Hey, Scott! 
It sounds less dualist and more idealist with a division (arbitrary?) between mediate and mediated existence with respect to my consciousness. Which doesn’t quite address the issue of whether my consciousness is or is not physical (from the OP: “the physical world includes everything that follows the laws of physics”). It almost, to me, seems to re-emphasize the question. What am I missing here?
i am in complete agreement here. i will use the term “reality” here, as the term “physical” is clearly misleading. there is only one reality, whether it is all knowable or not. this is so trivially, by definition.
**
this seems to disagree with the previous point. again, i think the distinction is a semantic one, and the word “physical” is not the best way to describe the view of anti-dualism. there is clearly only one reality, if it is all emcompassing, whether it obeys the laws of physics or not.
the term “laws” is also something of a misnomer, since the endeavour to describe our world is always one open to being appended.
it doesn’t really seem like there’s much left to argue about, if we consider it so abstractly, and we all use words upon whose meaning we agree. everything sort of just follows…
-d-squared
Hey y’self, Erislover dude!
—“It sounds less dualist and more idealist with a division (arbitrary?) between mediate and mediated existence with respect to my consciousness. Which doesn’t quite address the issue of whether my consciousness is or is not physical (from the OP: “the physical world includes everything that follows the laws of physics”). It almost, to me, seems to re-emphasize the question.” —
I’m saying you have to begin by deciding what you’re going to mean when you use the word “physical.” Because this term has more ambiguity than most people realize. Until this decision is made, one is not in position to say “whether my consciousness is or is not physical.”
Mmmm, I’m not so sure, after all, that the OP has adopted a clear definition. “An entity that obeys the laws of physics” (Russell’s definition, BTW) can be tortured into harmony with EITHER of my cited defs; particularly in light of the apparent fact (the SDMB “science guy” might want to make a comment) that there is a nonzero probability IN PHYSICS that a ball will pass right through a bat. The probability is low enough that one probably shouldn’t wait for it…
I am not pointing to a distinction between mediated and unmediated contact between consciousness and its objects. There is nothing in my mind that seems to fit “unmediated contact” as an example thereof; I’m not sure what the phrase means, or even what it COULD mean, in the context of a certain I-Myself knowing a certain “something.” I do not experience the working of my optic nerve; I experience a SIGHT. The existence of an optic nerve is an inference, with regard to which: (a) the inference arises from a set of actual experiences [ie, “knowings”] which we regard as the evidence for it; (b) the process of inference is either learned (another set of experiences juxtaposed with the evidence) or the truth of the inference is “just seen to be true” (an experience); © the resulting inference is itself a thing-known, a mental experience. Nowhere, no how, do you get beyond instances of actual mental experience; to insist that in some cases a “mechanism” is involved in their deliverence seems to me to go beyond the facts. In the context of this thread, it seems question-begging to boot.
So.
I am saying that the Monist, IF he insists on defining “physical” in such a way that “physical” entities cannot affect, or be affected by, that are not “physical,” is vulnerable to two criticisms. One the one hand, he has won a meaningless victory by defining himself into it–like pasionately defending the “scientific law” that a yard has three feet. If absolutely nothing is allowed to count as nonphysical, then, obviously, everything is physical and dualism is false. Likewise, if “blue” comes to mean “color,” then everything visible is blue.
The second criticism is the one is set forth in more detail. We have no evidence whatever of the existence of physical entities so defined–unless we cheat by simply starting off asserting that mental experience “is” a physical entity; which is of course the very question at hand.
Therefore I conclude:
(a) if monism is true, an immaterialist/idealist/nonphysical monism is the only form of monism that can be justified in logic.
(b) those who don’t care for such monism might like to reexamine their assumptions–specifically, the assumption that “to be physical” incorporates “to interact ONLY with what is physical.”
For reasons that go beyond the scope of this thread, I find nonphysical monism untenable; thus I count myself a dualist.
I’ve been thinking about the structure of my proof, and I realized that I should probably be focusing on the dichotomy between logical and non-logical classes of entity (or whatever you want to call them), instead of physical and non-physical. Since the idea of negation is a logical concept, and therefore meaningless without logic, then to speak of a difference between the existence and non-existence of the non-logical (as well as any difference between the logical and non-logical) is meaningless. My previous proof, that physical events can have only physical causes, is a collary of this, since causation is also a logical concept and meaningless without logic. There also might be other ramifications of the coexistence of logical and non-logical realities within one universe; I haven’t thought out the full consequences of this.
