The contradiction of that definition is:
A unicorn is not a blender with variable speed adjustments.
Exactly. That is what I suspected. Thank you. (silly, I know)
No problem.
Let me see if I can make my understanding of the limitation of monism clearer. For suppose that physicalism were true, and further suppose that we can understand what a person is thinking after some period of study with them exclusively, by only measuring their brain states over time.
We hook him up, sit him down, and say, “I want you to think of constructing a regular heptagon with only a compass and straight edge.” Now, clearly he is thinking about something. If he understands English, and our machine works as hypothesized, a person monitoring only his brain states will write down, “Subject has just conceived of constructing a regular heptagon using only a compass and straightedge.” But constructing a regular heptagon with a compass and straightedge is not possible, so he must have been thinking of something else. Then where could this sentence come from? Does it not mean what we think it means?
For to say otherwise is to say that the sentence “I am thinking of constructing a regular heptagon with only a compass and straight edge” doesn’t mean that we are thinking of constructing a regular heptagon with only a compass and a straight edge (because that’s provably impossible to construct), it in fact means something else. But this means that our lab technician would not say, “Subject is thinking of constructing [etc]” but instead says, “Subject is [thinking about something that is possible].” But then whence the interpretation that one is thinking of this? (Especially the one who suggests it! —what is he suggesting, then, if not what he says?) Or alternatively, what physically prohibits us from theoretically conducting this experiment successfully (that is, what physically prevents this experiment from ever happening)?
I don’t want to assume dualism. But I don’t see how physicalism explains the manifestation of thinking about a paradox.
I still agree with Vilayanur S. Ramachandran MD, PhD. — if science has found evidence of a correlation between spiritual experience and limbic activity, then the conclusion can go either way: (1) that limbic system causes the spiritual experience (physicalism), or (2) that the spiritual experience causes limbic activity (dualism).
Erislover:
Well, if the existence of an entity has any effect upon the universe, we can make a list of the differences between its existence and non-existence, and then incorporate this list into a definition. The only way it would be impossible to define an entity, then, is if it has no effect on the universe, and if it has no effect on the universe we don’t have too much of a reason to care about it.
I guess yet again it is possible to just work the concept of definitions out of the process, and say that if something has no effect on the universe, we can assume that it doesn’t exist, and if it does then it doesn’t involve dualism. (Actually, this is pretty much where we were about a page back, except without the neccesity of observation.)
As to your counterexample with the heptagon: It is impossible to answer that definitively with the state of science as it is, but it is possible to speculate, and to show that there is a possible solution. In this case, I think your machine wouldn’t be able to work that way, because the idea of “thinking” is somewhat nebulous. I would posit that it involves at least two (probably many more) seperate processes. The first is kind of just putting things together, like visualizing a heptagon, a compass, a straightedge, and yourself at a desk with a pencil and paper. The second process is the one that actually knows how to do things like that, step by step, and of course this abilty varies between person to person. Your average Joe doesn’t know this process, and probably just assumes there is such a process and leaves it at that; and a mathemetician who knows that there is no such process just gives you a funny look.
In fact, the idea of “process” is another concept that is probably visualized in the first mode of thought. How an idea such as “process” is encoded into matter is another question, but there are people being paid to find the answer to that. The burden of proof from this line of reasoning is very high, since you have not only note that science doesn’t have an explanation, but also prove that science will never be able to come up with one - i.e. that there is a contradiction involved. I don’t think this line of argument meets that.
Liberatarian: That is an assertion. I am asserting that option number two isn’t in fact an option, and I have spent this thread trying to prove it. You’re going to have to likewise provide some evidence for your position if you think otherwise.
The contradiction is: we have a statement that mentions something that is ontologically/behaviorally impossible (not just non-existent, like a unicorn, where a map of ‘unicorn’ to ‘cerebral representation of unicorn’ is not problematic). Thus there can be no representation of it (else it would be possible). But then what am I thinking of? I’m saying the stimulus meaning of the command, “I want you to think of [something impossible]” should physically represent what it is incapable of physically representing (an impossibility) or it should represent something else entirely that we mistakenly interpret for an impossibility (something that is actually possible, like sitting at a desk drawing something almost like a regular heptagon, that we instead name ‘impossible’; but then the question comes, how can we distinguish that this is unambiguously the impossible case? re: next paragraph).
That is, quite simply: “But doing that is impossible”; “Doing what?” i.e.- what are you thinking of, that’s the question!
The same line of thought could go for a paradox like, “I am lying”, or trying to evaluate the set of all sets that don’t contain themselves.
i think you’re making a “category error” of sorts there erislover. it seems to me that the problematic idea is never actually conceived.
the fact that we can give a name to something impossible, say, falling to the ground but missing it, does not mean that we can actually conceive it. try to imagine yourself doing it, or witnessing someone do it; describe what it is like. if the person in your original exmaple actually did conceive of drawing said heptagon, the machine wouldn’t know what to do because it would have learned how to do something that was impossible. not only that, but a clever enough person (and presumably one who could conceive of such a task would be pretty clever) would be able to translate that conception into reality, i.e. draw the heptagon.
the fact remains they can’t, because they can’t actually conceive a solution. we, if we do not know better, could presume that there might be a solution to x^n + y^n = z^n for n>2, and we might even spend some time trying to find it. the fact that a proof exists for its impossibility is not known to us. but try as we might, though we can postulate its possibility, we can’t translate it into reality.
so, in fact, the problematic idea is never actually thought. the necessary step that creates the problem cannot be done, because it is impossible. we can represent it symbolically, like B & ~B, but we can’t imagine what it would be like in reality.
as far as russell’s or the liar’s paradox, they are more like tricks of logic that show certain things we thought were certainly valid (the axiomatic approach to arithmetic, set theory) may not be. they are not themselves impossible conceptions.
and Lib, if i may offer a reinterpretation of mr. ramachandran’s saying…the mind causing the body does not represent dualism, necessarily. it represents a monism where the mind and body are causally related in a way a physicalist might be unaccustomed to. they do not need to exist in separate realities.
