against dualism

It doesn’t actually matter, for the sake of this argument, whether the “cause” in the cause-effect relationship is entirely within our brain chemistry, or from external (material) forces. It’s the deterministic, or non-freely-chosen nature of thought in a purely material context that’s the problem.

If a conscious agent is to construct a logical argument, they must be able to freely choose the links in that argument, otherwise there is no effective difference between “logical” thought and “random thoughts about subject X”. And the very idea of actual free will (as opposed to the mere appearence of it) seems to be incompatible with the idea that the material world is all there is, and that every state in the physical world is caused by a previous existing state. So in a purely material world you can never tell whether an argument is logical (rather than merely the result of aberrant brain chemistry) - including any argument proving that the material world is all there is

“notice the effects of” might have been a better term to use, regarding the non-physical world.

If we’re going to be debating whether any sort of non-material world exists, it’s helpful to figure out what the characteristics of any such construct would be if it existed. If we don’t know what it is, it makes it a lot harder to decide if it is, if you see what I mean. So in my points a - d, you can add the phrase “any such non-material world must have the characteristic” to the front of all of them, if it makes things any clearer.

Point (a) is simply “the particular non-material world whose existance or otherwise is one which has (or “would have”) regular interactions with the material world”. I take it that both sides in this debate would have to agree to that, otherwise the debate might veer off into discussion of miracles and other one-off events which would (if proven to have happened) refute the OP’s position. I take it that this is not the sort of thing under discussion, we’re just talking about regular every-day thought, existence etc as experienced by everybody.

The position of a particle by itself is not an “event”. An event is an interaction between at least two objects, so in order to measure it accurately you need to know accurately the position and velocity of two different objects. That cannot be done (for appropriate values of “accurately”).

Furthermore, you cannot measure an event without changing that event. Bounce a photon off a pair of particles to check where they’re hitting each other and you’ll shift their position.

So given that level of uncertainty in the actual fabric of the universe, how could you ever tell if there was “something” influincing the material world which was not part of it?

Aspidistra:

You’re right, practically speaking, that if we reject dualism than we’re pretty much left with materialism. In case you were thinking of saying that since we can’t prove materialism and any disproof of dualism proves materialism and therefore we can’t disprove dualism, though, you can’t do that because you can’t actually prove that a rejection of dualism confirms materialism. Once you have gotten rid of the logic of dualism, you can’t prove that those are the only two options, that process of elimination is a valid way to prove something, or even that materialism is itself.

Urbanranger, watch out for the burden of proof here. Since we are attempting to disprove dualism, we can’t assume that it doesn’t exist, otherwise that would be circular reasoning. My own responses to b), c) and d) (not in order):

c) I think you and I are using different definitions of interaction. I have been thinking that interaction requires specific events in the non-physical world to have effects in the physical world. I would file the case of static states under the non-interacting scenerio, which I don’t have a problem with.

d) Quantum theory doesn’t change anything. All it does is replace a discrete certainty with a continuous probability. If an event occurs once, there is a non-zero probability of it’s occuring in any given length of time, therefore if we wait long enough it will come back as many times as we want. With a large enough sample size, the random noise will eventually cancel itself out, and we can measure this event to any arbitrary accuracy.

b) This is kind of my main thesis for this thread. If one part of the universe is physical and it interacts with another part of the universe, the other part must be physical too. If we add apples and oranges, the first thing we have to do is to say that one apple equals 1.23 oranges. We have to describe the other part of the universe in physical terms, but then once we’ve done that we’ve defined it in physical terms. If the physical description is accurate, by definition, then there is no deviation from it, and if there is no deviation from a physical description of a phenomena than we can just stick with the physical description and not worry ourselves with things like free will. (To continue the analogy, after converting apples to oranges, we discover that an orange never was anything other than 1.23 oranges, so we don’t even need the concept of oranges to describe the universe)

that should read, “an orange never was anything other than 1.23 apples”.

