Zig, I haven’t, so far as I know, conceded any of those points. I can certainly accept the proposition that the Taliban is no longer in power, and such threat as a bunch of theological goat farmers may have presented to the US has clearly been neutralized. Which is to say, whoop-de-fuck-a-doo.
Was Osama the principal target of the operations? Well, he sure was when they started. For a while there, Our Leader did considerable swaggering and terse sound biting as to precisely that. It was rather later that more sophisticated guidelines for measuring success were introduced.
I suppose the terrorist training camps are destroyed. I am assured such by my government. As to whether this poses a crippling loss to our enemies, I frankly don’t know. More to the point, I don’t think anyones else does either. After all, what sort of facilities do you think are required for training in the use of the box cutter?
As to whether Al Queda is scattered, I assumed that was a given. They are all over the place. They were, therefore, scattered to begin with. And as to their being arrested, or hounded, thats all to the good. It was precisely that approach that persons like myself had first recommended. You seem determined to believe that such arrests are necessarily the result of military action in Afghanistan, I suggest they might just have easily been ratted out by thier brother in law.
Trouble is, we don’t know much. Our military men learned a great lesson in Viet Nam, regretably, they learned the wrong one. They learned to keep the snoopy damn reporters as far from the action as humanly possible. They learned that letting the people back home find out on a daily basis what was being done in their names is not a very good idea. There are no war correspondents, we know what we are told. We are told what they want us to know.
I do know odd bits, odd things like pictures of captued Al Queda ammunition dumps, stocked with heavy mortar rounds, presumably to attack very, very slow aircraft. I do notice a distinct lack of numbers: how many here, how many there.
In such conditions of designed ignorance, any certainty is suspect. Clearly, Our Leader would have us believe we have triumphed, just as clearly, you are convinced. I am doubtful. I am more inclined to believe it a failure, given the original terms of engagement we were offered. At any rate, it is difficult to justify its cost to the Afghani people themselves. The same warlords occupy the same positions, but with the extra benefits of several millions of US dollars. I’m hard pressed to see that as an improvement.