I’ll respond to both of Scott’s criticisms in light of this. First off, it is true that my definition of physical is very broad. Not only does it include things that we know can happen, such as a bat hitting a ball, but things that logically could happen, but scientifically we’ve never observed happening, such as the ball going through the bat. It is, in fact, broad enough to include pretty much everything imaginable…except for ideas such as consciousness and free will. If you try to define either of these, and define the terms used in the definition, ad infinitum, you will eventually end up using a concept in its own definition – circular reasoning. The example I gave before is that is the definition of consciousness requires a concept of experience, and the definition of experience also requires experience. It is (somewhat) possible to avoid this by defining them in terms of things that are already logically defined - i.e. physical things – but these are not the standard definitions.
I don’t have any problem with your second criticism (since it isn’t the existence of the physical, but the non-existence of dualism that I’m trying to prove), but I do have some problems with the conclusions drawn from it. First off, saying in (a) that I can’t prove the existence of the physical doesn’t mean anything unless you can simultaneously prove the existence of the non-physical. I would point out that if you tried to prove that, you would have to start out asserting that a mental experience is a non-physical event – the same thing you criticized my doing before. Both propositions are therefore on equal footing, so saying that one is illogical because it can’t be proven is incorrect. And then secondly, if you think that idealism is untenable, and you try to use the fact that it is to prove monism, the reasons that you think that are certainly within the scope of this thread. But of course, you only need one logical flaw to invalidate an argument, so in this case your reasons don’t really matter.
Personally, I’ve always been fond of the “levels of existence” model.
The traditional example is Shakespeare’s Hamlet. I can type Hamlet into a computer and store it as a series of electronic states (1’s and 0’s). If I change all of the 1’s to 0’s, I still have Hamlet. If I print out a symbolic representation of these electronic states (say, as repeated 1’s and 0’s), I still have Hamlet, although the physical structure of what I’m referring to as Hamlet has changed dramatically.
Information cannot exist without some “physical” form, but the precise nature of that form is arbitrary. Hamlet is information, not the physical substance used to represent that information.
(Now for the crazy metaphysics…) We could consider reality to consist of many different layers. Each layer consists of a different category of reality, which is dependent on the layer below it. From any given layer, the layers below it seem to be “genuinely” real, while those above it seem “unreal”.
Well, we know it is mental already. The proof of that is in the conversation itself, in the concepts we use to understand it. This is, in fact, probably the classic development of dualism: the immediate conscious understanding of things. I can’t prove my consciousness is like the physical. But I can’t prove the physical is. These are different kinds of statements though, and in fact the demonstration or refutaiton of one does not imply the truth or falsity of another. Given that my consciousness is like these things I call physical does not imply that anything is physical (well, it would if you were me as I find physicalism and idealism to be the same thing). Given that I prove these things are physical does not imply my thoughts are, too. They are independent statements as far as I understand them.
Does everyone realize that the demons of Socrates, Descartes, and Maxwell have leagued together on the SDMB? How else to explain the fact that in one’s posts (mine, at least) key terms are sometimes mysteriously omitted, or their opposites substituted?
Though no one caught it, in my previous post “There is nothing in my mind that seems to fit ‘unmediated contact’ as an example thereof”–I meant to say MEDIATED contact.
Also, David GOF–rereading what I posted (maybe I should do it more often), I think I came across as a little magisterial and even a tad sarcastic. Didn’t mean to. And when I talk of what I regard as the faults of the monist, I am not necessarily referring to your own postings.
Let’s see…logical vs. non-logical, negation as a logical concept. Students of formal logic have apparently defined various kinds of logic, and perhaps they have somehow opened the door to the notion of a null case, a “non-logic.” I’m not acquainted with that stuff. (Note to demons: please don’t delete the “not”!)
In my philosophical outlook, David, there is a basic logical “frame” (to use a term of the physicists) that is absolutely necessary and universal. I don’t mean you’re a bad bad boy if you deviate from it; I mean neither you nor any other conscious person, be it angel or alien, CAN POSSIBLY go beyond it. This logical frame consists of a very small number of axioms. I tend to formulate them as two. Depending upon how one phrases them, they might be extended to three, or somehow compressed into one. The big two are traditionally put in something like this form:
(1) a thing is itself, never other than itself.
