Huh, I had just assumed that Russia was still firing missiles and drones from Belarus into Ukraine. Googling, the last time I found mention of this happening was late July last year. I’m unsure how much of an issue Belarus allowing Wagner to attack Ukraine from its territory would really be; they already let the Russians invade from their territory at the start of the war after all. I can’t see an attack by Wagner from this direction being successful though regardless, Ukraine has had over a year to fortify against a repeat of an attack from this direction.
Especially Belarus. Popular support for the Belarusian military getting involved in the war amongst the population there is pretty much non-existent. Even if they did, any actual value they would add would be negligible at best, their army is both small and so much of a shitshow that it makes the Russians look like paragons of competence in comparison. Perun did a video on this (what hasn’t he made a video about on this war?)
At least part of their forces stayed at Rostov, and it’s unclear exactly how large of a force went towards Moscow. Even the figure of 25,000 members being in Wagner is open to debate. I think the 25,000 figure is what Wagner claims its size is, the Pentagon at one point estimated its strength to be ~50,000 of whom 40,000 were convict cannon fodder. They’re mostly gone now, and Wagner’s regular forces have taken substantial losses in the fighting, how well they’ve been able to replace their core of veteran mercenaries is another question without a clear answer that I know of. 25,000 could very well be an overstatement of their actual strength.
I think I read the truckin to Moscow force was maybe 6,000 to 8,000 men but that estimate was likely from Wagner so it actually might have been a lot less.
Or more. Who knows with this wacky adventure? I cant keep track of Wagner’s numbers at all.
They started out with A, the number of troops entering the theater. And then from that you have to subtract B, the captured, the dead and seriously disabled (ain’t coming back).
Then you add C, fresh troops coming in either as 1. New to Wagner, 2. Wagner veterans newly activated (from Africa or vacation at their dacha on the Black Sea, or playing video games at their grandma’s house) or 3, staight outta prison. Then there’s the sub-section D, the troops that actually rolled on Moscow.
I can’t keep track of all that but I think this “25,000” that’s being tossed around is not very accurate.
Interesting point then - bank accounts. Does Switzerland tolerate Wagner, or are all their accounts in Russia and/or less controlled places like Dubai? Wagner gets paid by assorted countries in Africa, somehow. Those men in Ukraine were likely paid via Moscow funds. (And the new law says they have to sign up with the Russian Army by July 1st or leave?)
I’m pretty sure that one group who will NOT be consulted on this is the Belarussian public. Until / unless they overthrow Lukashenko, their opinions simply don’t matter. Just as ordinary Russian’s opinions don’t much matter in Russia right now.
I don’t really see a way that Lukashenko or the Belarussian government or the Belarussian people gain from the rump Wagner and Prigo entering their terrain. This is true almost no matter what the Wagnerites (Wagnerians?) do once they get encamped there.
I also don’t directly see how Belarus hosting Russian-controlled nukes serves any of those 3 constituencies either.
The bottom line for me being that the entire Belarussian sideshow has been a mystery of mysterious motivations from Feb 2022 through to today. And will almost certainly be the same tomorrow.
One of the theories I’ve seen advanced with regards to the Russian nukes being place in Belarus is that it is Putin exerting his dominance over Lukashenko and putting him further in Russia’s back pocket since Belarus won’t get its military directly involved in the war. Lukashenko’s position in power is much more precarious than Putin’s, he faced mass protests after the charade of his last reelection, which were only put down with a large degree of violence and Russian backing:
Following the beginning of the 2020–2021 Belarusian protests, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko publicly requested assistance from Russia, saying, “Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and our native Ukraine, their leadership are ordering us to hold new elections. […] If we follow their lead, we will go into a tailspin […] we will perish as a people, as a state, as a nation.”[8] In response, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced he was willing to dispatch the Russian military to support Lukashenko, noting provisions within the 1995 agreements. These comments were condemned by Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, who called on Russia to allow for free elections in Belarus.[9] On 14 September 2020, following negotiations between the Belarusian and Russian governments, Russia’s troop presence in Belarus was expanded, with undisclosed units of the Russian military being sent to places of permanent deployment within Belarus as “reserves”.