Justhink: As far as I can tell you seem to be arguing two mutually exclusive arguments, so maybe I’m misunderstanding. In any case, I’ll respond to both. The first argument is that monism has no contrasts, and existence requires contrasts to distinguish itself from non-existence, and since we exist, monism can’t describe reality. The weak link in this argument is that you can’t prove that we exist (according to this definition of existence) without a priori, a dualistic concept, and of course using dualism to prove dualism is circular reasoning.

The second argument is that dualism is really a misnomer, since in the end it comes down to a monism (the same monism that you argued against above?). If it does come down to a monism then I wouldn’t have any problem with it. If part of that monism is physical though, then the entire thing would have to be, as described in the apples and oranges analogy above.

Hopefully this will clarify what I was stating.

Object and motion are two different concepts that could be considered a dualism in and of itself. I was pointing out that “object” all by itself renders motion impossible. i.e. “What does it mean to say that nothing at all is moving around?”

What is required is difference and motion; difference being the primary dualistic concept. This is what allows for a lack of perceptual acuity in regards to existent entities. (i.e. Does the forest make a sound when nobody is there to hear it? Does all of this still go on after I die?)

What this posits is that difference itself can propose existence in the absence of motion; it just eliminates the perceptuality of this, the capacity for the abstraction of this difference from existence. Existence itself is a meaningless term if it is not considered to be defined as difference, regardless of whether motion is occurring or not.

This is considered a necessary materialistic veiw. It does not argue that everything reduces to a monad, as the monad is difference itself. The monad in this veiw is seen as an illusion of perceptual acuity which engages in memory of homeostasis.
If that homeostsis is abstracted as BOTH motion and memory; then it will of necessity seek to avoid the monad; which is the denial of all logic. It is wishful thinking to assume that one can simply will difference away; as difference itself shows evidence of never being willed away from all attempts to do so. Neither has motion. Not even change or chaos has managed to diffuse difference and motion (difference = 2, motion = 1; hence the classocal belief that 3 was the first number).

If difference and/or motion are ever diffused; the very things which would desire them or wish them to be gone would collapse as well, including the tools necessary to engage in any desire.
This collapse can be considered absolute; in that the diffusion of either difference or motion at any point in the time-line irreconilably vanquishes us and/or any perception of us and/or the conditions which would even allow one of us to attempt to defy or conquer these states.

What occurs in this scenario is that one must assume that something comes from nothing at all; which collapses all reason and desire. While this can be observed in acute cases (remember the bet with God, also remember the robot who didn’t believe in difference, yet was using it to deny his suffering to other people even when he was observed to writhe in torment and agony.) - it is considered motion rather than something becoming nothing or nothing becoming something.

The most implicit social contract is that certain actions correspond with certain thoughts via. this axiom, where one must use the behavior to deny the possession of it.

-Justhink

I think (after reading that through a couple of times) that this is close to what I’m saying. But I’m not sure what you mean by “the logic of dualism”. Is that the same thing as what one would normally mean by just “logic” with no qualifiers?

Re your last sentence - yes, I think in fact that this is what I’m arguing! Since I believe that logical thought in a human mind can’t really exist in a purely materialistic context, there can be no such thing as a logical argument which proves materialism.

It seems to me that the logical argument in the OP, if it “works”, demonstrates either

a) that the universe (as a black box) is entirely materialistic …therefore undermining the existance of “logic” at all (and therefore undermining the logic in the OP)

b) that a facet of “logical argument” (the process of elimination whereby “disproof of dualism”==“proof of materialism”) does not apply to the universe…therefore undermining the existance of “logic” at all (and therefore undermining the logic in the OP)

Now you could get around this by saying “yes, the universe is non-dualistic … and is therefore fundamentally paradoxical”. I think that’s probably valid, but not necessary given that the dualist alternative is actually consistent and non-paradoxical. The dualist alternative says “yes, there is such a thing as logic, and it exists outside the material world … and, by the way, it does interact with the physical world (whenever a person constructs a logical argument)”

I’m trying to make more concrete (to myself!) what the characteristics of possible non-physical worlds might be. Leaving static states out of the current discussion is fine by me tho’

The problem is that it’s going to be difficult, if not impossible, for science to ever prove that a particular situation was effected, or not effected, by something outside of the physical universe, since we can never find out, precisely, what that physical state consisted of in the first place. This is more a practical problem for the proof/disproof of your theory, rather than a strictly logical one.

