscow likely better.
ISW has a special section on partisan attacks.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/interactive-map-and-assessment-verified-ukrainian-partisan-attacks-against-russian
Key Takeaway: Effective Ukrainian partisan attacks are forcing the Kremlin to divert resources away from frontline operations to help secure rear areas, degrading Russia’s ability to defend against ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensives, let alone conduct their own offensive operations. Poor Russian operational security has enabled Ukrainian partisan attacks. Russia’s increasing manpower shortages are likely degrading Russian forces’ ability to effectively secure Russian rear areas against partisan attacks and simultaneously defend against Ukrainian counteroffensives. The Kremlin still has not effectively countered Ukraine’s organized partisan movement and is unlikely to have the capabilities to do so.
What exactly is the difference between an “explosive drone boat” and a torpedo?
That was my thought. The only difference is just range as far as I can tell.
The guidance system. A drone is guided by an outside agent, while a missile or torpedo is self-guided. Common parlance has left that distinction behind, so it’s hardly worth correcting anymore.
Remote human guidance.
And cost. I expect a self-guiding torpedo of comparable combat value to be a lot more expensive, as well as needing dedicated launch systems (on warships or aircraft).
Same thing was said when torpedo boats started being used.
The introduction of fast torpedo boats in the late 19th century was a serious concern to the era’s naval strategists, introducing the concept of tactical asymmetric warfare. In response, navies operating large ships introduced firstly batteries of small-calibre quick-firing guns on board large warships for ‘anti-torpedo’ defence, before developing small but seaworthy ships, mounting light quick-firing guns, to accompany the fleet and counter torpedo boats. These small ships, which came to be called “torpedo boat destroyers” (and later simply “destroyers”), initially were largely defensive, primarily meeting the torpedo boat threat with their own guns outside of the range at which battleships would be vulnerable.
A torpedo is way more effective then a drone of equivalent explosive load because it delivers its explosion under water. Being surrounded by water has an effect similar to a shaped charge that directs the explosion more against the hull than the water. In addition, when the water displaced by the explosion collapses back into the vacated space, it hits the hole in the hull like a second warhead, creating further damage.
Near as I can tell, the biggest new thing about these drone boats is that off-the-shelf hardware has advanced to the point where they can be made cheaply and easily, by an underfunded but competent combatant. An individual torpedo might be more effective than an individual drone, but how many drones can you make for the cost of one torpedo?
This was my first thought. That drone boat looks like it could be deployed to any shore of any body of water just by two dudes in a pickup truck. You need fancy launching platforms to launch a torpedo. Certainly more than two dudes in a truck.
Or you tow an unpowered torpedo by a drone and the ship gets hit above and below the waterline in the same location at the same time.
O a downward-angled spar torpedo, like the earliest torpedo boats had.