As you note, the opinions of the Belarusian public don’t matter unless they overthrow Lukashenko, but Lukashenko is very likely terrified to get directly involved in the war with Ukraine because it could easily be the spark that ignites him being overthrown.
Consulted? No. But I think that the position that the opinions of the Belarusian public, or of “ordinary Russians” simply don’t matter is overstated. Public opinion does matter in dictatorial and autocratic societies. Why else do those leaders spend so much energy suppressing expression of dissent, and so much effort controlling what media can be heard?
It doesn’t matter in the same way it matters in more democratic countries, true. It does not require the support or affirmation of the majority. But it requires that the vast majority who do not support are instead apathetic, and that the numbers who are very upset stays below some critical mass. Things become unstable above that critical mass and things happen. At best for a regime those things are controlled by killing a few hundred protestors with some tanks on the streets, but sometimes leadership is replaced.
Putin’s appearance of weakness and his losing control of the narrative matters precisely because of this.
Lukashenko already needed some propping up once. I think he’d like to avoiding needing it to be repeated. Getting Belarusians killed fighting Putin’s war might not be enough to cause his defenestration, but it would make him concerned when he feels cross breezes! With no gain in return. Wagner forces using Belarus as a staging ground, like Russia already had done early in the war? He can feel fine breathing fresh air. And it is still enough to partly pay his debt to Putin.
Wagner forces going en masse to Belarus and staying off the field? I fear that is too much to hope for. And even just knowing they are massed there, with a training facility, is enough to make keeping more Ukrainian resources placed in the North a necessity.
Why? Wagner has had it’s most success propping up unpopular dictators. That’s what Lukashenko needs right now. As long as they get a steady paycheck, Wagner will be content with that role…unless Lukashenko does something stupid like try to send them back into Ukraine.
Satellite imagery of the reactivated base in Belarus where Wagner is supposed to be going shows tent space for ~8,000-9,000. It’s about 1:30 in on2:21 YouTube video.
Just their being there requires “strengthening” the north, even without any sign of imminent threat. That which is devoted to strengthening the north is less available for the counteroffensive in the south.
Don’t have an active NYT subscription at the moment, but Ukraine basically has had to keep forces held back around Kyiv anyway as defense against another attempt like they saw at the beginning of the war. I’d think it unlikely that at that level of force Wagner alone would move the needle much. For one thing they aren’t a regular army and need the support of one for a whole host of things in order to function as a viable offensive force. Belarus committing wholeheartedly to opening a second front with their limited military would be a slightly bigger danger, but that currently seems unlikely.
Not to dismiss the threat entirely, but at this particular point in time I doubt it amounts to much. Still, wars can go sideways remarkably quickly (just ask Putin), so I’m sure Ukraine isn’t sanguine about it.
Yeah, nothing in that article I would consider out of the ordinary. I doubt Ukraine is shifting meaningful forces intended from the counter-offensive to stiffen that border. Yet. Things might change in the future, but for now it looks more like a potential future threat to be monitored rather than active one that needs immediate countering.
The Kremlin has moved this week to take control of Wagner mercenary forces in other countries, including Syria and the Central African Republic, where they have formed the brutal spear point of Russian support for repressive governments, often while securing lucrative concessions in natural resources. Russian diplomats have rushed to assure their allies of continued Wagner backing.
So basically the Kremlin appears to have the wherewithal and control to grab the reins on the foreign Wagner manpower (or claim they do). I wonder what sort of resources and finances Prigozhyn has now that he’s persona non grata in both Russia and the West. Someone would have to pay to feed a whole lot of idle mercenaries. I don’t forsee fun times ahead for him.
Anyone in a position like he held would have ensured that there was a fast exit plan in place. Wagner as an organisation apparently have interests in all manner of shady enterprises. Especially related to their African exploits. Conflict metals come to mind. I would bet that there is a whole raft of intermediate layers avoiding scrutiny that eventually sheet home control to him.
If it all looks bad, I’m sure he can walk away to an assured life of luxury in a suitable exile. He will forever be looking over his shoulder. But that was always going to be true. There is no soft exit from his life.