Well, the physical world has other qualities apart from “interaction with other parts of the physical universe”. For instance, the physical universe has the quality of being reactive - all events in the purely physical universe were caused by a previous event, which was caused by a previous event…and so on back to the big bang.

If there were a “thing” which produced causes in the physical universe, but also had the characteristic of not being itself a cause, being entirely volitional, would you agree that this “thing” was not part of the physical universe, and was also interacting with the physical universe? Because “free will” if it exists does fall into this category (not all of the examples you give in the OP do, I think. Consciousness, for example could be an artefact. But I don’t think that free will can be)

Do you believe that there is in fact such a thing as free will, or are all our actions entirely “caused”?

I think Aspidistra raised points which I don’t agree with, and as such, I want to clarify an aspect of logic.

“That which can be measured” is not considered in terms of probability. “That which can be measured” is strictly considered in terms of possibility.

The possibility used to frame this is:
That which has the possibility of being observed.

Let’s say you have some possibility outside of the ‘big-bang’ which ‘triggers’ it. It is aknowledged in logic that this property cannot be “nothing at all”. What occurs instead is that the perceptual area of the universe itself is expanded to include this phenomenon in the topography. That which is NOT “nothing at all” must by definition not be an absolute monad which moves; rather the ‘monad’ must be defined as difference; in that there is something_else to move whether intentional or not.

This quality automatically qualifies it into the possibility of being measured and as such becomes integrated with the definition of ‘universe’. Specifically: That which has the possibility of being observed; That which is NOT absolutely “nothing at all”

Again, ‘nothing at all’ is memory that a specified stasis is different; it has moved. Rationality dictates that it did not become “nothing at all”; nor is that where it came from, simply that a lack of perceptual acuity has caused the condition of different memories to even be possible; a quiality which in and of itself allows for memory to be possible; and for something to be said to be observable.

Observations are specifically determined as true and valid when a difference has been noted and monads have been discarded.
Monads which contradict their purpose in light of a more vast perceptual memory and acuity; are considered ‘false’ ‘impossible’ ‘irrelevant’; to the degree that it is now in direct contact with the decision to believe whether something comes from or moves into “nothing at all” or not.

When an idea is held which can be narrowed down to the belief that “something comes from or moves into nothing at all”; it is considered illogical and irrational and inconcsistent with the very types of memory being observed in terms of communicating with people or eating ones meals instead of starving.

Monad to this degree is never considered absolute, unless it is defined as difference.

-Justhink

Justhink: Now that I understand you a little better, I think I didn’t realize the full implications of what dualism means when I wrote the OP. I’m mostly concerned about the specific dualism between the physical and the non-physical, as described by Descartes. I’m way over my head talking about general dualism though, so I’ll concede that to you.

Yeah, sorry I didn’t make that clear.

Re: quantum theory, I think you’re right that it is more of a practical than a theoretical problem, and since we’re talking theoretically it shouldn’t make any difference.

Yes, but if we can show that there is no physical difference between if it did have other qualties and if it didn’t, than we may as well say that that it doesn’t.

I’m not sure I understand the first sentence; is that meant to say “produced effects in the physical universe”? If that’s the case, you’ve already contradicted yourself by saying that it isn’t itself a cause.

Conciousness can have many definitions, some which include dualism and some which don’t. Free will, on the other hand, pretty much implies dualism. You can use it monistically as a personification (“my computer is angry at me”), but that’s about as close as you can get without dualism. So no, if you’re asking my personal opinion, I don’t believe in free will.

“”""""“Justhink: Now that I understand you a little better, I think I didn’t realize the full implications of what dualism means when I wrote the OP. I’m mostly concerned about the specific dualism between the physical and the non-physical, as described by Descartes. I’m way over my head talking about general dualism though, so I’ll concede that to you.”""""""

