At the very least, it’s grounds for an adjudication of neglect. As someone who’s currently cranking out a first draft of a judicial opinion in a termination of parental rights case in D.C., I’ll say that – under the law of this jurisdiction, at least – termination of parental rights is first and foremost about seeking an adoptive placement for a child, and that TPR procedures wouldn’t be instituted, even in a case such as this, until the child has spent a bit of time in the foster care system.
Although the termination of parental rights is a “drastic remedy,” it may be ordered when the judge determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that “continuing the parent-child relationship would be contrary to the best interests of the child.” In re J.L. and R.L., 2005 D.C. App. LEXIS 260, 11 (D.C. 2005) (internal citations omitted); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2353 (2004); D.C. Super. Ct. Neg. R. 38(d). A determination of the child’s best interests requires the weighing of the statutory factors found in D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2353(b) (2004).
The first of these factors is “the child’s need for continuity of care and caretakers and for timely integration into a stable and permanent home, taking into account the differences in the development and concept of time for children of different ages.” D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2353(b)(1) (2004). A potential adoptive home need not already be in place for the termination of parental rights to promote timely integration into a stable and permanent home. “[A] TPR may properly be entered even where no specific adoptive parents have been identified, where the child is adoptable and termination would enhance the child’s prospects for an appropriate adoptive placement.” In re A.R., 679 A.2d 470, 479 n.14 (D.C. 1996); see also In re Ja.J., 814 A.2d 923, 925 (D.C. 2002); In re T.W., 756 A.2d 402, 411 (D.C. 2000); In re P.D., 664 A.2d 337, 339 (D.C. 1995); In re A.W., 569 A.2d 168, 172 (D.C. 1990).
The second of the statutory factors to be weighed is “the physical, mental, and emotional health of all individuals involved to the degree that such affects the welfare of the child, the decisive consideration being the physical, mental, and emotional needs of the child.” D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2353(b)(2) (2004).
The third factor is “the quality of the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent, siblings, relative, and/or caretakers, including the foster parent.” D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2353(b)(3) (2004).
The fourth statutory factor to be weighed in deciding a motion to terminate parental rights is, “to the extent feasible, the child’s opinion of his or her own best interests in the matter.” D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2353(b)(4) (2004).
The final statutory factor is “evidence that drug-related activity continues to exist in a child’s home environment after intervention and services have been provided.” D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2353(b)(5) (2004).
That’s a descriptive response to your OP. A prescriptive thought would be: In egregious cases like this, would the state be justified not only in terminating a parent’s rights to that child, but to (at least for a fixed period of time, or until the woman could meet certain conditions) future children as well?