(2) an assertion evaluates to “true” or to “false,” but never to both.
These have been called the “laws of thought.” A suggested third one, to the effect that there is no third alternative to “true” and “false,” is controversial.
If someone were to posit a part of reality to which 1 and 2 did not apply–and thus “non-logical” in the most radical of senses–I literally would be unable to understand the meaning of the posit. To grasp a meaning is to grasp a concept, and I find no concept described by the verbal negation of 1 and 2 (either, or both). To me, it’s like try to find meaning in “the nonsquare square” or “the invisible visible.”
So I can’t regard dualism as, somehow, the adoption of a reality that is partly logical and partly non-logical. And logic must incorporate negation: it is the mutual negation of meanings that renders “nonsquare square” a pair of notions that can never be attached to the same entity.
Now of course you basically agree with me, David, in that you are using something like this argument in your assault on dualism. But it only works if you define the nonphysical as the nonlogical. But to define something is to assign it a meaning; I deny that “non-logical” (ie, those words) denotes a meaning.
I think your original impulse was quite correct, as far as your NOTIONAL definition of “physical.” I just wanted us to get clear on why you started with the assertion that the physical could not be affected by the nonphysical–was it so “by definition,” or by weight of evidence?
ErisLover’s comments are pretty much what I would say as to your further points. Remember, the kind of “physical” that I regard as unproven and (probably) unprovable is the kind that falls under the ultra-strict definition, the one which builds-in the stipulation that the physical can only affect the physical. If by “physical” you mean what most people mean–eg, “something like this keyboard,” “something like this chair”–then no proving is required. We know that there is something like this keyboard, namely the very mental experience that exemplifies “this keyboard.” You don’t have to prove that “a thing is itself”.
I regard nonphysical monism as untenable in that it erases by fiat the distinction ordinary people are trying to make between “made-up and abstract stuff” and “stuff like this keyboard here.” One would just have to reintroduce that distinction at the next step, but under new names. I don’t find that useful. Thanks for asking.
Hey, me too! When I first encountered idealism my thought was, “Ha! No necessity of the physical.” My second was, “Then what seperates imagination from fact?” I abandoned it right there. The rest seems semantics.
Kinz wrote, “if dualism can be convincingly maintained …”
Do you mean maintained by faith based on credulity, or
do you see any evidence that would stand the test of
inquiry on an objective basis?
Scott: Apology accepted. Likewise, I think my last comment in my last post came off as more offensive then I meant it too.
Yes, but I still think that consciousness is an illogical entity. Every logical concept (besides everything and nothing) has things that describe it and things that don’t. These things can be enumerated in a definition of this concept - that’s what a definition does. Therefore, if we can’t define define something, this means it is illogical.
And yes, illogical does mean incomprehensible. I don’t think anyone really comprehends what the concept of consiousness means. In the past it has been possible to sweep the fact of its non-comprehensibility under the carpet with religion; With science it is becoming harder to do so.
But again, this is using a dualistic entity in defense of dualism. By assuming a separation in reality between imagination and fact, you have assumed what you are trying to prove.
FTR, I do believe in the separation between imagination and fact, I just think that the two realities are so far away as to be considered separate universes. There is no empirical evidence (in physicalism) to suggest that “made-up abstract stuff” exist, but I like to think that they do anyway.
I am going out of town for Thansgiving, so I won’t be able to post again until Monday.
David GOF: "Yes, but I still think that consciousness is an illogical entity. Every logical concept (besides everything and nothing) has things that describe it and things that don’t. These things can be enumerated in a definition of this concept - that’s what a definition does. Therefore, if we can’t define define something, this means it is illogical. "
-
But are you DEFINING “logical concept” to include that it possesses “things that describe it and things that don’t” which can be “enumerated in a definition”? Or are you saying that this is the ONLY sense in which “logical concept” is ever used?–an observation, not a definition. Obviously you and I can define our terms in such a way that the conclusions are generated directly by the definitions–but “victory by (arbitrary) definition” brings no honor to either of us.
-
Or might it be that you are distinguishing between two possible KINDS of concept, the Logical (can always be analyzed into its parts, so to speak, and is thus to be identified) vs. the Illogical (has some other mode of identity)? This comports with “illogical does mean incomprehensible”–which would be conclusive if I knew you meant the incomprehensibility to be both necessary AND sufficient.