You bring up a very good point, and I am fairly convinced that your confusion in this regard is as ‘common as dirt’. It stems from an insistant history of belief that “nothing” and “zero” actually exist as absolutes ingrained into the very fabric of ‘this’.

In this tradition, Descartes opined about the duality of ‘existence and non-existence’; not comprehending that zero is not a number and that existence (number one all by itself) is what most would consider the ‘number’ zero to be. The duality is not a matter of existence vs. non-existence in this regard; but rather in a necessary physical split implied in the term ‘existence’ itself.

This belief that something can become nothing OR that something can come from nothing is quite possibly the most common theme running through every brain on this earth. It can be observed in all statements of contradiction emminating from behavior. Much of this is attributed to the autonomous indentured systems’ penchant for discarding logical consistency as much as possible; in-so-much that people manage to be consistent enough to drink water and eat food so they can survive another week or so; the rest of the personality utilizes the abuse of ‘numbering’ zero and running this black-box to steal everything in their possession with absolute contradiction.

To add one more comment that may have not ‘shown’ through:

The possibility for observation is considered: measurable.

Observation being the most fundamental mechanism of measurement! Tools created above and beyond the use of memory comparisons are used to render greater accuracy to one or more of the senses pulling the data into perception. These tools should not be confused with the very fundamental use of observation as a measuring device.

This is where arguments for monism fall flat (which should be no suprise!):

If it cannot possibly be observable!!!, it cannot possibly be discernible (aka. nothing at all). When ‘nothing’ is associated with the broad spectrum “all”; the conversation ceases to have a logical purpose and rather becomes a string of words hoping to trick someone into believing in and giving energy to a misdirection of form; which can be defined any-which-way on the fly. There is no standardization that applies here. This is where ‘game service providers’ come into the picture as a social force. They are in effect ‘virtualizing’ an undefined term and running the contradictions (through the use of defining zero) right through it.

As a thought virus, this is undoubtedly the most common and most insidious to any sense of free-will or being able to claim rationality under any circumstance. ‘God’ doesn’t have anything on the horror of this real judgement day that divides that few who are actually doing anything here from the many who steal and make up tales about their work. The God concept itself is rooted in this corruption of logic as are many secular theories.
The spread of this virus can be directly correlated to social degredation, as zero is the operator of choice for selective selection.

-Justhink

I agree. However, at this point in time, we cannot show this, we can only assume it.

In your OP, you say

That’s an assumption that I disagree with. There is no reason why an entity couldn’t exist which shared some of the properties of the physical universe (being able to produce effects on physical entities) without sharing others (eg exhibiting predictable behaviour, fully “caused” by some other entity)

I’m not sure I understand the first sentence; is that meant to say “produced effects in the physical universe”?

[/quote]

err, yes. :smack: Please replace the word “cause” by “effect” BOTH times in that quote and it should make more sense.

That is, I meant to posit the existence of an entity which produced effects in the physical universe, but was not in itself an effect of something else - that is , it stands outside the cause-and-effect-chain-going-back-to-the-Big-Bang which all entities in a purely physical universe must be inside.

That’s pretty much what I figured. So the core of our differing positions is this: you disbelieve in the existance of free will and logic (since you agree that dualism is necessary for the existence of both). I believe in the existence of both. Both of these opinions are equally matters of faith, or assumption … UNLESS you can use logic itself (“the logic of dualism”) to disprove logic and therefore make the whole edifice of dualism collapse on its face.

Which, of course, was what the OP was intended to do. (it took me a while to figure this out. But I’m there now…)

However, I don’t think you have acheived your proof, because the OP makes some assumptions that I disagree with, and which are not proven.

Firstly, there’s the one I noted above:

“if something can change the state of a physical entity it must be physical itself.”

And also:

“If it [the consciousness/freewill “black box”] were part physical and part non-physical, the second alternative, then all we would need to care about is the part of it that interacts with the physical world. We wouldn’t even be able to talk or think about the non-physical part, since talking and thinking are physical processes”

If the black box were part non-physical, then talking would still be a purely physical process, but thinking would not be. One of the assumptions of a dualist worldview is that we ourselves (our consciousness) partly exist in the non-material world.