-d-squared
What problematic idea?
for example.
as to your question about what makes such an experiment impossible, i think what makes it impossible is that if such a machine were actually predicting our subject’s thoughts, it would not conclude that the subject was thinking about constructing the heptagon. how we would translate its output (whatever the person was thinking) is a different problem altogether.
-d-cubed
But you just said I cannot have that idea (i.e.- there is no problem).
Also, the machine is reporting our subject’s thoughts, much like his own physical consciousness is via English (or whatever), by monitoring brain-states. I am sorry that wasn’t more clear. I was just saying that perhaps the machine needed to adjust to the individual person, much like a speech recognition program needs ‘training’.
so i said there is no problem. so there is no apparent paradox arising from the machine’s representation and the actual representation.
on reporting:
if by a brain-state, you mean a snapshot of everything that is going on in the brain at a given time, and by monitoring them, the machine is able to keep track of each change and how it relates causally to everything else, i believe that it would be an inherently difficult problem to translate the findings to an output coherent to a lab tech.
by that i mean, when you think, you don’t necessarily think in english. or in any other language. you are not, yourself, able to describe all your thoughts. or why you think them. your thought processes are not serial.
and when you think about the idea of drawing the regular heptagon with a compass and a straightedge, you don’t actually produce a brain-state in which the problem is solved. that’s why i called it a “category error”, because representing the problem and representing the solution are not the same thing. so a machine, if it could continuously monitor all the brain-states and their changes, would not presume that you did produce such a state and a solution.
-d-cubed
David wrote:
Evidence for WHAT position?
That a negated tautology is a contradiction?
[ul][li]From this site, if A is a tautology, then ~A is a contradiction.[/ul]That Ramachandran said we could interpret limbic system experiments either way?[/li]
[ul]From Amazon, Phantoms in the Brain: Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind by V. S. Ramachandran. See the chapter titled “God and the Limbic System”.[/ul]
Well I wasn’t suggesting, hey, let’s go build one. I am only suggesting that such a machine must be possible under physicalism since we are that machine, and in fact, we are more advanced than this machine. It doesn’t need, necessarily, to change all my thoughts into English. It needs to answer the question, “What are you thinking?” with, “I’m thinking of [something impossible]”.
ok…so what are you thinking?
Liberatarian:
The position that “the spiritual experience causes limbic activity (dualism)” is a possible way to interpret physical evidence.
Also, maybe I wasn’t clear above. When I said I was trying to link the concepts of definition and negation, I wasnt talking about the difference between A=A and ~(A=A), where A is a spiritual entity or whatever, but rather the difference between the existence and non-existence of A in this universe. (If you like, the difference between B and ~B when B says “A exists”.)
I’m thinking that since contradictions can’t manifest themselves, then we can never think of contradictions under physicalism unless contradictions can manifest themselves (otherwise the term doesn’t mean what we think it means, which is contradictory!).
Can you tell me what I would be thinking of (as a hypothesis that some super-advanced culture could test) when I think of something impossible or when I think of a contradiction? Or where else am I going wrong here?
David wrote:
I linked you to Dr. Ramachandran’s book. You’ll have to read it for yourself. An entire chapter is devoted to the argument and evidence. The book is a good read anyway if you’re interested in fascinating neurological experiments like ghost feelings in severed limbs, subjective perceptions of color, and such.
Well, if B is “A exists”, then ~B is “A does not exist”.
But definition and negation are already linked. The negation of a definition is a contradiction. The negation of a contradiction is a definition. (Definition may also be read as “tautology”.)
what i tried to say before is that you never actually think something impossible. that is, frankly, impossible. you can represent the impossible problem, to be sure, by saying “A & ~A”, simple enough. but you do not actually think “A & ~A”. similarly, a computer can print “A & ~A”, even though it could not “think” A & ~A.
as a reinforcement of that, i said you could say to someone “draw a regular heptagon with nothing but a compass and a straightedge”, and they would presumably think “ok, i’m going to do this. how?” up to here, everything is theoretically possible for computers as well as humans. that how question is what would be answered if the impossible thought was actually represented, and then the person would be able to draw the heptagon. and a computer could say “here’s a regular heptagon, i drew it with nothing but a compass and a straightedge.” but we both know that that’s impossible. it doesn’t prevent the problem from being represented, though.
and is that ALL you were thinking? i have a feeling it isn’t.
-d^2
LOL, Ramanujan, I’m enjoying this, but I fear one of us isn’t making the point clear. I don’t know if that’s me or not, because I’m still not sure I have a point.
Presumably, everything that is a concept has a physical representation as either a particular arrangement of physical objects (and the forces between them), or as a sequence of causal events comprised of physical objects (and the forces between them). Now, yes, we can write down A&~A. And we can say, “This represents a contradiction.” But this represents a contradiction to us, and in us must (under physicalism) be a representation of the concept of contradiction that consists of [physical objects etc as above].
Do we agree so far?