-
Or might it be that the distinction is between “logical concept” and some other kind of mental meaning-backer that is NOT a concept–a “notion,” a “mere thought”, etc.
What does the average person mean by “a logical concept?” I don’t know. Perhaps something like “a concept functioning as the logically consistent conclusion of a process of reasoning.” But we don’t in fact reason our way to grasping what redness looks like, or what middle b-flat on a piano sounds like. Yet isn’t it correct for someone to say, “Sure, I can conceive of redness”? (Is what we mean by “redness” then an example of what you mean by an illogical concept?)
It’s true enough that many many specific things one names as examples of concepts are so strongly associated with other, apparently simpler concepts that we “feel” that the latter are actual PARTS of the former–as the smile is one part of the Mona Lisa. …But if you agree with that sentence of mine just preceding, I assume you accept the word “simpler,” implying that there are degrees of “simplicity.” Doesn’t the chain of analysis always end in what are sometimes called “simple knowables”–true singulars? If so, the concept of any one of them is an example of a concept that cannot be “defined” by breaking it down into smaller parts, as ex hypothesi it has no smaller parts–it is “just itself.”
Do such knowable singulars not exist? Are they not the ultimate basis of all the definitionally-analyzable concepts that you referred to? Doesn’t that mean that “logical concepts” are in all cases composed of entities that are NOT logical concepts?
Just asking for your clarification.
Scott Dickerson, in defining concept, there are the first steps of
isolating the properties or characterists that will construct the abstraction we are creating, and then generalizing the concept to all objects or situations that measure up to the abstraction.
Let’s try the concept chair: Each chair has a seat, a back, and some type of leg(s) and is intended for one person to sit on.
We have astracted the minimum number of characteristics or properties that will identify all chairs.
We generalize this concept to include chairs of all kinds beyond the simple description: rockers, folding, kitchen, dinning room,
front room, yard or patio, etc. etc. etc.
The value of a concept is that it allows us to group classes of similar things under one name, instead of requiring that each item have a particular or personal name.
I think the concept itself can be quite clear and specific in the properties that constitute it. The variance from item to item, or subject to subject, is expected unless all things in the class
described by the concept were to be identical. We have such instances, as in molecules of a particular isotope. In such a case,
one copper atom would be identical to any other copper atoms.
That surely would not be true in comparing two or more people,
or dogs, or houses, etc.
A concept need not represent something that is real. I have yet
to see a unicorn, or a push-me-pull-you, however, I would recognize one instantly should they appear.
This is how I use the term “concept”. Hope that is useful for you.
Concepts can be enclosed inside of another, as all fruit are included in the larger concept of vegetable. Fruit are the seed bearing part of a plant, and separate from root, leaves or stem.
We classify species, genus, family, order, class, phylum and
Kingdom from the smallest and particular concrete example of a living organism to a series of abstractions that beyond kingdom or domaine include all living things, etc. etc. etc.
We create hierarchies of concepts, and provide structure for our abstract thought. Abm9
I’m beginning to see a pattern here. I define a concept to use in my argument, and you question its relevence, and then I abandon that concept and retain only the part of the concept that was relevent in the first place. The idea of logical vs. illogical concepts is really just a middleman between the two things I’m really trying to link - definition and negation - so there isn’t any real need to spend time on that.
Basically, I’m not saying that an undefinable entity can’t exist; but rather that if it did exist it would be identical to its non-existence. To get the opposite of a defined concept, you have to take everything in your list of things that it is and put a “not” in front of it, and then take everything in your list of things that it isn’t and take out the “not”. Without such a list, though, or with a list with zero items, no such process can take place, and it effectively remains the same.
(And that makes sense in context too, when you think about the negation of red or the Mona Lisa.)
David wrote:
A definition is a tautology; negated, it would be a contradiction.
Oh, I don’t know, lib… ~A=~A?
David
I think there are more views on existence than this. The existence of non-existence is rather paradoxical. But it would make a nice proof by contradiction. Would you care to flesh it out a little more?
The tautology is A=A. The contradiction is ~(A=A).
Can you explain to me how that is contradictory using a definition?
You’ll have to clear up your amphiboly first. Is “using” a gerund?
That is, define something, then negate it in that manner.
eg
A unicorn is a blender with variable speed adjustments. (Def’n.)