“”"""""“If the black box were part non-physical, then talking would still be a purely physical process, but thinking would not be. One of the assumptions of a dualist worldview is that we ourselves (our consciousness) partly exist in the non-material world.”"""""""

I spent the last couple posts dismissing this myth. shrug

-Justhink

Justhink I don’t understand any of what you’re talking about in your posts, so I’m afraid I can’t interact with them. Or ant any rate, it would take up FAR more time than I currently have up my sleeve

Aspiditra:

The black box scenerio was meant to be an illustration of everything that was contained in the paragraph above it, which contains your first objection, so really they both come down to the same thing.

I thought I had several proofs for the first objection lined up and ready to go, but when I started trying to write them down I started discovering logical fallacies in all of them. In the end what I came up with with was quite different (and simpler!) than I had thought it would be. In any case, here goes: We can define physical as “being a manfestation of the laws of physics”, and the laws of physics as “our attempt to use logic and mathematics to understand the universe”. So when we talk about one thing causing another, we are already talking about a manifestation of logic, and therefore both the cause and the effect are physical.

This proof has the unintended effect of also proving that if one non-physical event causes another non-physical event, that this too is physical. This doesn’t seem to make too much sense, until you consider that no two events in the non-physical world (as dualism posits) do really cause each other - they have to go through the physical world first. Concepts such as consciousness and free will doesn’t have internal mechanisms - they just sort of are, so this is consistent with how we have defined the physical and non-physical world so far.

In addition, this shows how the problem of a first cause, or a non-caused physical event, is a non-problem. Nowhere in the definition of “physical” does it mention anything about causation, and the proof taken as a whole is about if a physical event has a cause.

Also note that I can use the rules of logic even though we are talking about materialism, because I can’t prove them. Science offers no garuntees that tomorrow everthing it knows will be false and the rules of logic will suddenly not apply. What it can do is say that the chances of this are so vanishingly small that we don’t really need to consider them.

There is the possible reply that concepts such as free will and consciousness are in fact logical. If this is the case, then logic forms a common ground between these concepts and the physical world, so this worldview can’t properly be called dualism. But I don’t think this is the case, because there is no way to define conciousness or free will without it coming down to “well, you know” - a reference to experience. If you try to define experience, you have to use the same “well, you know”, but now it is circular logic, using itself to define itself, and therefore illogical.

In reference to the black box analogy, talking and thinking were both meant to be examples of physical concepts. If you are saying that thinking is not a physical concept, then forget I said that and just stick to the talking. Also, I meant for the black box to be as big as necessary to include everything non-physical - if it extends to the entire brain that is fine. What this does is to make it obvious that something non-physical has caused something physical, without having to worry about all the shades inbetween. At this point my proof above takes over.

Justhink: I am trying not to come to the same conclusion about your posts as Aspiditra. I have been understanding small snippets of your posts, but not larger concepts, and that is where I’m getting myself into trouble. What I need to do is to go over all of your posts and try to translate the vocabulary that you are using into the vocabulary I have been thinking in. In any case, I’d like to respond to one argument that I think I understand well.

I agree with you in your equation of monism with non-existence (I like the term “zeroism”). What I disagree with is the idea that you would be able to prove, based on information from inside the universe, that zeroism isn’t a valid way to describe the universe. Without dualism, we can’t use logic (and saying that we aren’t even here to use logic only bolsters this case), and without logic we can’t prove anything.

Doesn’t this proof also allow us to drag some of the dualist concepts you mention into the OP (“the soul, free will, private phenomenon, consciousness, absolute morality”) into the realm of “physical”? I agree with you that if a non-material-entity has no actual effect on the physical universe then for all practical purposes we can treat it as non-existant. However, this doesn’t prove that any of these specific things do not exist, and do not have effects on what we would normally think of as physical reality.

I think that to say that (paraphrased) “the definition of ‘physical’ doesn’t mention causation” isn’t the whole story. Although the various dualist concepts above are normally defined as belonging to the “other world” because of their nebulous and “non-physical” (in the ordinary sense of the word) nature, the concept of “causality” is a major factor in how I’m currently thinking of the distinction between material and non-material entities.

