A tank designer who fetishizes main gun autoloaders and cripples the safety of ammunition storage in order to accomplish it.
The diagram towards the bottom of that page shows the arrangement of ammunition and propellant in a T-72, which is also the same in a T-90 and almost the same in a T-80. It’s an unprotected carousel that goes all the way around the turret ring to feed the autoloader and (because of its size and distribution) can’t incorporate blow-out panels to vent ammunition fires. So if the tank is buttoned up, the turret pops into the air like a cork out of a champaign bottle (except no one inside is celebrating any more).
This is the diagram I mean, since Forbes is just copying a Wikipedia diagram. It’s an SVG, though, so it won’t preview here.
a couple of days ago I saw a video with a tank turret inside an apartment of the 5th floor … looks like if properly motivated, those can get quite kinetic
I’d be willing to bet it was some sort of Soviet-era doctrinal difference that emphasizes/emphasized smaller, shorter, and nimble tanks with fewer crewmen, over larger, more survivable tanks. It’s not the T-72 alone that has autoloaders and problems with jack-in-the-box effects when hit.
For example, the T-72 has a height of 7’ 4", and the T-90 has a height of 7’3". And the T-64 that the Ukrainians are using is 7’1" high as well. All of them are ex-Soviet basic designs (T-64 evolved into the T-80, T-72 evolved into the T-90).
Not only does the smaller crew mean that for every 12 crewmen, the Soviets/Russians can crew 4 tanks to NATO’s 3, it means that the turret is smaller and therefore can be more armored for the same weight. And since all of them will be sitting (loaders typically stand), it can be shorter as well.
But the price is survivability. We see them blowing up right and left and popping their turrets because the ammo is essentially within the crew compartment and if it’s hit, it blows up the crew and pops the turret.
Meanwhile Western tanks like the M1A2 (8 ft), Challenger 2 (8’ 2"), Leopard II (9.8’) and LeClerc (8.3’) are all at least half a foot taller than the T-72, and more like a foot taller than the T-64. And with the exception of the LeClerc, they all have four crewmen. They all have protected ammo storage that prevents ammo explosions. The cost is in money, extra crewmen and size.
The first time I saw it in real life, my first thought was " This is just like how tanks blow up in Sgt. Rock comic books." Even when Sgt. Rock would drop a hand grenade into a German tank, the turret would blow straight up in the air. It doesn’t always happen, but it is definitely common.
That’s exactly what this means. Could be some harrowing times coming up in the east if they get into some open field warfare with room for tank maneuvers. Tank wise, the Ukrainians are going to be outnumbered and have the same quality tanks as the Russians. The western anti-tank weapons could play a big role here.
Unfortunately, Russia also has a very good anti-tank weapon that has even been used somewhat successfully against both the US Abrams and the Israeli Merkava, two top of the line tanks. Open warfare in the east may well boil down to who has the most bodies they can throw in there.
Between captured and donate tanks, the UKR forces may outnumber the remaining Russian tanks in the theater.
Total tanks still favor Russia but getting them to Ukraine by depleting every other location [Russia is a big place] is a massive logistic problem - not a Russian strength.
Real news is scant from the eastern front. I saw yesterday reporting that Russia has taken several towns. Russians are adapting and using somewhat smarter tactics that rely on their superior firepower. Ukrainians just don’t (yet) have the firepower to match the Russians.
Wish the US would take some bolder risks, such as donating nearly every Javelin in its inventory to Ukraine instead of merely one-third. It’s unlikely the US would find itself in a situation in the near future where it would urgently need to destroy enemy armor but have no airpower with which to do so. It could give Ukraine most of its remaining 13,000 Javelins right now while spending, say, the years 2022-2027 slowly replenishing the stockpile.
I was aiming for absurd. Russia is the largest single inhabited patch of dirt on the globe by a wide margin. Ukraine would make them maybe 3% larger. Real estate is quite definitely not something they need more of (except for that location3 thing).
Assuming this war is going to last at least another several months, I’d suggest going bolder than that. Set up a training area in Germany or Poland and train some Ukrainian soldiers in operating the M1A2 Abrams tanks and A10 Warthog bombers, and then send them a whole bunch of those.
ETA. And some F/A-18 Hornets to protect the Warthogs.
If Putin bombs Germany or Poland, it’s be game over for him. Forget about training Ukrainians to operate those weapons. Just send in Americans and it’ll be over within a week.
I don’t understand this criticism. I mean it was publicly announced they were sending these armored cars. Why wouldn’t they train Ukrainians in their use? How is that any more egregious?
I’m just pointing out a distinct disadvantage of dedicated training infrastructure. And there are at least two forks to this path to consider, but not simultaneous:
The question of whether NATO, in whole or amongst constituent members, really has the resolve to become directly involved in Ukraine or Russia.
Whatever the answer to that question may actually be, the question of whether Putin will be sufficiently convinced that NATO would escalate in turn so as to be deterred himself.
At this point, we are actually dealing with question number 2, and specifically need to consider what actions might cause Putin to think he can attack NATO in any fashion without inviting a full-on war with NATO. I say the chance of him thinking he can get away with that is increased if he is presented with discrete targets he can bomb in Europe that all sides will recognize as existing to support Ukraine’s war effort.
The goal at this point is, I think, to support Ukraine to the extent necessary for it to maintain its sovereignty against Russia, but it so far as to provoke Putin into attacking NATO, whether due to miscalculation or (as it may turn out) he correctly deduces NATO really doesn’t want a war with Russia over Ukraine right now.
ETA: I’ll just sum it up like this. The more overt war-fighting support for Ukraine becomes, the easier it is for Putin to sell attacking NATO, not just to his own people (whom he can lie to anyway), but to opposition groups in the west, potentially driving a wedge both between more or less-committed NATO states, and into internal political factions within member nations. The more discrete and open these avenues for support are (eg: explicitly announcing training is occurring in the UK, or even setting up training facilities in Poland, for example) the easier it is for Putin to launch just such a wedge-inducing attack while limiting the extent of the damage to discrete areas (which strengthens the anti-intervention groups he will want to mobilize to his effective support, in opposition to the push for NATO to intervene).