Why is the US’s strategy for the initial assault on
Baghdad considered brilliant and unconventional? I know that one novel aspect was the use of armored columns but all that means to me is that they used tanks. Would one of you military strategy buffs short-lesson me on what a conventional strategy would have been and what the actual strategy was, and why the latter was brilliant and unconventional?
It’s considered “unconventional and brilliant”? Not to my knowledge.
I thought they just kind of drove in a little at a time and met next to no resistence ?
It was unconventional and brilliantly amusing that Baghdad Bob was giving press conferences while they were driving around town, but that’s not quite what you meant . . .
Mainly I believe , for a recon in force , it payed out dividends out of proportion to what was put in, that and it worked.
When the col in charge of Task Force rogues seen bagdad bob on tv , saying nothing of the sort took place, he had an epiphany that , it had suddenly become an information war, so the task was repeated two days later
They used both tanks and bradley fighting vehicles , the novelty was that they went counter to army doctrine , in an urban setting , by keeping the soldiers buttoned up inside, rather than having them dismount and procede to clear lanes and groundguide.
Probably someone more conversant with Mech infantry can give you a more consise blurb.
Declan
Among the unconventional elements of the assualt on Baghdad were:
- the forward units were operating at the end of a very long and unsecured supply line. The Us held a series of key bridges and towns, but the supply lines could easily have been cut by a determined enemy (e.g. “Hell’s Highway”, Operation Market-Garden, 1944).
-there were no forces securing the flanks of the advance, and acting as a reserve in case an Iraqi armoured unit showed up.
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the columns that entered Baghdad were relatively small, light on infantry, and lacked forward support assets like artillery and army aviation units.
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the standard doctrine says that you take a city by first encircling it, and then reducing the perimeter with infantry and artillery (see e.g. Stalingrad, 1943 and Berlin, 1945).
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the conventional wisdom was that taking armour unsupported by infantry into a city was suicide for the armour, due to the many opportunities for ambush at close range.
The brilliance in the assault lay in the US command realizing that:
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the Iraqi army had either declined to fight or been smashed, and was unwilling or incapable of offering significant resistance.
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the speed and momentum of their advance had totally confused the Iraqi command, who seemed to have no coherent defence plan
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air power provided a significant amount of flying artillery that could help support the columns if needed, and
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Baghdad was almost undefended, and the chance existed that the U.S. could smash in, thereby demoralizing the Iraqis and possibly ending the war sooner. They decided to gamble, and won. Against a more determined and skillful opponent, the decision to storm Baghdad could have turned out very badly.
Thanks burntsand, great answer. If you don’t mind a few followups:
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What exactly did happen when the columns arrived in the center of Baghdad? Unfortunately, news coverage seemed to jump right from “US forces are approaching Baghdad,” to “US forces are helping Iraqi citizens pull down statues of Saddam.”
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Was armor specifically used because it was intimidating?
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Is the term “column” still used to define a specific tactical formation, or does it describe a unit size, or just the way they look traveling down a highway?
Here’s an article from the LA Times (free registration required) about a crucial part of the battle. It may answer some of your questions.
Yeah, no kidding. It was only brilliant because it succeeded. From that lead humvee, it probably looked more like Mogadishu for a while there.
We got slaughtered on that one, and it could have happened again.
Time magazine had an excellent timeline of the taking of Baghdad if you can find it.
“Brilliant”? Why?
I had reached some sort of inkling of the four points you mention above, by sitting on a couch in Brisbane watching TV news. Given the amazing recon and intelligence info available to the US command, I hardly think that figuring out the points you mention was “brilliant”.
Does anyone know what, if any, effect that “Decapitation” attack at the beginning of the war had? Obviously Saddam wasn’t killed by it, but was Saddam incapatitated from organizing Iraqs Defense?
On a related note, apparently US air power pretty much decimated their communications and command/control facilities, making it far easier to isolate and rout the Iraqi armies (Unless I’ve gotten the wrong Idea).
“L’audace, l’audace, toujours l’audace” was Frederick the Great’s motto for success in battle. Look at the varying uses commanders have made of intelligence in battle: Rommel was made aware, through AK Signals intelligence, of most of Eighth Army’s tank returns and movements; he used the information to attack and bearly defeat the British in Africa. Similarly, Montgomery knew, through Ultra, the weakness of the Afrika Korps; but he failed to press home the attack as vigorously as he might have.
Stalin knew, though Richard Sorge, that Hitler was planning to attack in Operation Barbarossa; he did nothing, and almost lost the Soviet Union as a result. Marshal Zhukov had intelligence that the Germans were planning a buildup around Kursk and Kharkov, and he planned the greatest tank slaughter of all time.
Knowing that the Iraqis were weak during OIF was easy; having the courage to act on your convictions and risk the lives of your servicemen and women is the hard part.
As often seems to be the case in modern war, air superiority may have been key to this strategy. A lot of the risk of the full speed assault on Baghdad was mitigated by the complete control of the air and the relatively open terrain of Iraq. It’s hard to imagine the Iraqi’s every being able to isolate the advance column considering the US air capability. Stall them for a while perhaps but not cut them off.
It could be called brilliant but the extent to which is would apply to another enemy and another terrain is questionable.
That is arguable, clearly, but that is not what you said. You said “The brilliance in the assault lay in the US command realizing that:” and then listed four intelligence points. I just didn’t think that there was much brilliance in realizing those things. Maybe your post just wasn’t well worded (a problem I have myself, much of the time ;))
personally, I think covert ops, cell phone calls to Iraqi colonels, and probably cash payments explain the lack of resistance and have more to do with the success of the assault on Baghdad than anything else.
Fact is, a lot of old-world military commanders won by as much luck as anything else. We turn the art of war into a science, and we leave as little to chance as possible. That doesn’t mean our best successes are not brilliant - we’ve engineered them to be.
In this case, the appelation is well deserved, because classical doctrines would have been much more conservative. Remember that at the time intel would have been much less sparse and the dangers magnified. Yet, the commanders decided to rewrite the book and everything exactly wrong, against every lesson the last century taught us. And we won, because we’d built our victory before we even started. It took guts to do all that.
The Iraqi’s had lost before they even begun though. Their military structure was atrocious. We did make our way a lot easier for us and less bloody for them. Howerver, the units around Bagdad were the hard-core Republican Guard, and they weren’t goin to give up, and I don’t think we had too many Spec Ops around there - too dangerous to dump them into that kind of zone. The enemy was demoralized, confused, and unready, however, and that is what we needed most.