In the material world, we know of two types of events - “caused” events and “random” events. Everything fits into one of these categories to one degree or another (on a microscopic level it’s often “a bit of both”). However, the standard definition of “freewill” is outside of both these categories. It is, as the name implies, entirely free - but nonetheless not random, it is “chosen” or “volitional”, which is an entirely different category of entity, and not one that science is very comfortable dealing with. It can be the start of a causal chain, but not the middle of one (unlike ordinary physical objects, which must always react when acted upon).

[Note: I’m using “freewill” as an example a lot because it’s the one I’ve thought about the most. I think that some of the other ‘dualist entities’ would exhibit a different set of similarities with /differences from ordinary matter. I’m still mulling over what they might be, though]
Regarding the relationship between freewill and logic - I’m not arguing that freewill is “logical”, any more than, say, a photon is “logical” - they both “just are”. I don’t have a problem with saying that freewill “just is” - according it the same degree of proof-of-existence as a photon, or the Gravitational Constant is fine by me :slight_smile:

If your interested (and have a lot of time on your hands) this is a site that has shaped a lot of my thinking on this matter (obWarning: the site is religious, but it’s possible to skip those bits and simply stick to the philosophy bits. It’s also looooong…)

David, I just wanted to come back and thank you for your swift and courteous response. I am having a bit of Real Life inflicted on me at the moment and I cannot give this fascinating subject proper attention. Meanwhile, some things I would have said have been said and many things I don’t understand yet have been put forth, which will take me a while to untangle and digest. But I didn’t want you to think I was unappreciative, dismissive or uninterested. (BTW, I do not, as you suggested, “assume” the existence of the non-material by questioning the origins of an experience. I am unwilling to dismiss it by defining it out of existence. I think this is related to the cause and effect part of the discussion, which I have only skimmed as of now.)

I have thought more about consciousness than free will and I have thought more about it from the biological mind-body connections than the philosophical angle this thread is taking. And I haven’t had the chance to think about them very long or the information to think about them very deeply. I hope my attempts at contribution don’t derail or hijack. Feel free to ignore them.

This site has some interesting things about the possible… nature? origin? implications?.. of consciousness from a biological point of view. I’m not convinced that Chalmers’ speculation that consciousness may be “a kind of fundamental constituent of reality,” since “no other emergent phenomenon appears to have the properties of consciousness,” puts it in a category different from physical (sort of pre-physical? trans-physical?).

Once they get into the Hameroff-Penrose stuff on quantum computation being embedded in our microtubules, I get pretty lost. If anybody can elucidate that, I’d read with great interest if small understanding. There’s a great deal more on the subject here. It seems as though our definition of what is “physical” is in the process of changing, and I think even this small discussion here reflects that.

I feel a bit awkward putting this much forward here, since I don’t know if I’ll be able to continue to contribute, having little learning in this and not enough time to think properly about it (it being fairly unfamiliar and all). I don’t wish to stir stuff up just to appear to run away. But I would very much welcome thoughts on this by anyone in a position to reflect more cogently on it than I am. I hope I will have enough understanding to at least come back and ask an intelligent question if not make an intelligent comment (but won’t be surprised if I don’t). Regardless, I will continue to read with interest and I apologize if this is an unwelcome interruption in your discussion.

Aspiditra

As I mentioned earlier, if it does, then this isn’t properly called dualism. But I don’t think it does, at least according to popular definitions of all of these concepts.

But if you’re not disagreeing with me over the definition of physical, then how you are thinking about it is irrelevent. It doesn’t have to be more than mere coincidence that all illogical entities are uncaused, therefore that fact can’t be used to prove anything.

I don’t have a problem with saying that free will “just is” either. As I’ve said before, my problem is in saying that it interacts with the physical world.

Sparrowhawk:

Could you elaborate on that a little bit (if you get the time)? I’m not questioning you, just curious as to what you mean.

hey, same here and I haven’t let that stop me!:smiley:

Just bumping this up to give another day or two to whoever might respond.

