How would they get to them?
Not our problem.
They are focusing on people already with military service. So less training required depending on the mix they tap into. No idea what percentage that might end up being, but should be quite high. They are hoping to use these people behind immediate front lines. So again, can get by with less higher level immediate upgrade in training.
There is a very odd mix of front line personnel right now. Actually a bit thin in Russian regular forces in a lot of areas. A lot of Donbas forces which are a bit irregular in a lot of ways. If a good force of behind front line support personnel can be set up. Russian forces may be able to more freely choose the best of what they have from regular and Donbas forces to concentrate on the front line. As well as Chechen, Wagner.
More personnel, like more material, increases your options.
But also very much increases your supply pressures.
A big one is food. Barracks, with all the associated supplies and energy. Vulnerability of the added forces to attack in maybe larger barracks.
Just because you add raw quantity to a thing, does not mean you add quality. Russia has had some advantage in quantity of a lot of material, arms. But has seemed to avoid personnel loss as much as possible. Will they now accept more personnel loss as just a percentage staying the same, of an increased number of overall personnel?
Russian efficiency at its finest.
I don’t think those would be motivated troops. But maybe there is a legal loop that gets them a worse spanking after they are legally troops.
No idea if this is true, or just fun fiction. But hopefully it is just a slap and they will be released.
6 months ago I would have said just fiction
I suspect the fear of summary execution is a pretty good motivator in the short term.
There have been new laws added since the war that are harsher for any protest and speech.
Unfortunately this isn’t just happening in Russia, where it is more expected. All over the world, freedom of speech and lawful, peaceful, protest that goes against the government mandates is being more harshly treated. Social media is a minefield for free speech as well.
I actually tried to start a poll on this site, as to how comfortable people are, expressing their real free speech in various forums. But have not figured it out yet.
There’s nuclear war, and there’s nuclear war.
Putin’s “escalate to deescalate” doctrine holds that a nuclear device should be used as a “warning”* to defend Russia when its existence as a state is threatened, and that those attacking Russia will back off when this happens and move to negotiations.
In this scenario, keeping the pressure on while differentiating Putin from the Russian state could encourage other power centers to move against his regime for reasons of simple self-preservation.
Turning it into an on-the-ground invasion of Russian soil itself - the Great Patriotic War 2.0 scenario - strengthens the Putin regime in the eyes of the people. We don’t want that. We want Russians of all stripes to stare into the abyss and be disgusted with Putin’s brinksmanship and adventurism so that they do in his regime themselves. Another outcome would mean that nuclear war could well turn into nuclear war, and no one can afford that.
* Note that the Russian concept of a “warning” here involves the use of a nuclear weapon against a tactical or strategic target. It should not be confused with the idea of a “warning” detonation in an area where damage and casualties would be light - this would be an actual strike against a major troop assemblage or logistics node.

I agree with iiandyiiii’s suggestion: a nuke should be met with a full NATO conventional intervention in Ukraine, but no further.
We had a thread on “What to do if the nukes start flying” a few months ago. I still stand by my plan:
To get back to the real topic, my response would be to try to attack Russia both directly and indirectly, while trying to avoid a full scale nuclear war. To that end, I quite publicly state that, although the nuking of Kyiv provides the moral justification for full scale nuclear war, I am magnanimously refraining (at least for now…) from turning Russia into a giant hole in the ground. Everything that follows is done at the same time as the most massive propaganda effort ever made to get informa…
And yet they hand them guns to walk around with. What could go wrong?

If a good force of behind front line support personnel can be set up. Russian forces may be able to more freely choose the best of what they have from regular and Donbas forces to concentrate on the front line.
The problems with this plan are at least two-fold:
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The “best” forces you want to hold the front line while you use the new, lesser trained forces to hold the rear areas, are the same ones who have already been fighting for 6 or 7 months. They’re worn out, that’s the whole reason they need the new troops.
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These “best” forces are also the ones who couldn’t successfully invade Ukraine in the first place, even with the advantage of surprise. Why would anyone think they could do much more, now that Ukraine knows exactly what’s going on, and has been massively upgraded in capabilities by all the support from NATO?
300,000 new Russian troops will just be 300,000 new corpses.
They may not be armed until they get to the front. At that point, they’re hundreds of km away from home, surrounded by other soldiers who resent the rookies, and generally no real threat to anyone back in Russia.
Maybe they mutiny, but armed forces in the field are pretty vigilant about stamping those out as quickly as possible. Maybe they desert, which makes them no different then their predecessors… and the blocking detachments are waiting to intercept some of those.
Maybe they hunker down and try not to get killed.
Or maybe, they don’t get sent to Ukraine, rather are sent to some god forsaken base in the Russian < insert region here >and reliving troops who in fact are sent there.

More like… doves take flight.
I agree with your main point, but do need to mention that doves are NOT birds of peace.
Front line forces have been rotated out already. They are very recently coming back into action. That might explain how badly Russia got nailed lately. Likely thinned out and a lot of lesser forces trying to hold lines. A bit too self assured I would say. Under estimated ability of Ukraine forces to take advantage of that.
Second point… almost three whole Oblasts under control. But definitely could have been done better, faster. This is being conducted in unusual ways.

Putin’s “escalate to deescalate” doctrine holds that a nuclear device should be used as a “warning”* to defend Russia when its existence as a state is threatened, and that those attacking Russia will back off when this happens and move to negotiations.
Cf. my earlier comments about paying Danegeld.
Both sides are not the same. Nice try though.
I never said the doctrine was correct, just what it assumes. And I do not advocate caving to Putin.
But if Putin decides to try it, the best way for us all to come out of it involves getting the narod (people, nation) of Russia to understand that this is Putin’s war and not Russia’s, and the best way to end it is for them to remove Putin, forcibly if need be, from the levers of power. We need to do things that maximize the probability of that outcome.
The worst way for us all to come out of it involves the Dead Hand system. If the Russians see this as an attack on the nation of Russia, the more likely that no one’s gonna stop Putin when he pulls the trigger on it.
Where are these supposed fresh, well trained, and experienced Russian soldiers who have not yet been sent to Ukraine?