(Acceptance or rejection of dualism is an important premise for most discussions of religion and morality, and morality (and sometimes religion) are at the foundation of politics, so this debate is relevant to at least 3/4 of the debates going on in GD right now. My little blip for this thread.)

Well, just to continue on with our little part of the discussion…
I think I do disagree with you on the definition of ‘physical’. I would call ‘physical’ all those entities which conform to what we would normally regard as the laws of the universe - that is, obey cause and effect, the principle of entropy, operate under mathematically defineable laws and so on.

What actually is your definition of “physical”? Apart from “interacts with the detectable universe in some way”?

Anyway, the purpose of the OP seems not to be to argue about what is or is not ‘physical’, it’s to argue against the existence/relevance of “the soul, free will, private phenomenon, consciousness, absolute morality (etc)”.

The problem is that you say that if one of these entities interacts with the physical world it “must be physical itself”.That is, all its interactions within itself and with other supposed “non-physical entities” must also be classed as “physical”…or else it can be split up into a “physical part” and a “non-physical part”.

Not necessarily! After all, you can’t split an electron into its “wave part” and its “particle part”. The electron exists as an entity which can interact in a “wave way” or in a “particle way” depending on what you do with it.

Likewise there’s nothing to prevent the existance of a “freewill entity” which can interact in a “physical way” (which I take to be ‘interacting via the laws of cause and effect’) or a “non-physical way” (‘interacting via some strange non-physical mode that we don’t know anything about’)

Hello. i’m rather new here, so bear with me…

i read this post, and wanted to respond to a lot, so you’ll forgive me if i leave out some things. first and foremost:

logic actually requires nothing to work. there are a set of about 10 “undefinables” in logic, such as the concept of ‘truth’, the idea of a relation or an implication, etc., and from this tiny set all of pure mathematics can be derrived. these undefinables are concepts that can be reduced no further, and therefore we say that they are so simple as to be taken as granted. so logic and free will have nothing to do with each other. i think you meant rational behavior, and the existence of this is a hotly debated topic on its own. i hope this provides the refutation you sought. you did not just disprove logic using logic. if you ever do, i’m sure bertrand russell would rise from the dead to shake your hand.

on free will, i say that in a purely rule based system, in which we may believe that we live (we can know no other system, lest we invent rules to govern it), there is no room for free will. what intentionality did a given particle have when it collided with another? who made the choice for that particle to behave in a perfectly predictable fashion? it had none, and no one did. as we are just a collection particles, free will can essentially be reduced to the intentionality of these particles, which i claim is lacking. quantum mechanics says nothing about this, since we are not trying to locate the particles.

and that brings me to my point, which is to agree with the OP. if you are having a hard time finding a proof against dualism, the way the OP describes it, that is because it is a trivial proof. by definition, a purely physical world absorbs all. more explicitly:

  1. assume we live in a world in which all things can be observed, at least insofar as they affect other things. when i say “can be”, i mean that the possibility exists, not that we will ever achieve it. if they affect nothing (tachyon-style) we can assume they don’t exist. let this be the definition of our physical world.

  2. by definition, there can be no magic, no non-physical world. if it exists in the physical world, it is physical. it has observable properties or effects. these eventually reduce to something known to be physical, or else we don’t know they exist.

in simpler terms, as soon as something magical happens, it becomes part of science and ceases to be magical. if i were to shoot a fireball from my finger tips, the fact that it happened in our physical world implies some cause. we now take this cause as physical, for we can observe its effects.

as Aspidistra said this does not leave out the possibility of such things as the soul or a god. it only says that by our definition of our physical world, they can be reduced to something physical.

since this is a philosophical debate, we need not consider such things as whether or not modern science can determine the physical nature of the soul. leave that to the debate of means.

lastly, descartes himself had a great deal of trouble with the problem he created. he went to great lengths to show that the energy the mind added eventually evened out, so that the law of conservation was preserved. his only error was to use a scalar quantity, and what canceled out the added energy was actually moving in the opposite direction, continuing to give that energy to the physical world.

i hope this helps.

-d^3